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Abstract 
This study of the trade and investment relationship between Japan and China asks what 
drives it and whether the vagaries of their political relationship have affected these 
elements of their economic relationship. Tools are developed to account for the 
determinants of trade and investment flows and to measure resistances to trade and 
investment. This allows benchmarking and cross country comparisons of trade and 
investment performance. A world trade frontier and an FDI frontier are estimated using 
an approach that incorporates a consistent framework for isolating core determinants 
and resistances. The results suggest that the proximity of Japan and China, their 
complementary economic structures and the multilateral settings in which both are 
deeply integrated have been more powerful drivers of trade than the ups and downs of 
politics. While the economic relationship is not independent from the politics it has not 
been diminished or disturbed by politics to a significant extent. The analysis is 
complemented by examination of the electronics and automobile sectors, investigation 
of the dynamics of the link between politics and trade, and discussion of the role of the 
WTO. China's commitment to the global trading system from the mid 1980s and its 
accession to the WTO in 200 I have meant that tensions from time to time in the 
political relationship have not derailed, but have increasingly come to be dominated by, 
the economic relationship. 
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1 The Issues 
The Japan-China relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships in the 
world in terms of its impact on economic welfare, security and peace in the East Asian 
region and the world more broadly. The economic relationship between the two 
countries has seen unprecedented growth in trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the last three decades. However, it is also complicated by political and historical 
tensions1• 
From Japan's perspective, the economic engagement with China has been important in 
recent years for recovery from the economic downturn of the 1990s, with China a major 
factor in Japan's large-scale externally-driven growth. But the antecedents of the 
relationship lie in the deep comp!ementarity in the structure of the two countries' 
economies and how it has changed over time. The relationship with Japan has been 
important for China's 'catching up' to the frontier of industrial technology and its 
transition from a low to a higher income country through the access that it has provided 
to industrial technology and investment. The bilateral relationship also has implications 
for the rest of the region, because of the extensive production networks in which both 
economies are involved, and for the broader global economy, as these are the second 
and third largest economies in the world2 . 
An important element in the economic relationship, and one which underpins much of 
the trade in goods and services both ways, is the flow of investment from Japan to China. 
Japanese investment in China has a long history and has played an increasingly 
important role in the overall economic engagement since China's modern opening to the 
outside world. Bilateral economic relationships were once largely trade relationships. 
This is no longer the case, especially in the relationship between Japan and China. 
The Japan-China bilateral relationship is large and significant. What underpins its scale 
and significance? It is also a relationship that is fraught with political sensitivities. How 
1 See Whiting (1992) for a discussion of the coexistence of historical tensions and the economic 
relationship. 
2 As this is a study of a bilateral relationship, the European Union is treated as a regional grouping and not 
as a single economic entity unless otherwise mentioned. 
do these political sensitivities affect the potential of the economic relationship? Has the 
growth of the economic relationship affected the course of the political relationship? 
These questions are central in the argument of this thesis. 
The structures and scales of the two economies and their proximity to each other 
suggests a large potential in the bilateral trading relationship. In order to understand how 
political factors impact upon the economic relationship, it is necessary to analyse the 
factors that influence the scale and structure of this economic relationship and how they 
can be measured over time. The starting point of the study, therefore, is to explain the 
structure of Japan-China trade and investment. 
The opening up of the Chinese economy to the international system and the ongoing 
large-scale reforms along the way have helped the Chinese economy integrate into the 
global economy. In this process, China's bilateral economic ties have been important. 
How has economic integration with Japan, a neighbour and one of its most important 
economic partners, progressed and what factors have inhibited or furthered the process? 
At its core, this is an economic story of the Japan-China relationship in which the 
political relationship, nonetheless, plays an important part. The complex effects of 
political relations on the growing economic ties, as well as the effect of the growing 
economic interdependence on the political relationship are both subject to analysis here. 
The contemporary economic relationship began in earnest in I 978, the year the Long 
Term Trade Agreement (LTTA) between Japan and China was signed. The three 
decades since then have seen highs and lows in the political relationship, significant 
events and milestones. Major economic and political events include, on the one hand, 
China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 and, on the other, 
large-scale anti-Japanese protests and boycotts of Japanese products in 2005 resulting 
from heightened political tensions due to unresolved historical issues. 
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The scale of the relationship 
In 2007 trade between Japan and China was the third largest bilateral merchandise trade 
relationship in the world, in terms of exports and imports together, behind the United 
States-Canada and United States-China trade relationships. In 2007 United States-
Canada trade was US$551 billion, United States-China trade was US$494 billion while 
Japan-China trade was US$236 billion3 China is Japan's largest trading partner overall 
and Japan is China's second largest trading partner after the United States and the third 
largest if the European Union (EU) is taken as a whole. Japan is the largest exporter into 
China and until 2003 was the largest importer of Chinese goods. China ranks first in 
terms of its shares in Japanese imports as well as Japanese exports. 
While China's relative importance to Japan has steadily been rising in terms of trade 
shares (Figure 1.1), since 2003, two years after China's accession to the WTO, Japan 
has become relatively less important to China by this measure (Figure 1.2) 4. 
Figure 1.1 Japan's world trade shares, 1994 to 2006, per cent 
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Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
3 Source: UN Comtrade. 
4 Technically 200 I was the year of China's re-accession to the GA TT/WTO as it was one of the original 
signatories in 1948 but had since left. 
3 
Figure 1.2 China's world trade shares, 1994 to 2006, per cent 
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Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
Japan is the second largest source ofFDI into China after Hong Kong (Table 1.1 )5 At 
the end of2007 Japanese FDI stock in China was approximately US$37 billion and FDI 
flows had averaged 37.8 per cent growth, year on year, since 19856. This included 
average growth in the first half of the 1990s of almost 54 per cent annually and 25 per 
cent from 2000 to 20047• The scale means a significant presence of Japanese firms in 
China. The rate of growth is much higher than the average FDI growth worldwide, 
estimated to be 17.7 per cent from 1986 to 19998, including nearly 32 per cent in the 
latter half of the 1990s (Markusen, 2002). Japan is important to China in terms ofFDI 
share but is the FDI share (and value), as shown in Table 1.1, the amount ofFDI that is 
to be expected given the proximity and complementarity of their economies? 
5 This is in terms of cumulative, or stock of, FDI. The source is China Statistical Yearbook and author's 
calculations. The China Statistical Yearbook is available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/ 
6 Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance and OECD.Stat. 
7 Source: Author's calculations from Japanese Ministry of Finance FDI data. 
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/files.htm 
8 UNCTAD FDI data, and Blonigen (2005). 
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Table 1.1 Total FDI in China and share of major sources, 1985-2007 
1985-90 1991-2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total (value) 15.9 327.7 53.5 60.6 60.3 63.0 74.8 
Hong Kong 60.9 48.5 33.1 31.3 29.8 32.1 37.1 
Japan 13.8 7.7 9.4 9.0 10.8 7.3 4.8 
EU 3.1 5.6 8.0 7.9 9.4 9.1 5.8 
us 11.9 8.4 7.8 6.5 5.1 4.5 3.5 
Taiwan 0.0 7.9 6.3 5.1 3.6 3.4 2.4 
Note: Total FDI is in billions of US dollars, shares are in percentages. 
Source: Author's calculations from China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
Why bilateral? 
No two economies operate and interact with each other in isolation. Bilateral 
relationships are conducted in an increasingly globalised, complex, many-country 
setting. To ignore third country influences would distort any analysis of bilateral 
economic relations, yet bilateral factors have a dominant influence on levels of trade and 
FDJ. As China 'goes global' and integrates more deeply into the international economy 
through its rapidly growing trade and commerce in all regions of the world, there are 
factors of specific importance to the success of this process. At the forefront of these are 
its relationships with particular countries and warranting particular scrutiny is the 
relationship with Japan, due to its scope, depth and complexity. 
The complexity in the Japan-China relationship is mainly a product of historical and 
political factors. State visits, alliances, the frequency and persistence of trade disputes, 
institutional heritage and history are some of the many factors which can affect 
decisions by importers and exporters to trade and investors to invest. Some of these 
factors are more acute in their effect on some relationships than on others and the 
analysis of their effect is complicated by the fact that many of them are difficult to 
measure. The unmeasurable costs that add to trade and investment costs have their effect 
in respect of particular country markets at a bilateral level. There is much interest, 
therefore, in a study focusing on bilateral trade and other dimensions of economic 
5 
relations such as FDI, and how it is affected by the course of political relations between 
two countries. Capturing the difficult to measure costs resulting from the complexity in 
bilateral political relations is also of significant interest. 
Analysis of bilateral trade relationships cannot, however, be conducted in isolation. The 
recognition of this is apparent in recent developments in the most widely used empirical 
tool of international economics, the gravity model of trade. Anderson and van Win coop 
(2003) introduced, or rather made theory-consistent, a gravity model which includes 
third country effects, or multilateral resistances. Although recognition of such effects 
was evident in earlier studies, it was not widespread and was rarely made explicit or 
justified by theory. Most earlier applications of the gravity model of trade estimated 
world trade patterns and determinants from bilateral flows and ignored multilateral 
resistances. 
The same can be said for FDI models. The decision to invest in one country is not 
independent of a firm's decision to invest in another. The literature modelling FDI flows 
refers to multilateral resistances as spatial effects (Markusen, 2002; Egger and 
Pfaffennayr, 2004; Davies, 2008). FDI models are not properly specified without 
inclusion of multilateral resistances, meaning that FDI flows are not properly explained 
unless these effects are included (Blonigen et al., 2004; Baltagi et al., 2007). The 
inclusion of multilateral resistances helps explain bilateral FDI and trade. 
The politics of the relationship 
An important part ofthe story of the Japan-China relationship is the uneasy and 
sometimes uncertain geopolitical relationship which cannot be ignored in an analysis of 
the economic relationship. The large economic relationship exists despite tensions that 
at times have looked as if they might threaten to derail the economic ties. This is not 
uncommon, as history is littered with large-scale conflicts between trading nations 
which damage or halt economic transactions. 
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This study does not focus on the details of the politics between the two countries but 
rather recognises that there are unresolved political and historical issues, mistrust that 
stems from the inability to resolve these differences, and frictions that arise because of 
rapidly changing patterns of politics and trade. It then proceeds to analyse the interaction 
between economics and politics in the relations between the two countries. 
Bilateral trade and commercial relationships inevitably lead to disputes from time to 
time which vary in severity and length. Examples are not limited to adversaries but also 
occur between allies, and are endemic in all economic relationships. At one extreme, 
war between two nations will seriously disrupt trade and investment, if not halt it all 
together. At the other extreme, a political agreement or partnership which leads to the 
formal integration of two economies into a customs union, common currency area or 
economic union will reduce barriers and costs to trade and investment. While these two 
extremes are not relevant to the case of Japan and China in the period under study, they 
are useful in thinking about the effects of low intensity events such as minor incidents, 
protests and disagreements or, on the positive side, a leadership visit. The analysis will 
be directed to the impact oflow intensity conflicts which have occurred, and the 
bilateral agreements aimed at furthering cooperation and increasing economic exchange. 
Unresolved historical issues and regional rivalry issues flare up from time to time. 
Tensions and political disputes meant that no leadership visits took place for a period of 
six years from 2001 to 2006 and relations saw a low point in 2005 with mass protests in 
China against Japan. Other well publicised examples are the periodical flare-ups that 
occur occasionally when Japanese domestic politics reveals its nationalist side with 
Y asukuni Shrine visits. 
Many on both sides of the relationship attributed the fall in Japan's share of Chinese 
overall trade, from being its largest to its third largest trading partner, and the slowing of 
the rapid growth in trade in 2005, to the worsening of the bilateral political situation 
between the two countries. The then Chinese Commerce Minister, Bo Xilai, said in 
February 2006: 
7 
Bilateral political relations will certainly affect economic ones, which have 
already seen a slower growth in 2005 ... The crux of the strained political 
relations lies in the Japanese leaders' repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.9 
There has been no systematic analysis that confirms or measures the effects of political 
relations on economic relations. Such evidence as there is remains anecdotal. Is it 
possible to devise measures of the performance of trade and FDI that allow rigorous 
assessment of the effect of the politics on the economics of the relationship? Any such 
analysis must clearly be conducted in a general equilibrium setting that allows the 
performance of the bilateral relationship to be placed alongside performance in other 
relationships. 
The impact of political factors on the activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is of 
particular interest in the Japan-China economic relationship. There are factors which 
minimise the adverse effects of political tensions on foreign investor activities, both by 
accident and by design. These include how Japanese MNEs project themselves in China, 
and what investment regulations are in place in China. Similarly, there are also factors 
which reduce political tensions, such as recognition of growing economic 
interdependence and cooperation politically. These factors are explained in detail in this 
study and placed alongside the larger structural changes in the relationship to put their 
effects into perspective. Previous studies (Zhang, 1998; Drysdale and Zhang, 2000) have 
dealt with either the political relationship or the economic relationship separately but 
there is little analysis of the impact one has on the other. This study sets out to fill that 
gap. 
Beyond the numbers 
Japan has been supportive of China's modernisation since nonnalisation (Zhang, 1998). 
The signing of the 1978 bilateral agreement, which consisted of a package of deals that 
helped China in its opening up to the rest of the world, was a significant departure in 
China's economic development. The package included overseas development aid 
(ODA) to help China build infrastructure for trade (such as ports and transportation), 
9 Shrine visit affects China-Japan trade ties, Chinese Government official web portal 24 February 2006, 
http :1/www .gov .en/m i sc/2006-02124/ content_ 20965 3 .htm 
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loans from the Export-Import Bank of Japan (Exim Bank) so that Japanese imports 
could be paid for (the first time it had loaned money outside Japan), and the trade deal 
that facilitated the exchange of capital goods from Japan for raw materials and resources 
from China. 
These two Asian giants are highly complementary, importantly because they have vastly 
different factor endowments, reflected in their different structures of production and 
trade at different stages of their development. Japan is a high income, high technology 
and human capital rich country with low economic growth. China is a low income, low 
wage country and growing very rapidly. For years the Japan-China relationship was a 
text book model of North-South trade. Now China's rise is gradually transforming the 
relationship between the two as China moves up the value added ladder. In addition to 
their having such closely complementary economies, the two countries are in such close 
proximity that the flow of goods, capital and people can be expected to be high. 
The importance of Japan and China, separately, in East Asia and globally, is difficult to 
overstate. The new phenomenon of production networks, splitting the production 
process vertically, where parts and components are produced in different countries 
according to comparative advantage before being assembled into final goods, is 
increasingly dominating manufacturing production globally. This pattern of trade is 
dominated by East Asia, and 1 apan and China have played central roles. 
These developments have contributed to making China the most promising destination 
for Japanese firms to expand their operations overseas. The Survey Report on Overseas 
Business Operations by Japanese Manufacturing Companies undertaken every year 
(since 1989) by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation Institute (JBICI) is a 
comprehensive survey that shows Japanese investors consistently see China as the most 
promising country for overseas business operations. 
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China and the World Trade Organisation 
China's accession to the WTO in December 2001 was a major event in the global 
economy. It signalled a commitment by China to a rules-based international economic 
system at a time when its scale and unprecedented growth was affecting the global 
trading system at a pace that caused discomfort for, and often backlash from, other 
countries (Drysdale and Song, 2000). It changed the terms on which the Chinese 
economy engages with the rest of the global economy and had a significant effect on 
economic engagement with Japan. Officials from the Japan-China Investment 
Promotion Organisation explained that WTO accession gave all potential investors and 
traders 'assurance' and that 'WTO accession changed the way people think about China' 
(JCIPO representative) 10• An executive in a Japanese MNE said that '[with] WTO 
accession [China] became recognised as a real player globally and a real market' 
(Electronics informant 2). 
Investment into, and significantly trade with, China increased sharply in 2002 for most 
countries as well as Japan (Bhattasali et al., 2004). The effect ofWTO membership on 
trade levels has been the focus of much study and debate in trade literature (Rose, 
2004a; Martin et al., 2009). The WTO regime affects countries and economies that are 
not official members, with positive spill-overs from the system and official members 
although the benefits from membership are not always obvious (Tomz et al., 2007). 
Entry into the WTO sent a signal that the Chinese government had committed to deep 
rooted domestic economic reforms aimed at engagement with the global economy that 
are not easily reversible (Drysdale and Song, 2000; Garnaut and Huang, 2000). 
Purpose of this study 
This study sets out to answer the question of how international institutions and political 
relationships have affected the Japan-China economic relationship. In this context, it 
makes a corollary contribution to the analysis of bilateral economic relationships more 
10 Interviewees are listed in Appendix I. The corporate sector interviewees are identified only by number 
and industry, whereas Ministry officials are identified only by their ministry in order to maintain 
confidentiality. 
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broadly and to understanding of the structure and dynamics of the Japan-China 
relationship. It does this by explaining the factors that have led to the growth of the 
economic relationship, examining what its unique characteristics are and what the 
impediments have been to its development. 
A central argument is that China's commitment to the global trading system and later 
directly to the WTO has allowed more confident Japanese and Chinese economic 
engagement based on the proximity of the two countries and their complementary 
economic structures in a way that that has insulated against the vagaries of political 
distance. 
Outline 
Chapter 2 introduces a framework for measuring how trade and FDI perform based on a 
common set of detenninants. Explanation of the structure of trade and FDI makes it 
possible to then focus on the target issue, namely, to assess whether the political 
distance is affecting trade and investment performance. The estimation of trade and FDI 
frontiers allows a counterfactual measure, or benchmarking exercise, in which the 
effects of different factors on trade and FDI can be assessed in the context of all 
determinants to trade and FDI. It reviews the gravity model of trade and models ofFDI 
and develops a framework for explaining the structure of trade and FDI. Limitations in 
models ofFDI and gravity models are discussed, with explanations of how to overcome 
them for the purposes of this study. 
Chapter 3 develops a method for measuring potential Japan-China trade. The method 
allows for measurement of the performance of, and resistances in, the trade relationship. 
The determinants of trade are estimated in a stochastic frontier gravity model to create a 
world trade frontier where bilateral trade flows, as well as country and regional 
performances, can be assessed. Trade potential, achievement of that potential and the 
determinants of trade are estimated for a matrix of world trade flows. Trade 
performance is first measured and then explained in separate but related steps which 
contribute to a better understanding of the influences on trade between the two countries. 
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The measurement ofFDI determinants and prediction ofFDI given those determinants 
is undertaken in Chapter 4. The structure of FDI is explained, as is the effect of factors 
such as WTO accession and political distance. 
The impact of China's accession to the WTO on China's trade with the international 
economic community and investment into China is discussed in Chapter 5. Specifically, 
the chapter asks what did China's entry into the WTO mean for Chinese economic 
policy, continued reforms in China and confidence for China's major trading partners 
and foreign enterprises? The chapter examines how the WTO changed the way China 
relates to the rest of the world and to Japan. 
Chapter 6links the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 in an examination of two of the most 
important trade and investment sectors in the bilateral relationship: the electronics and 
automobile industries. Empirical findings from Chapters 3 and 4 are elaborated with 
quantitative and qualitative evidence from both sectors. This chapter discusses the 
expansion of production networks in East Asia due to the expansion of MNE and small 
and medium enterprise (SME) activities, and the importance of Japanese investment in 
China and for Chinese production. Resistances to trade and FDI are described in detail. 
The chapter also examines the forces which have led to the rapid growth in investment 
and trade dealings between Japan and China in these important sectors. The 
entrenchment of Japanese firms in China and East Asia is discussed, with anecdotal 
evidence provided for how political tensions have affected firms and how they may have 
mitigated these effects. 
The complexity of the links between trade and politics and the interest in that link for 
Japan and China is the subject of Chapter 7. Chapter 7 extends the findings in Chapters . 
3 and 4 about the nexus between trade and politics. The chapter explores evidence of the 
way in which trade affects political relations in both countries and also evidence of the 
way in which the political relationship affects trade over time. A review of the literature 
on the schools of thought in the trade-politics debate is brought to bear on this analysis 
and a statistical analysis is conducted using the Granger causality method. 
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The main conclusions of the study are distilled and brought together in Chapter 8. 
Implications for studies of other bilateral relationships are then presented in terms of 
both policy and analysis. 
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2 Explaining bilateral trade and investment flows 
The influence of politics on a bilateral economic relationship can best be understood in 
the context of the other determinants of trade and investment flows. Trade and 
investment depend .on many factors and a partial or general equilibrium analysis has to 
be undertaken in order to understand the relative influences and importance of factors of 
interest compared to all factors. This chapter develops a framework through which 
bilateral trade and FDI can be explained. It sets out a model to examine the structure of 
trade and FDI and changes in trade and FDI over time. 
The ability to account for all factors that determine trade and investment allows for the 
separation of the political elements, which are the principal interest in this study. There 
is a rich variety of models which explain trade and its performance. Models that explain 
FDI and its performance are not as rich or vast yet this is a growing field. 
Trade and FDI are affected by many of the same or similar factors. These factors affect 
trade and FDI performance differently due to the different nature of trade and FDI. For 
example, the same set of political relations across a particular economic relationship 
will affect trade in a different way from the way in which they affect FDI, as setting up a 
plant and producing across a border involves different processes and political distance 
affects this in a different way from arms length trade. 
Trade and FDI flow more readily between some countries than between others because 
resistances to these economic exchanges are different among different countries. Gravity 
models of trade incorporate this element into their structure. They allow the 
identification of the importance of resistances in shaping economic relationships 
between countries. This chapter will look at the variety of resistances to trade and FDI 
and how their influence has an impact on economic relations in comparison to the core 
determinants of economic relations, such as GDP and distance. 
While the focus of the study is on how political relations affect a bilateral economic 
relationship- specifically, that between China and Japan- economic relationships need 
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to be analysed in the context of the international economic system. This requires a 
'general equilibrium' multilateral framework of bilateral relationships in the sense that 
bilateral trade and investment flows are not analysed independently of all other trade 
and investment flows. Studies of bilateral trade and FDI flows now commonly 
incorporate third country effects in the form of multilateral resistances which impact on 
international trade and FDI patterns. 
The chapter starts with a review of the gravity model of trade, which is often used for 
explaining the pattern of bilateral trade. A new framework, incorporating stochastic 
frontier analysis, is introduced and elaborated on throughout the chapter. The following 
section reviews FDI models and the consistencies with the framework for explaining 
trade. Concepts of distance, beyond geographic, that change over time due to resistances 
to trade and FDI are then explained. The subsequent section introduces a method to 
measure those distances and resistances that are theory consistent (that is from models 
with theory consistent micro derivations) as well as provide a consistent framework of 
analysis consistent across both trade and FDI flows. This is an innovation in the 
literature. 
The geographic structure of trade 
International trade is not subject to a law of nature such as the gravitational constant in 
Newtonian physics, but the gravity model of trade has been successful in explaining 
trade flows with distance and mass, or size, as the main explanatory variables of trade. 
The gravity model of trade, pioneered by Tinbergen ( 1962), is based on the idea that 
trade volumes between two countries depend positively on the sizes of the two countries 
and inversely on the distance between them. 
The gravity model in its simplest form shows that trade is positively related to the scale 
of the two economic bodies (the scale of an economic body often represented by a 
measure of GDP) and negatively related to the distance between them. The larger 
countries are, the more they will trade on average and the further away they are, the less 
they will trade, on average. The scale, for example, of the Japanese and Chinese 
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economies and their proximity, without taking into account their economic structure, 
suggest a large potential in the bilateral trading relationship. Scale is one of the most 
important determinants of trade. Baier and Bergstrand (200 1) suggest that, between the 
two periods of 1958-{)0 andl986-88, two-thirds of trade growth amongst OECD 
countries was due to growth in real GDP. While trade growth may also have contributed· 
to GDP growth, GDP growth alone is a powerful explanatory of the scale of trade 
growth. GDP is included to control for scale and not reflect causality which is a 
common method in the literature. 
The gravity model has been widely applied, in some cases testing standard trade theories, 
in others explaining trade and the effect of certain policy measures on trade volumes. 
Earlier criticisms of the weak theoretical foundations of the gravity model have been 
rectified in a number of theoretical derivations 11 but there are still improvements to be 
made in analysing trade and the costs associated with trading (Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2004). There have been many developments and additions to the gravity 
model over time. Linnemann (1966) made popular the inclusion of policy variables in 
the model, and the estimation of the impacts of these policy variables is now common-
place. Anderson (1979) was the first to derive the gravity model with theoretical 
underpinnings, which led to further theory-based derivations by Bergstrand ( 1985), 
Bergstrand (1989) and Deardorff(1995). With the link between the empirical model and 
economic theory firmly established, Frankel et al. claim that the gravity model has 'gone 
from an embarrassing poverty of theoretical foundations to an embarrassment of riches!' 
(1997:53). 
Trade theory tells us that the resource endowments shape the commodity structure of 
trade and help determine the pattern of trade through comparative advantage. However, 
while not often including a measure of comparative advantage, the gravity model has 
been derived from, and also used to test and find evidence for, trade theories including 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model of comparative advantage (Deadorff, 1995). In this way, 
gravity models are used to find support for trade theories and there is reason to extend 
this result so that such theories can help explain trade in a gravity model. 
11 Harrigan (200 I) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) contain comprehensive reviews. 
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Some studies, such as Linnemann (1968), Frankel et al. (1997) and Baltagi et al. (2003), 
do in fact include a measure of factor endowment complementarity or a measure of 
relative factor endowment differences. These studies find that a measure of relative 
factor endowments is significant in explaining trade in a gravity model framework 12• 
Such findings suggest that the inclusion of a complementarity variable is important. 
The derivation of the gravity model from theory by Anderson (1979), Helpman (1987) 
Deardorff (1995) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) does not justify the inclusion 
of a relative factor endowment measure. The authors also do not justify the inclusion of 
population nor GDP per capita, both of which are often included in empirical studies 
(see, for example, Frankel et al., 1997; and Matayas, 1997). 
GDP per capita is included in the gravity model to explain trade between countries with 
different demand structures or different relative factor endowments due to being at 
different levels of development. In that sense the GDP per capita variable is capturing a 
similar effect to a measure of relative factor endowments. Population and GDP per 
capita variables are often statistically significant explanatory variables in empirical 
studies, but their inclusion in gravity models is not appropriate. Including the log of 
GDP and log of population separately in the log linearisation of the gravity model for 
estimation is equivalent to including the log of GDP per capita with a restriction on the 
estimated coefficients of GDP and population separately. Many papers do not explicitly 
say this, and the population term is included in the model to control for country size but 
often ignored in the analysis. Empirically, the effect of population is positive sometimes 
and negative at other times (Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann, 2003). If different 
levels of income (GDP per capita) are included to reflect different stages of 
development and therefore different relative factor endowments, it is better to include a 
more accurate or direct measure of relative factor endowments, to which earlier studies 
have not had ready access. 
12 See Drysdale and Gamaut (I 982) and Harrigan (200 I), who identifY two streams in the international 
trade literature which have developed in parallel with little direct overlap. They are the gravity model, and 
other studies of trade intensity (and complementarity). 
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While traditional trade theory tells us that the resource endowments and the commodity 
structures of a country's trade will determine the patterns and intensities of its trade, 
these are only one of the determining factors of trade. More recent trade models 
emphasise the importance of distance and geography (Krugman, 1992). Drysdale (1967) 
and Gamaut (1972), in their studies of bilateral trade, noted that theories of international 
trade commonly assume away most trading costs between countries. 
Geographic distance is the simplest form of distance- the physical distance that 
separates two countries- but other concepts of distance are important as well. The 
reason why the 'force of gravity' is not constant in gravity models is because of the 
multilateral resistances and the distance that matters between two potential trading 
partners is not the absolute geographic distance but the 'economic distance' between 
them (Anderson, 1979; Boisso and Ferrantino, 1997; Ghemawat, 2001 ). Economic 
distance refers to the cost of getting a good from one location to another, including all 
border adjustments and transport costs (Roemer, 1977; Anderson, 1979). Economic 
distance is correlated to geographic distance, when thinking about international trade 
and investment, as the transit cost of a good can vary greatly even over similar distances 
due to both geography (with factors such as type of terrain and common land borders 
affecting transit costs) and other trade resistances such as political or legal barriers to 
trade and investment, but they are not the same. 
These resistances have been called trade frictions in the trade literature and add to trade 
costs. Measuring and explaining resistances that make trade more costly is an integral 
component of explaining trading patterns. As Anderson (1979) showed, economic 
distance, as it is affected by all the various types of trade resistances, allows a more 
accurate explanation of the geographic structure of trade than geographic distance. 
Trade flows much more readily, for example, between two countries in an economic 
union than between two that have natural or constructed barriers to trade between them 
that increase transit costs. 
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Many resistances are very difficult to define and measure. Among them are costs due to 
uncertainty and asymmetric information in decision making, termed psychic costs or 
subjective resistances. Beckerman (1956) was the first to introduce psychic distance into 
studies of trade flows. This approach was subsequently adopted by authors such as 
Linnemann (1966), who was the first to include it in the gravity model of trade. Psychic 
distance is the perceived distance between the home country and a foreign country 
resulting from differences in culture (business and otherwise), language, political and 
legal systems, institutions and the stage and structure of economic development 
(Drysdale, 1967; Garnaut, 1972; Joliet and Hubner, 2003:5). These costs arise from the 
uncertainty and asymmetric information that are present in economic dealings between 
any two agents but are likely to be greater when these dealings are across national 
borders. This study uses the concept of subjective distance (equivalent to psychic 
distance), which covers those resistances that are not easily tangible. 
Objective resistances can be distinguished from subjective resistances and can be 
measured more easily. Drysdale and Garnaut (1982) define objective resistances as 
those obstacles or resistances that can be overcome at some easily identifiable cost. 
These include, for example, transportation costs and trade protection measures. Other 
barriers to trade and investment, such as language and different political and legal 
systems, can be overcome to some extent at some cost (using intermediation services 
such as interpreters and lawyers) but not fully and therefore can be thought of as having 
a high subjective component. Another way to characterise these two types of resistances 
is that objective resistances are readily measurable and tangible whereas subjective 
resistances are not readily measurable and often intangible. Any f01m of resistance with 
a subjective component is classed as a subjective resistance. These are elaborated on 
later in this chapter. 
The resistance that is of particular interest in this study, as outlined in Chapter I, is the 
influence of political distance on the structure and scale of bilateral trade and FDI over 
time. Resistances may influence some types of trade and investment more than others so 
they impact not only the scale of these flows but also their structure. Political distance is 
a measure of how 'close' two countries are politically or geopolitically and how well 
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they get along. Two countries which are political and security allies can be described as 
being close in terms of political distance, whereas two nations that are political rivals 
can be described as politically distant. Between these two extremes there is a wide range 
of degrees of closeness and distance in the relationships between traders and investors. 
There is a well established literature that examines how politics affects trade (see 
Hirschman, 1945; Polacheck, 1980). A measure of bilateral political distance has not 
been included in any gravity model to date and how such a measure should be included 
is of interest to this study. Political distance is a subjective resistance since the cost of 
overcoming political distance, which causes uncertainty and other risks, is commonly 
opaque and difficult to measure. The political distance variable used in this study is 
comprised of conflict/cooperation data from King's (2003) dataset of Integrated Data for 
Events Analysis (IDEA) 13 . 
Apart from bilateral economic distance, third country inf1uences also affect bilateral 
trade. One of the most important developments in the modelling literature was the 
formal inclusion of multilateral resistances, which explicitly recognise third country 
effects on bilateral trade. This significantly improved the theoretical and empirical 
explanation of trade (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). 
Trade between Japan and China, for example, is affected by changes in trade between 
Japan and the United States. Also, shocks to trade, such as rising trade frictions between 
the United States and the EU, can affect trade between Japan and China. However, it is 
not just trade elsewhere that affects a bilateral trading relationship but developments in 
the international trading system as well as in, and between, each of the particular trading 
partners involved. 
No two economies operate and interact exclusively with each other in a bilateral world. 
Bilateral relationships are conducted in an increasingly globalised, many-country setting 
and involve a complex range of multilateral interactions. To ignore third country 
influences distorts any analysis of bilateral economic relations (Drysdale, 1967; 
Drysdale and Garnaut, 1982; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). As China 'goes 
13 The cooperation and conflict events are coded from Reuters Business Briefs. Other conflict/cooperation 
datasets use varying news sources for events coding and the appropriateness of using Reuters Business 
Briefs is discussed in Chapter 7 where the variable is used extensively. 
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global' and integrates more deeply into the international economy through its rapidly 
growing trade and commerce in all regions of the world, while there remain factors of 
specific importance to its bilateral economic relationships, especially relationships of 
the scope and depth of the one with Japan, this, like other bilateral relationships, has to 
be analysed in a multilateral context. Trade between two cotmtries will be affected by 
the rapid rise of a neighbouring country. Third country effects can be due, for example, 
to the size of neighbouring countries, the proximity of those countries and their relative 
factor endowments or relative factor prices. In fact, the decision by an MNE to trade 
with another country is not independent of its decision to invest in that country and both 
trade and FDI decisions depend on third country factors, as the next section shows. 
Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) termed the measure of multilateral resistances the 
gravitational un-constant. Unlike in physics, the gravitational force of trade depends on 
a measure of distance that is not a constant force between two objects (economies). 
However, as in physics, the gravitational force between two objects (constant or not) is 
affected by third objects (multilateral resistances). Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
capture multilateral resistances with relative prices of all third country trade partners, 
which affect the prices of traded goods, and hence the economic distance, between two 
trading partners. 
The study develops a framework which characterises the determinants of trade (Figure 
2.1) (and later FDI). The core determinants of trade structure are scale, relative 
endowment structures, economic distance and multilateral resistance, and are on the top 
row. Economic distances differ for countries with the same geographic distance between 
them because of the character of objective and subjective resistances. Geographic 
distance and protection, in the form of tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs), comprise 
objective resistances as they are tangible and readily measurable costs. 
Figure 2.1 describes a consistent framework for understanding the impact of various 
kinds of resistances in determining trade flows. Quite often the choice of explanatory 
variables for a gravity model (as well as FDI models) is arbitrary. The question of using 
population as an explanatory variable is one example where the gravity equation is 
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inconsistent14 • Even the form of the scale variable varies between studies without a 
strong consensus, with some using GDP per capita or the product of GDPs both 
countries to explain trade (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). The most common formulation 
is two separate GDP variables. 
Figure 2.1 Schematic of trade and FDI determinants 
Trade and FDI 
Scale + Endowment + Economic distance + Multilateral resistance 
Objective resistance 
Geographic 
distance 
Protection 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
(rest of the world) 
' 
Subjective resistanc~ ', 
' 
Institutions 
' 
Information, trust, 
confidence, 
language, culture, 
risk. 
distance 
Note: Arrows indicate direction of causality and therefore economic distance and political distance have 
causality both ways. Lines without arrows show a link but no causality. 
The measure of economic distance is also arbitrary, with most empirical studies using 
geographic distance and the other resistances, usually comprised of an inconsistent and 
14 The derivation of the gravity model by Anderson (1979) includes population as an explanatory variable 
alongside income and other variables. Frankel (1997) also includes population in what is a widely cited 
and seminal study, as does Matayas ( 1997) in a paper that improves the econometric performance of 
gravity models. Anderson later derived the gravity model with van Wincoop (Anderson and van Wincoop, 
2003) without population and most versions of the model that include theoretical underpinnings do not 
include a population variable (Bergstrand, 1985; Deadorff: 1995). 
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arbitrary collection of variables, to explain economic distance. Those resistances often 
include variables that affect geographic distance, confidence, information, institutions 
and other subjective distance. Since Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) it is generally 
accepted that multilateral relative prices, or some other control for multilateral 
resistance should be included to avoid mis-specification (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006; 
Shepherd and Wilson, 2008). 
Economic distance is the key variable that changes over time, and is comprised of 
natural trade barriers (geographic) as well as manmade barriers (policy variables such as 
trade and investment protection) and other difficult to measure trade resistances. The 
composition of economic distance and the methods of measurement of the various 
resistances are discussed later in this chapter. Analysis of whether the distance variable 
has been important in particular bilateral economic relationships over time is the subject 
of closer examination in Chapter 3 for trade, Chapter 4 for FDI and further discussion in 
Chapter 5 in relation to the electronics and automobile sectors. 
The determinants ofFDI 
FDI has become an important aspect of international economic relations and 
globalisation can no longer be analysed through merchandise or services trade alone. 
The FDI activity ofMNEs is a key driver of trade. Bernard et al. (2005) find that MNEs 
are responsible for 90 per cent of United States trade (both exports and imports) and half 
of all trade flows between MNE affiliates, while Kiyota and Urata (2008) find that in 
2000, only 12.4 per cent of Japanese firms were multinationals but they accounted for 
93.6 per cent of Japanese exports and 81.4 per cent of Japanese imports. 
In the study of a bilateral economic relationship it is no longer sufficient to analyse trade 
independently ofFDl as a firm's decision to trade is not independent from its decision to 
invest (Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 1984; Carr et al., 2001; Markusen, 2002; Egger and 
Pfaffermayr, 2004). Since trade and FDI are interdependent and decisions to trade or 
invest are based on similar factors such as production and consumption capacity (often 
captured in scale terms) and distance, for example, it is understandable that the core 
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determinants in models of trade and FDI are very similar (Markusen and Mask us, 2002; 
Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004; Helpman et al., 2004; Bergstrand and Egger, 2007). 
The earlier general equilibrium models ofFDI by Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984) 
set the foundations for the current understanding of MNE behaviour. Markusen 
developed a model of horizontal FDI where MNEs produce offshore from the country of 
their headquarters to avoid trade costs such as transportation and tariffs. This form of 
FDI can be characterised as market-seeking FDI where a firm will set up a plant to 
produce and sell in that host market. This development in the literature came 
concurrently with Helpman's model of vertical FDI where MNEs take advantage of 
different factor prices across countries to cut production costs. Simply put, vertical FDI 
is trade-increasing and horizontal FDI is trade often seen as trade-reducing15. 
Recognition of the existence of a combination of both vertical and horizontal types of 
FDI within MNEs led to later studies combining the two models into a knowledge 
capital (or knowledge-based) model of FDI (Carr et al., 200 I; Markusen, 2002; 
Markusen and Maskus, 2002). Knowledge capital models describe FDI operations 
where the research and development, as well as other skilled labour-intensive, or 
knowledge-intensive activities, are geographically separated from production (Carr et al., 
200 I). The separation of such activities in general means that knowledge-based 
activities can be supplied at low cost to numerous production locations (Carr et al., 
200 I). These models made significant steps towards understanding MNE behaviour but 
were general equilibrium models in a simple two country framework and therefore not 
adequate to explaining or characterising MNEs which make their FDI decisions based 
not only on home and host country characteristics, but also on other country 
characteristics. 
The inclusion of mnltilateral resistances in FDI models is similar to developments in tl1e 
gravity model of trade which recognise that trade is occurring in a many-country world16. 
15 Horizontal FDI is not necessarily trade-reducing, especially when component trade is involved in an 
MNE 's operations. 
16 The FDI literature refers to spatia/linkages whereas this study will use multilateral resistances for 
consistency with the trade literature. Both take into account third country effects. 
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Multilateral resistances have become commonplace in empirical work in FDI studies, 
which take account of FDI patterns beyond the horizontal and vertical types of FDI, 
confinning the importance of taking account of third country effects. 
The strong interdependencies between trade and investment led to many studies in 
which FDI was modelled using gravity model determinants of trade, and these models 
were relatively successful at explaining FDI (see, for example, Eaton and Tamura, 1994; 
Brenton and Di Mauro, 1999; Razin et al., 2002; Eichengreen and Tong, 2005). 
Empirical studies have confirmed that the cross country pattern ofFDI is well 
approximated by the gravity relationship (Barba Navaretti and V enables, 2004:32). 
However, as some studies (for example, Blonigen and Davies, 2000) show, the 
knowledge capital models of FDI, and models that include third country effects allowing 
for such multilateral factors, explain FDI better than the gravity model type FDI models. 
This is not to say that the determinants are different, but that the method for 
incorporating multilateral resistances, the measures of scale (the difference between 
separate GDP variables, and other measures such as similarities in scale or 
multiplicative scale variables) and relative factor endowments, as described in Figure 
2.1 (p. 22), are different. Perhaps more importantly, gravity type FDI models are not 
theoretically based (Bloningen, 2005). Theoretical derivations of models which estimate 
FD I are based on firm decisions where the choice to trade or invest is endogenous and 
depends on economies of scale, factor prices, country risk and transportation costs (Dee, 
2007). 
The model used in Baltagi et al. (2007) allows for four types of FDI: vertical, horizontal, 
export platform and complex vertical. All four modes of FDI include third country 
effects. The export platform and complex vertical modes of FDI are knowledge capital-
type FDI. As communications technology has progressed, MNEs have increasingly been 
involved in complex production and supply networks. Export platform FDI describes 
FDI where an MNE sets up a plant in its home country and another country, i, with the 
final goods traded from country i to a third country ,j. The MNE uses country i as an 
export platform base (Egg er and Pfaffermayr, 2004 ). Complex vertical type FDI 
describes the pattern of an MNE building plants and producing in two host countries, i 
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and), with trade of final goods from) to the source, or MNE home, country. FDI flows 
and stock between source country and host country i have to be modelled with all other 
country j effects. 
The literature on MNE behaviour and FDI models shows the importance of including 
scale, distance, relative factor endowments, interdependencies between markets and 
networks of production (multilateral resistances). The determinants ofFDI are similar 
though not necessarily exactly the same as those for trade, so that the framework set out 
in Figure 2.1 broadly applies to FDI as well as trade. Distance and economic size, which 
explain the flow of goods between trading nations, also play a large role in detennining 
capital flows (Kawai and Urata, 2004). The high explanatory power of distance and 
scale alone meant that many studies simply used the gravity model substituting FDI for 
trade. Gravity models of FDI are used as competing models of FDI in recent studies 
(Kawai and Urata, 2004; Eichengreen and Tong, 2005). However, simple substitution of 
FDI for trade in gravity models does miss some important features of the latest FDI 
literature and does not have any theoretical underpinnings. The rest of the study uses 
FDI models derived from theory. Measures of endowment structures and multilateral 
resistances, consistent with MNE decision-making theory, as well as the scale and 
distance measures used in gravity models are included in the analysis. 
In estimating factors affecting FDI flows, multilateral resistances are especially 
important, perhaps more so than in the case of explaining trade flows (Bionigen et al., 
2004; Baltagi et al., 2007; Dee, 2007; Davies, 2008). Third country factors may 
influence FDI more than trade for vertically motivated and knowledge capital type FDI 
because FDI host cotmtries are 'competitors' for FDI. A casual hypothesis would be that 
trade and horizontally motivated FDI are affected by third country factors in similar 
ways. In analysing the location choice of FDI firms, Altomonte (2002) shows that the 
power of a country to attract FDI comes from the surrounding countries. Third country 
effects can act as positive or negative forces in FDI decisions in a bilateral setting and 
recent theoretical models (Egger and Pfaffennyer, 2004) account for the dependency of 
alternative investment destinations (Blonigen et al., 2004). Third country effects can 
increase FDI if the FDI is of a knowledge capital type and plants are spread across more 
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than two countries to take advantage of finer degrees of specialisation. Third country 
effects can reduce FDI if it is concentrated in one country and is an exclusive competitor 
host market. These third country effects are often included in the modelling by using 
econometric techniques that control for spatial correlation (Bionigen et al., 2004; Baltagi 
et al., 2005). The empirical work in FDI studies, which takes account of rimltilateral 
resistances, confirms the importance of third country effects. FDI studies that include 
multilateral resistances usually include these as third country effects of each determinant 
ofFDI weighted by a measure of distance. 
Studies that model FDI and estimate its determinants use geographic distance to proxy 
economic distance, as is the case in explaining trade. Economic distance in this case is 
not the cost of transit of a good from one country to another, but similar in concept. 
Capital will flow more easily between two locations with lower economic distance 
(fewer resistances) compared with two locations that are the same geographic distance 
apart but have more economic distance between them. An example of this at the limit is 
a barrier to investment in a country that is designated as a political rival or enemy. 
Another example is where there is high perceived country risk. The economic distance 
between Japan and North Korea is much greater than that between Japan and Taiwan 
despite Taiwan being geographically further away. There are much higher subjective 
resistances to investment in North Korea. 
Different FDI models and the theoretical derivations of MNE FDI decisions at the firm 
level vary in respect of the determinants ofFDI that are included. Blonigen (2005) 
reviews the partial equilibrium and general equilibrium empirical literature on FDI and 
finds partial equilibrium conclusions, such as that taxes generally discourage FDI, do 
not hold consistently. Chakrabarti (2001) finds that most determinants of cross-country 
FDI are fairly fragile statistically. 
There is no underlying theoretical derivation for use of a gravity model to estimate FDI 
parameters. The reason these models succeed in explaining FDI well statistically is 
because trade and FDI are interdependent and two of the main determinants- scale and 
distance- are explanatory variables in both (Blonigen, 2005). Models such as that of 
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Carr et al. (2002), that include multilateral resistances, a measure of relative endowment, 
as well as distance and scale, outperform models that do not include the four key 
determinants shown in Figure 2.l(see p. 22) (Blonigen and Davies, 2000; Blonigen, 
2005). 
When an MNE is looking to invest in a country or region, neighbouring countries in that 
region do not always act as substitute locations for FDI. The rapid growth of FDI to 
China, in fact, has not necessarily come at the expense of potential FDI to other East 
Asian countries, as much of the production network literature has shown (for example, 
Athukolara and Yamashita, 2006). Having a large FDI recipient country as a neighbour 
often creates network activity and agglomeration forces that benefit smaller countries. 
These issues are taken up in detail in Chapter 5. Multilateral resistances can have 
negative and positive effects but are not necessarily zero sum where FDI in one location 
is a substitute for FDI in another. FDI in one location can both increase and decrease 
FDI in another. 
FDI flows face resistances much like those that trade flows face but the nature of 
barriers is different. Resistances differ across different investment routes and objective 
and subjective resistances influence FDI differently to trade. FDI involves a presence in 
a foreign land and therefore some barriers and resistances impact on FDI more than 
arms-length trade that does not require relocation to another country. Political distance 
can therefore reasonably be expected to affect FDI more than trade and such hypotheses 
are tested later in this study. The next section details the difficulty in measuring the 
resistances that explain variations in economic distance over time. 
Resistances 
Resistances, which cause economic distance to vary across similar geographic distances, 
play a large role, beyond underlying comparative advantages and disadvantages, in 
determining which countries trade which goods with each other and the extent to which 
they do. Resistances also play a role in determining the scale and form of FDI flows and 
in which countries an MNE invests. Changes over time to resistances are important in 
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understanding both the size and structures of trade and investment flows. Many 
empirical exercises using the gravity model are concerned with measuring the effects of 
certain resistances or resistance reducing measures, such as regional trading 
arrangements. The literature has a long way to go in explaining these resistances. 
Therefore, they warrant further examination here, with a review of some of the issues in 
measuring and examining resistances and distances. 
The developments in New Trade Theory, using increasing returns to scale as an 
explanator of trade, and theoretical derivations of the gravity model, still do not allow 
for much more than iceberg transportation costs to account for transit costs. Iceberg 
transportation costs assume a certain proportion of the value of the good being 
transported melts and is lost in transit. In practice, physical geographic distance is often 
used on its own to proxy for economic distance. 
Geographical distance is the easiest to measure, although there are even issues about the 
measurement of geographic distance because very few states can be taken as single 
points and many, themselves, cover a great deal of space (Melitz, 2007). Some studies 
use measures of distance between capital cities whereas others choose the centre of 
economic activity, not necessarily to capital city (see Head and Mayer, 2004). Because 
geographic distance provides the most objective measure of distance it is often used as a 
proxy for other forms of distance. Geographic distance is not limited to the absolute 
distance that two countries are apart. The topography of a country, a common land 
border between two countries, whether a country is landlocked, the transportation and 
communication infrastructure and connectedness and dispersal of economic activity 
within a country all affect trade and FDI (Ghemawat, 2001; Limao and V enables, 2001). 
The advancement of transport and communications technologies has led to popular 
claims that the importance of distance has diminished in international economic 
relations: one example is the idea that 'the world is flat' (Friedman, 2005) and another is 
featured in the title of Cairncross's 1997 study The Death of Distance: How the 
Communications Revolution Will Change Our Lives (Cairncross, 1997). Friedman 
(2005) suggests that the global playing field has been flattened as transportation 
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technology and information and communication technology (ICT) has advanced so that 
almost anyone can compete globally. 
In contrast, Hummels ( 1999) finds evidence of ocean freight rates having actually risen 
in the post-war period while air freight rates have fallen rapidly. He finds transport costs 
over land have fallen relative to ocean transport costs. In fact there is quite a deal of 
evidence that the impact of distance has become more important over time (Brun et al., 
2002; Coe et al., 2002; Disdier and Head, 2003). Limao and V enables (2001) find 
transport costs and hence trade flows are significantly impacted by transportation 
infrastructure quality, which has improved over time but overall costs may not have 
fallen substantially, given Hummels' findings (1999). Hummels (2007) finds that, 
despite technological advances in shipping, the decline in the cost of shipping has been 
swamped by cost shocks. Disdier and Head (2004) provide further support to this result 
by conducting a comprehensive review of 78 earlier studies, which also shows the 
influence of distance has risen over time. 
Technological improvements seem not only to have made distance more important in 
trade but, combined with its effect on FDI, distance has changed the pattern of trade and 
FDI. Increasingly, FDI and trade respond jointly to the complex forces of economic 
geography (Dee, 2007). ICT development has led to MNEs having the ability to move 
offshore or outsource high value added components of production and also to a 
proliferation of complex supply and production networks, with the production of 
different components, and design and supply chain management input all able to be 
conducted in separate countries. The rapid rise in FDI and ability of MNEs to readily 
relocate and expand production, with forces of agglomeration and trade driven by 
comparative advantage, has led Krugman to describe the phenomenon as a 'tug of war 
between forces that tend to promote geographical concentration and those that tend to 
oppose it- between "centripetal" and "centrifugal" forces' (1998: 8). 
The resistances that trade and FDI flows face when crossing borders is not fully 
explained in gravity models or FDI models. The trade literature has long identified this 
problem, which is known as the 'border problem' or 'border puzzle'. The border 
problem in international economics arises from the fact that empirically, the low volume 
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of trade over international borders cannot be explained (McCallum, 1995; Limao and 
V enables, 2001; Evans, 2003; Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). This is different from 
the almost universal finding that sharing a common land border increases trade on 
average as transportation costs are lower across land as opposed to sea. Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003) make a contribution, explaining away some of the border problem 
by formally including multilateral resistances in gravity models but there are a host of 
unexplained bilateral resistances that mean the border problem still exists. 
Rossi-Hansberg (2005) derives a model that shows trading across borders will cause a 
disconnect in relative prices as insurance, freight, tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and 
different regulatory structures cause uncertainty and impede trade to some degree. This 
increase in resistances from crossing a border has been called the 'border puzzle' in 
studies such as McCallum (1995), as much of the resistance carmot be explained. Even 
though the theory consistent with the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) gravity model 
improves estimation and claims explanation of the border puzzle, there are some signs 
that all the subjective resistances are not accounted for. Balisteri and Hillberry (2006) 
find that the theory-consistent model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) does not 
explain away the border puzzle when they relax the assumption of symmetric border 
costs and account for stmctural bias in the Anderson and van Wincoop specification. 
The multilateral resistances have explained away some of the resistances that were 
previously unaccounted for in gravity models but there remains a significant portion of 
trade resistances that are unexplained. 
In this way, trade resistances are at the heart of most puzzles in international economics 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000). As Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000:42) say 'Introducing trade 
costs (implicitly or explicitly) must be an essential ingredient in resolving the 
international pricing puzzle'. This is evident in the fact that the volume of trade is much 
smaller than predicted by the frictionless gravity model (Harrigan, 2001 ), meaning that 
trade resistances in fact play a large role. 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) showed that there are still significant resistances that 
are difficult to measure. They attempt to quantify trade costs (all transaction costs 
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involved in trading a good) but concede that the literature is still in the early stages of 
understanding and measuring what the real transaction costs are. Baldwin and Taglioni 
(2006) use t(distance, other stuff) to explain trade costs, and split all trade costs into 
man-made, cultural and natural trade costs, to describe the bias from omitting these 
variables, but then themselves use only a few variables in their estimation. 
The arbitrary choice of resistance tem1s included in gravity model studies leads to 
different degrees of omitted variable bias that is often only controlled for by using fixed 
effects estimation that assumes constant resistances between country pairs. Tariffs and 
easily measurable trade barriers, for which there are good data available, seem to be 
among the lowest of the trade costs. All other trade costs that the literature usually 
proxies for with distance- border dummy variables, regional grouping dummy 
variables, preferential trade agreement variables and language differences- are 
supposed to capture the rest. In their paper, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) estimate 
that all trade costs could be thought of as a 170 per cent ad valorem tax on traded goods 
for developed countries. Although this is a useful exercise and confirms the magnitude 
of trade costs imposed by trade restrictions and resistances, as they concede, it is 
unrealistic to apply such a constant rate to all traded goods and, they may have added, 
all country pairs. The aim of Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) is not to give a value 
such as this to trade costs but to survey how trade costs are treated in the gravity model 
literature. They conclude that there is still a lot of work to be done in measuring trade 
costs. 
Neither objective nor subjective resistances add a fixed cost, such as a certain 
percentage increase to the costs of trade or FDI flows, since the nature and size of 
resistances vary greatly across different goods, across capital in different activities, and 
across country pairs. The case ofFDI can be illustrated from the example of special 
economic zones in China, where export-oriented FDI faces less objective resistance than 
other forms ofFDI within that zone as well as any form ofFDI outside it. Such 
examples highlight the varying degrees of objective resistance for different modes of 
FDI. Subjective resistances vary even more and their measurement is more complex, as 
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can be seen in the findings in trade studies (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004) and FDI 
(Ghemawat, 2001). 
Studies commonly apply fixed effects to the panel data in a gravity model to account for 
unobservable variables that are omitted (Matayas, 1997; Egger, 2002). This method has 
been used to control for economic distance but only controls for those factors that do not 
change over time (Wall, 1999; Cheng and Wall, 2005). Such methodology may be 
appropriate over short time periods but fails to account for economic distance variables 
that change over time. In effect, this method differences out (with the fixed effects), or 
controls for, all geographic variables and some other characteristics which do not 
change over time. It is straightforward to see this is not appropriate for controlling 
unobservable subjective resistances, as most subjective resistances would change over 
time, although change might be slow because of institutional, cultural or even political 
inertia. This is seen in the stability of coefficients that provide measures of these 
resistances over time (Drysdale, 1988) although there is also evidence of how policy and 
other events can lead to radical changes in their impact (Drysdale, 1967; Drysdale, 
2007). There are radical changes in policy in China which alter the institutional setting 
and other variables suddenly that will be of interest in this study. China's WTO entry as 
well as its stages in opening up leading to its WTO entry, for example, are significant 
events that change the structure of resistances in a very short time frame. 
The scale and structure of resistances is influenced by factors that reduce, as well as 
factors that increase, trade and FDI. For instance, any measures which reduce 
information asymmetry (through narrowing political distance, improvement in 
institutions or improvements in transparency), monetary cooperation, harmonisation of 
regulations and other measures reduce subjective resistance and economic distance and 
they may reduce resistances differentially across trade and investment flows. Other 
measures, such as joining an international institution like Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), or cooperating with another country in the United Nations, can 
have the effect of narrowing political distance or reducing asymmetric information and 
therefore reduce subjective resistance. Uncertainty and confidence are important factors 
in international trade and FDI but are often overlooked as they are difficult to measure. 
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Political distance is closely associated with both uncertainty and confidence and so there 
is an element of these reflected in the political distance measure. 
The inability to measure all resistances to FDI, similar to the border problem in trade, 
has led to many classifications of different types of economic distance for FDI. Partial 
equilibrium analyses of empirical estimation ofFDI decisions find taxes, trade 
protection, institutions and common currencies all affect FDI (Bioningen, 2005). The 
equivalent has been developed in the international business or global strategy literature 
that concerns itself with cultural distance, institutional distance and the choice of mode 
of entry ofMNEs, given uncertainty caused by these and other distances (Hymer, 1960; 
Kogut and Singh, 1988; Ghemawat, 2007). General equilibrium analyses and long run 
structural estimation show that the determinants are consistent with those in Figure 2.1 
(p. 22): scale, relative endowment structures, distance and multilateral resistances. 
Resistances from partial equilibrium studies are not routinely or systematically included 
in general equilibrium estimations ofFDI (Bloningen, 2005; Baltagi et al., 2007). 
There are two important streams of literature which seek to analyse FDI relationships, 
both of which have developed almost exclusively from each other without significant 
overlap. One is the FDI modelling literature discussed earlier that has established the 
core determinants of FDI consistent with Figure 2.1. That literature is younger and less 
established than the international business or global strategy literature that concerns 
itself with cultural or institutional distance between countries and its effects on FDI 
decisions (Hymer, 1960; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Ghernawat, 2007). This literature 
focuses mostly on how different resistances, such as trust, cultural and institutional 
factors, affect the scale of investments, the ownership structure (for example, fully 
owned or partially owned subsidiary) and the mode of entry (vertical or horizontal FDI). 
Combining both strands of FDI literature would seem to allow the development of a 
method for modelling consistent with theoretical derivations based on inclusion of 
knowledge capital FDI and multilateral resistances while taking into account resistances 
similar to those that receive much more focus in the trade literature. While there has 
been some overlap between the two sets of literature, with the inclusion of some 
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resistances in general equilibrium FDI models, this has been done in an ad hoc manner, 
not systematically. 
Hymer (1960) introduced the term the 'liability offoreig1mess' to describe the barriers 
that MNEs face when operating in another country. Building on Hymer's study, 
Hofstede (1980) and Kogut and Singh (1988) were important contributions to measuring 
cultural distance in FDI and identifying information asymmetries, cultural differences, 
local biases and other barriers that impacted on cultural distance (Kogut and Singh, 
1988; Ghemawat, 2001 ). More recently Kostova (1996) introduced the concept of 
institutional distance, which is a measure of the similarities or differences in institutions 
between countries. Ghemawat (2007) has extended these concepts and provides a 
comprehensive framework for analysing different kinds of distance between countries 
that is elaborated below. 
Ghemawat (2007) separates factors in the distance measures that are affected in a 
bilateral relationship from those that are country specific and have their effects beyond 
the bilateral relationship. A widening of political distance between a country pair, which 
increases uncertainty and therefore subjective resistance to trade or investment, is 
internal to that bilateral relationship. A country specific (multilateral or unilateral) shock, 
such as an increase in domestic political stability in one country, adds resistance in 
economic exchange to all partner countries involved in trade and FDI. This distinction 
between resistances that are exclusive to a bilateral relationship and resistances that are 
not is a useful one when modelling resistances and understanding their impacts. 
Country-specific resistance, or resistance that is not exclusive to a particular bilateral 
relationship, is not included in theoretical derivations of determinants of FDI, such as 
that ofEgger and Pfaffermyer (2004) but included without theoretical justification in 
studies such as Baltagi et al. (2006) that build on Egger and Pfaffermyer (2004). These 
country specific resistances are often included in gravity models without theoretical 
justification beyond lumping them into the !(distance, other stujj) formulation of 
economic distance. 
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Country pair specific resistances are not completely exclusive to the bilateral analysis as 
they affect any form of multilateral resistance that is included in the model. They will 
affect multilateral price terms in the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) gravity model 
and specific distance weighted resistances terms in FDI models (Egger and Pfaffermayr, 
2004; Baltagi et al., 2007). The multilateral effects of such bilateral shocks are included 
implicitly, but for explicit measurement they would have to be separated from the 
multilateral term which captures the rest of the world and included explicitly as an 
independent variable. 
Empirical studies have not included the effect of political distance in MNE decision-
making models ofFDI, either in general equilibrium models that explain FDI patterns or 
partial equilibrium models that explain MNE behaviour. Instead, FDI host country 
political risk measures have been included in various FDI models and partial 
equilibrium models have included the differences in political systems between countries 
(Ghemawat, 2007). 
While it is useful to separate out the effects of some resistances, as the sections below 
describe, methods have been developed for this study to obtain an estimate of all 
resistances which cannot be measured easily, at which point particular hypotheses can 
be tested with variables of interest. 
Measuring the effect of distance on trade and FDI 
This chapter has shown that trade and FDI have common structural determinants of 
scale, multilateral resistances, factor endowments and economic distance, where the 
measurement of economic distance is an ongoing area of immense research interest and 
far from precise. Apart from the structural variables and geographic distance, an area of 
interest to this study is developing a method to measure and isolate changes in the 
economic distance between countries, brought on by changes in various resistances. 
This section presents a method for analysing whether variation in the distance variable is 
important over time, separate from the scale and multilateral factors. 
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This study is not limited to cross sectional or static analysis but, to understand the 
drivers and factors altering the dynamics of the structure of trade and FDI over time, 
uses panel data over time. While scale and multilateral resistances change over time, 
and comparative advantage changes over a longer time horizon, capturing their effects 
in gravity models of trade and FDI models is straightforward. Geographic distance does 
not change but its effects can change over time, as Hummels (1999) and others show, 
because of changes in technology and other factors. 
As explained above, one limitation of the gravity model literature has been its inability 
to deal fully with trade resistances that might limit or promote trade between particular 
trading partners. Gravity model studies often rely on a number of variables to proxy total 
trade resistances, including trade related costs, such as physical distance. In fact, it has 
become common to 'control' for the difficulty in measuring trade resistances by 
differencing them out in panel data sets and making the assumption that these 
resistances are stable over time. The assumption of different measures of resistances 
being stable over time is unrealistic unless, of course, over a short term period. Besides, 
it is the resistances and the changes in them over time that are of interest in 
understanding the factors and dynamics that shape trade and FDI. 
Gravity models of trade have been used for estimating unexhausted or untapped trade by 
estimating a trade potential or natural trade volume (Baldwin, 1994; Baldwin et al., 
1997; Egger, 2002). They define unexhausted trade as the deviation of actual trade from 
what the model predicts as the natural rate, estimated by the determinants and their 
parameter estimates. Egger (2008) also applies the concept to FDI and calculates 
bilateral FDI potentials and deviations from potentials for Austrian FDI. Actual trade 
and FDI deviates from what the determinants predict (the natural rate) due to 
measurement error or because of omitted variables which are omitted for various 
reasons including the difficulty of measuring them. 
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In order to measure the economic distance and hence the resistances, there is a need to 
benchmark trade and FDI with structural, or core, determinants of trade and FDI. 
Bald win and Taglioni (2006) classifY resistances into natural and manmade 
determinants. This study follows similar lines and use geographic resistances as a 
'natural' determinant of trade and FDI structure and measure a combination of all other 
resistances, subjective and other objective resistances such as protectionist measures, 
which can also be thought of as manmade. The combined effect of all resistances other 
than geographic resistances can be measured and observed over time. The effects of 
certain variables of interest such as political distance, country risk and institutional 
memberships can then be isolated and measured. 
Estimation of a gravity model or FDI model without inclusion of some resistance 
variables has the potential for omitted variable bias. Yet the choice of explanatory 
variables differs from model to model. Which resistance variables should be included in 
the model even when there is the hint from Baldwin and Taglioni (2006)? The answer to 
this is straightforward for the case of FDI models. It is to follow the theory and use a 
model with theoretical underpinnings. Many studies include resistance variables of 
interest in explaining trade or FDI, often without justifiable reasoning other than 
statistical significance and obtaining parameter estimates for policy implications, 
however. FDI models such as that ofEgger and Pfaffermayr (2004) and Baltagi et al. 
(2007) do not include subjective resistances, as their derivations from theory do not 
allow for them (except for a host country risk variable that is included without 
explanation or theoretical basis). Following Baltagi et al. (2007) and Dee (2007), this 
study does not include subjective or other man-made resistances when estimating 
models of FDI but unlike those two studies, does still account for them in subsequent 
analysis as discussed below. 
With gravity models of trade, the separation of resistances can be carried out with 
careful attention to theoretically consistent models such as Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) and by using the framework developed in Figure 2.1 (p.21) which separates the 
resistances to avoid the ambiguous choices in the literature for the estimation of 
resistances. The separation of man-made and natural resistances in the economic 
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distance variable allows for development of a method to measure all non-geographic, or 
man-made, resistances that do not bias the coefficient estimates and do not contradict 
the behaviour of the usual residual of the gravity model. 
The gravity model can be used for explaining trade but also for measuring potential 
trade. In the present study the definition of potential trade differs from other studies in 
trade (Egger, 2002) and FDI (Egger, 2008) and a new meaning of the term 'trade 
potential' is introduced. Trade potential is conceived of as the maximum possible trade 
that can be achieved, not the average as the previous use of the term in the gravity model 
analysis meant. Trade potential is characterised by the frontier as described in the 
production literature and can be used as an estimate of what trade would be in the 
hypothetical case of the most frictionless and free trade possible under present 
circumstances observed throughout the world. Realistically, the estimate of the frontier 
is based on the best achievable 'trade technologies' ( Kalirajan 1999; Kalirajan and 
Findlay 2005). The measurement of economic distance can proceed explicitly by 
estimating a potential trade frontier that will capture all resistances not measured in 
conventional gravity models. Conventional gravity models estimate the mean effects of 
the determinants of trade. Do we then have to settle for the unsatisfactory fixed effects 
estimation and hope that we control for all these bilateral factors that are assumed to be 
fixed over time? 
Stochastic frontier analysis is used to measure production efficiency. This analysis was 
developed by Aigner et al., (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). In the 
production literature, the argument is that the '[production] process is subject to two 
economically distinguishable disturbances, with different characteristics' (Aigner et al. 
1977:24) and so the error term is 'composed' into a non- negative term which captures 
production inefficiencies and a more conventional symmetric error term which captures 
random disturbances. The ability to split the disturbance terms allows that a fam1er 
(producer) who experiences a drought (random disturbance) is unlucky, not inefficient 
(Aigner et al. 1977). 
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A similar concept can be applied to measuring trade flows and FDI. The subjective 
resistances, as well as the protectionist objective resistances, which affect trade in a 
bilateral relationship and which are captured in the unobservable term in the 
conventional gravity model, are captured as a cause for reducing trade in a stochastic 
frontier gravity model. Drysdale and Garnaut (1982) recognised that this distinction is 
blurred, as unmeasurable disturbances make it difficult to get an accurate estimate of 
'potential trade'. 
The problem of applying stochastic frontier analysis to the gravity equation is that this 
application requires a leap of faith in assuming that all trade restrictions are captured in 
the inefficiency term, the non-negative disturbance, just as all of a producer's 
inefficiency in producing an output is captured in the inefficiency term in the 
conventional use of the stochastic frontier method. These issues are dealt with later, in 
Chapter 3. 
One of the strongest assumptions in conventional gravity models is that the mean of the 
unobservable effects is zero. Here the argument is that the unobservable effects reduce 
trade and so have a negative correlation in respect of the dependent variable, trade. 
Policy variables, and other trade-increasing measures such as a regional trade 
arrangement (RTA), are thought of as reducing the resistances. As discussed above, the 
theoretical foundations of the gravity model have only gone as far as including relative 
distance and border effects to capture the resistances. 
The non-negative disturbance that reduces, or impedes, trade means no one can achieve 
trade on the frontier-there will always be asymmetric decision making, port 
inefficiencies, uncertainty, risk and scope for trade facilitation. So this one-sided 
disturbance measures the distance from the frontier and can be thought of as the trade 
inefficiency term that captures trade resistances not specified in the gravity model. The 
only trade resistance terms that need to be included in the gravity model to estimate 
economic distance are geographic distance terms. 
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Just as in the case for production, in the analysis of trade there is a random disturbance 
term that has the usual symmetric properties which are found in conventional gravity 
models. The random disturbance term captures and distinguishes disturbances that are 
not reflected in the bilateral trading country characteristics from disturbances which are 
specific to that bilateral relationship. 
Now instead of finding the average effects of impediments (borders, tariffs and other 
quantifiable barriers) and whether a country is performing better or worse than the mean 
sample, as intensity analysis does using trade shares as benchmarks, a measure of how 
much trade resistance exists in a bilateral trade relationship can be estimated. 
Trade flows closer to the frontier (or the potential level of trade) face fewer resistances. 
Further analysis explaining the deviations of trade relationships from their potential can 
be conducted empirically. Chapter 3 estimates a world trade frontier from which trade 
potentials can be calculated and goes on to explain the estimated distance to the frontier 
for trade flows. 
Stochastic frontier analysis was first used for analysing agricultural output (Aigner et al., 
1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977). Its application is also prevalent in social 
efficiency literature where a govermnent' s ability to deliver social services to those most 
in need is analysed. 17 Applying stochastic frontier analysis to the gravity model may be 
more applicable than its application to measuring aggregate social efficiency, as 
empirical trade gravity models have theoretical foundations whereas the models of 
social indicators do not. It may therefore be more justifiable to impose and extract a 
latent 'inefficiency' feature from a theoretical gravity model than from a social indicator 
model. The application of this method is developed fully in Chapter 3. 
Resistances can be captured in the same potential framework for FDI. There are 
different modes of FDI which are determined by more complex factors than trade but a 
frontier ofFDI can be estimated. There is a potential problem in that FDI is increasing 
in some variables for horizontal FDI but decreasing in that same variable for a different 
17 See Ravallion (2003) for a review of stochastic frontier analysis used in measuring aggregate social 
efficiency. 
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mode ofFDI (vertical FDI) (Baltagi et al., 2007). This, however, is only the case for a 
small number of variables such as the similarity of scale variable- two variables in the 
Baltagi et al. (2007) model which are bilateral determinants and three of the seven 
multilateral variables. It is not considered a significant problem that will inhibit the 
estimation of a frontier. Nevertheless the appropriateness of an FDI frontier model is 
tested in Chapter 4. 
With an FDI frontier, economic distance can be measured for FDI and can explain 
whether, for example, FDI from Japan to China faces similar economic distance to that 
which Japanese FDI faces elsewhere, as well as that faced by other, competing FDI into 
China. Once there is a potential amount ofFDI calculated, given the core or natural 
determining factors and predicted parameters, the distance from the frontier can be 
explained in a second stage of analysis that will help explain the resistances to FDI. 
Egger (2008) conducted a similar exercise but without the frontier and using predicted 
values ofFDI given the mean determinants ofFDI. The model ofFDI he used was not 
consistent with theoretically derived models and therefore it is not clear that the choice 
of core or natural determinants was appropriate. In fact, Egger modelled FDI activity 
(three models using foreign assets, number of foreign affiliates and number of foreign 
employees) using GDP as the only explanatory variable, ignoring all other variables 
shown in Figure 2.2. Also, the Jack of a frontier method in such studies fails to separate 
resistances from random shocks (and measurement error) and therefore attributes those 
shocks as resistances to FDI (Aigner et al. 1977). 
Figure 2.2 replicates Figure 2.1 but with core determinants shaded. The choice of which 
explanatory variables to include in estimating the base line models, potential trade and 
predicted FDI, is straightforward when taking theory seriously and with the framework 
shown in Figure 2.2. The shaded determinants of scale, relative factor endowments and 
multilateral resistances are included, along with only geographic distance from those 
factors that comprise economic distance, to estimate trade potential and also to predict 
FDI. Subjective resistances and easily quantifiable protection measures, which are part 
of objective resistances, are not included in estimating trade potential or estimating FDI 
potential. The deviation from potential or the predicted amount of trade or investment 
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will therefore give a measure of all resistances apart from the geographic distance 
measures of trade or investment. 
Figure 2.2 Separation of core determinants of trade and FDI determinants 
Trade and FDI 
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Note: Arrows indicate direction of causality and therefore economic distance and political distance have 
causality both ways. 
An RT A variable that would reduce resistances is not a core or natural determinant and 
is a resistance, most easily thought of as an objective resistance, that explains the non-
geographic aspect of economic distance. Therefore an RTA measure or variable should 
be included in explaining the deviation of actual from potential, in the case of trade, and 
actual from predicted, in the case of FDI. Without the framework of Figure 2.1, and if an 
RTA variable is included in estimating potential trade or predicted FDI, potential trade 
would become higher as, given the RT A, that trade flow would be expected to be higher 
and therefore the deviation from actual would be higher and performance would appear 
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to be lower. For the case ofFDI a similar result would apply even though the benchmark 
is not a frontier but a mean-calculated benchmark. Inclusion of an RT A variable would 
increase predicted trade for those countries that are involved in the RTA and 
performance, whether actual FDI is above or below what is predicted, would decrease as 
the predicted FDI increases. 
A variable that estimates the effect of membership in other institutions such as APEC or 
WTO has a significant effect on subjective resistances (as well as objective resistances) 
through channels of reducing uncertainty and (assumed) narrowing of political distance 
through cooperation. Such variables can be included in measuring the distance of actual 
from predicted or potential trade and investment the same way as an RT A would. The 
effect of membership in the WTO is of particular interest to this study as outlined in 
Chapter 1. 
The international business literature highlights the importance of resistances to FDI with 
focus on cultural distance and institutional distance to explain or predict the type and 
scale ofFDI. The international trade and MNE literature focuses more on modelling and 
estimating FDI with factor endowments, scale, distance and multilateral resistance. 
There is scope for incorporating the literature on the effects of resistances into the 
modelling, which largely ignores these, in order to obtain a better picture of economic 
distance in FDI flows. This allows for inclusion of variables such as political distance 
into FDI models. The interaction between political distance and economic distance 
typically focuses on trade rather than investment with a vast literature that analyses the 
interaction between cooperation and conflict (political distance) and trade (see, for 
example, Polachek, 1980; Mansfield and Pollins, 2003). 
To answer the question posed in Chapter 1 and to better tmderstand the interaction 
between bilateral economics and bilateral politics, the dotted arrow with causality both 
ways in Figure 2.2 is explored in detail in Chapter 6. Inclusion of a political distance 
measure in explaining why some countries are closer to potential trade, as measured by 
trade determinants, and why some FDI flows are achieving higher than their 
determinants would suggest, are both new developments. They allow a test of whether 
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political distance affects trade and FDI after controlling for other all other determinants. 
The relationship between political distance and trade, as well as political distance and 
FDI, are complex and require further detailed analysis. There is ample evidence of the 
link between the political relationship and trade (Mansfield and Pollins, 200 I; 
Mansfield and Pollins, 2003) with recognition of the direction of causality and Jag times 
differing depending on the bilateral relationship. There is no such comparable literature 
for FDI but implications of accounting for causality running both ways and lag length 
issues, which vary for country pairs that do not necessarily hold a linear relationship 
over time, will be required in any analysis on FDI or trade. 
Trading does not commit as many resources as directly setting up a plant in a foreign 
country and therefore it is hypothesised to be less sensitive to increases in uncertainty. 
This assumption depends on the type ofFDI, for example whether it is horizontal and 
aimed at the domestic market, but in general it would be reasonable to assume FDI is 
more affected by political developments than trade which is arms-length. In this manner, 
a widening of political distance between two countries would be expected to affect FDI 
more than trade. 
The complex interactions between economic distance and political distance are explored 
in detail in Chapter 7. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter the gravity model of trade and FDI models were reviewed to establish a 
common set of determinants. The established and rich gravity model literature and the 
relatively young FDI literature show that scale, distance, multilateral resistances and 
factor endowments are common determinants. 
The framework established in this chapter allows understanding of the forces that affect 
the scale, structure, and changes in scale and structure, of trade and FDI. Analysis is 
usually confined to explaining just the scale and structure of trade or FDI with gravity 
45 
type models but making use of world trade and FDI data over time allows the study of 
change in structure and scale over time. 
The measurement of, or inability to explain, all resistances in trade is considered a 
problem and the drop in trade across borders that it causes is referred to as the border 
puzzle or border problem in the literature. General equilibrium FDI models rarely 
include resistances and the choice of which resistances to include is often arbitrary and 
not consistent with theory. Partial equilibrium FDI models often focus on resistances to 
FDI. To analyse an economic relationship it is important to study and measure all the 
resistances to understand what determines economic distance between two countries. 
Beyond explaining trade or FDI with scale, multilateral resistances and factor 
endowments, measurement of economic distance over time is able to illuminate the 
causes of changes in the structure or scale of a trading or FDI relationship and this is a 
very useful tool in the context of examining the influence of politics on trade and 
investment. 
A method was introduced to estimate potential trade using stochastic frontier analysis 
combined with a gravity model, which is put into practice in Chapter 3. The method 
allows estimation of a trade frontier and further analysis in explaining the distance of 
actual trade to that frontier. A stochastic frontier model can also be applied to an FDI 
model to estimate potential FDI. The determinants of FDI, as described by theory and 
empirical evidence, define the frontier from the best performing investment 
relationships worldwide. Those that achieve close to the frontier (their potential) can be 
characterised as facing less resistance and having lower economic distance. Further 
analysis on explaining the resistances in that economic distance is then possible. The 
estimation of an FDI frontier and explanation of resistances in FDI is carried out in 
Chapter 4. The choice of variables to include is based on theoretical derivations of the 
models and results in using scale, multilateral resistances, geographic distance 
(including geographic factors such as common borders) and relative factor endowments. 
The deviation of actual trade from potential trade, and actual FDI from predicted FDI, 
are remaining variables that comprise economic distance, most of which is explained by 
subjective resistances. 
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Variables of interest, such as membership of the WTO, can be used to explain economic 
distance. In particular, a measure of bilateral political distance can be included in 
explaining subjective resistances and also the effect of changes in that variable on trade 
and FDI over time. 
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3 Japan-China trade performance and the world trade 
frontier 
China is Japan's largest trading partner, accounting for one-fifth of Japan's total trade 18• 
Japan was China's largest trading partner until2003, but has been overtaken by the 
United States and the EU, with China-United States and China-EU trade growing faster 
than China-Japan trade since 2005. Japan has become less important to China in terms 
of trade share since China's WTO entry but China has become more important to Japan. 
Have the barriers to trade with China fallen for the EU and United States by more than 
that of Japan? Or have barriers between Japan and China increased relatively? Or do 
these changes in the status of Japan-China trade simply reflect changes in the relative 
importance of both economies in the international economy, rather than the comparative 
performance of each of these bilateral trade relationships? This chapter explains the 
geographic structure of trade and provides a measure of trade performance to help 
answer these questions. 
By what measure might the trade performance between Japan and China be judged? 
How can its performance be compared with the performance of other bilateral trading 
relationships and world trade t1ows? This chapter estimates a trade frontier to create a 
counterfactual level of trade for trade flows based on the world's most frictionless trade 
t1ows. To do this, the chapter combines a stochastic frontier model with a gravity model 
of trade, as introduced in Chapter 2. 
The framework developed in Chapter 2 can be used to specifY variable choice based on 
theory and consistent with explaining trade. A frontier gravity model is estimated using 
the core determinants of scale, multilateral resistances, complementarity and geographic 
distance factors. Each trade t1ow can then be compared to its potential and performance, 
measured as the distance of actual trade from potential trade. Two stages of estimations 
will allow examination of the structure of trade as well as explanation of the trade 
performance and its changes over time. 
18 Source: UN Comtrade database on line. 
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The next section reviews the stochastic frontier gravity model and some of its uses. The 
section after that introduces the specifics of the model and data that are used in this 
study to explain trade and estimate its performance. Then the results are presented 
before introducing and estimating the second stage of the frontier gravity model- to 
explain the performance. At the end the conclusions are summarised. 
The stochastic frontier gravity model 
The stochastic frontier gravity model, introduced in Chapter 2, combines the stochastic 
frontier model (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977) with the 
gravity model of trade (Tinbergen, 1966). The stochastic frontier model is used 
extensively in measuring the efficiency of firm level production given certain inputs. 
The gravity model is used widely in explaining trade and estimating effects of trade 
policy measures. This chapter combines the two methods to estimate an upper bound on 
trade and measure trade performance (which can be thought of as trade efficiency). A 
few studies have estimated a stochastic frontier gravity model 19 ('frontier gravity model' 
from here on) but none have justified its use or chosen variables in a consistent manner. 
The following sets out the model and explains, extending the explanation in Chapter 2, a 
theory-consistent choice of variables for estimating and then explaining the frontier of 
trade20. 
First, assume a standard gravity model of the fonn 
where X;Jt is exports from country i to country j and time I, Yu1 is a vector of trade 
determinants at timet fori and), jJ is a vector of coefficients to be estimated and cu1 is 
the disturbance term that is independently and identically distributed. If Equation (3.1) is 
estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) then Eu1 is the deviation of actual to predicted 
trade (due to unobserved factors and measurement error). For stochastic frontier analysis, 
eu1 is a composite disturbance term that is decomposed into vu1 and uu1• vu1 is an 
independently and identically distributed nonnal variable with mean zero and variance 
19 See, for example, Kalirajan (1999), Drysdale et al. (2000), Kalirajan and Find lay (2005) and Armstrong 
et al. (2008). 
20 The stochastic frontier gravity model will have the same limitations as the conventional gravity model, 
especially when using aggregate trade flows. 
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u/ and uy1 is an independent and identically distributed non-negative variable which 
usually has a half normal, truncated normal or exponential distribution (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). 
where 
where Jl > 0 and vy1 and uy1 are distributed independently of each other, and of the 
regressors21 . 
The disturbance term vy1 accounts for random variation in trade similar to the 
disturbance term in the standard OLS model. The non-negative (or one-sided) 
disturbance term, uy1, measures the difference between potential trade and actual trade. 
More precisely, it is the amount of trade that falls short of the frontier for trade from 
country i to j at time t.22 
Figure 3.1 illustrates how a stochastic frontier gravity model compares to a conventional 
gravity model. A conventional gravity model fits a line of best fit through the 
observations whereas the frontier gravity model estimates an upper bound. The frontier 
method is preferred in this study because of the ability to capture the resistances in the 
distance from the frontier, as explained in detail in Chapter 2. The frontier gravity model 
distinguishes between random error (such as measurement error) and resistances to trade. 
The stochastic frontier model allows the analysis to split the disturbance terms so there 
is a distinction between a producer (a farmer in the original literature) who experiences 
21 This assumption is necessary for the calculation of the frontier. However, it assumes that a country's 
trade policies that affect its objective and subjective resistances (such as tariff liberalisations) are 
independent from its performance of actual to potential trade, or that the country does not know its level 
of trade potential achieved when conducting trade policy. A country that knows it has (or is recognized to 
have) relatively friction less trade (Singapore or Hong Kong, for example) may behave differently to other 
countries that do not. However, as most resistances are subjective and a partner country's resistances are 
very difficult to gauge, the assumption is somewhat safer than in conventional use of the stochastic 
frontier model, where producers can conceivably adjust their inputs knowing some information about their 
technical efficiency. 
22 For a detailed technical description of the estimation procedure see Coelli (I 996) and Kumbhakar and 
Lovell (2000). 
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a random disturbance (such as a drought in the case of the farmer) that is unlucky, and a 
producer who is inefficient (Aigner et al., 1977). 
Figure 3.1 Frontier and conventional gravity model comparison 
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Source: Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). 
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To see how the variation of actual to potential trade is determined from Equation (3 .1 ), 
combining Equation (3 .1) and Equation (3 .2), we obtain 
(3.3) 
which can be rearranged to 
(3.4) Xu, actual E(X ijll uij,Y,p) 
J(Y,,,fJ)exp(vu,) =potential= E(X,flluu, =O,Xu,) 
where exp( -uv) is the ratio of actual to potential trade which can be calculated for each 
country pair, ij, at timet. One minus that amount, [1- exp(-uv)], is the variation from the 
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frontier (see Figure 3.1 ). The expected value of trade given the determinants, Xij,, and 
the inefficiency equal zero, uu1 = 0, is potential trade, or trade on the frontier. 
Stochastic frontier analysis typically estimates the frontier, which is the same as 
estimation of the one-sided disturbance term, and also has a second stage which explains 
the distance of actual value to the estimated potential value. The second stage can be a 
simple model, such as: 
where zu1 is a vector of variables that influence the distance from potential trade. r5ij, is a 
vector of parameters to be estimated, and g(.) is the function that maps those variables to 
the distance from the frontier. The two step estimation is usually done simultaneously 
and with a different model specification but this study follows Drysdale et al. (2000) and 
conducts these two estimations separately23 . This requires the assumption that uij, is 
independent from vu1 24 • The reason for estimating the two stages separately is discussed 
later in the chapter. 
Equation (3.3) is a multiplicative function with the product of determinants defining the 
model. It is usually estimated in logarithms: 
The specific functional form of Equation (3.6) and the choice of variables in both stages 
are discussed in the next section but first it is useful to review the literature that has 
estimated the stochastic frontier gravity model. 
Stochastic frontier analysis has been applied to gravity equations in a handful of papers 
such as Drysdale et al. (2000), Drysdale and Xu (2004), Kalirajan and Findlay (2005), 
Kang and Frantianni (2006) and Armstrong et al. (2008). Drysdale et al. (2000) estimate 
the model using a large enough set of countries to allow it to be defined as a world trade 
23 If the two stages are estimated simultaneously, u,i, will have a distribution ofN(mij~>cru2) where rnijt =zut 
(Coelli, 1996). 
24 See footnote 19. 
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frontier. That is, their trade frontier is one whose estimated coefficients are hased on 
best practice, or least trade resistant trade characteristics within all world trade flows. 
Kalirajan and Findlay (2005) use only Australian exports to define a country specific 
frontier. Export perfonnance in a bilateral relationship can be compared to any other 
bilateral trade flow or measured against average performance by any country if the 
world frontier is used. 
Drysdale et al. (2000) find that on average, bilateral trade flows achieved 34 per cent of 
the estimated trade potential for 1991-1995 while Kalirajan and Findlay find Australian 
exports achieved 65 per cent for the time period 1999-2002. The difference is explained 
by the way in which the frontiers are defined, the different countries being analysed in 
each study (and so results are not comparable), the different time periods and perhaps 
the different specification of the distribution of the non-negative disturbance term 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000)25 The relatively low ratios of actual to potential trade in 
these studies, especially in Drysdale et al. (2000), is evidence of high trade resistances 
but also a result of high variation in the sample. 
The empirical results support the use of a stochastic frontier as Drysdale et al. (2000) 
find that 78 per cent of the variation in trade flows is due to the variance in the 
inefficiency term26, which dominates the rest of the variation, from the stochastic 
disturbance term. There are other applications of stochastic frontier gravity models 
which use a varying coefficients version of the model (Drysdale et al., 1997; Kalirajan, 
1999). 
Differences in trade patterns across different regions of the world, different time periods 
and countries at different levels of development mean that the estimated elasticity 
coefficients of gravity models, or frontier gravity models, could be improved if they are 
allowed some flexibility. Since developing countries tend to produce more 
homogeneous goods and developed countries produce and sell more differentiated 
25 When dealing with cross-sectional data it is necessary to specifY, or force a distribution, for the non-
negative disturbance whereas with a panel, the model fits the best distribution to the disturbance. The most 
commonly used distributions are exponential or half normal. 
26 This is the value of gamma, which is the proportion of total variation (from both the disturbance terms) 
that is explained by the variance of the non-negative disturbance term. 
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products, it would make sense to allow for coefficients to vary between the groups. 
Further, allowing the coefficients to vary for each estimate is desirable as it is 
reasonable to assume they will be different because of different stages of development, 
different preference structures or having a stronger 'home market' effect. Also, income 
elasticities are likely to change over country pairs and over time. The stochastic varying 
coefficients gravity model is used in Kalirajan (1999) and Drysdale et al. (1997). In 
these applications, coefficients are allowed to vary and the model predicts a different 
coefficient for each observation, at each time. 
There is potential for any number of subjective resistances to be used to explain the 
distance of a trade performance relative to the frontier: measures of domestic, bilateral 
and multilateral institutions, governance quality, freedom and corruption indexes and 
conflict-cooperation variables, for example, could used to extend the application of this 
methodology. Drysdale et al. (2000) used some of these variables for this purpose. 
Estimating trade potential 
The choice of explanatory variables is outlined in detail in Chapter 2. The scale 
variables (GDPs), geographic distance factors, complementarity and multilateral 
resistances are used to estimate the frontier. Before specifying the functional form of 
Equation (3.6) for the purposes of this study, it is necessary to show how Equation (3.6) 
can be fitted to a gravity model. 
Deriving the frontier model 
The widely used standard structural gravity model as derived by Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) is 
(3. 7) ln x'l, = ln /30 + /3, ln y" + /32 ln y 1, + (1- o-)fJ3 ln t'l, + (1- O" )ln TI" + (1- O" )ln P;, + "'~' 
where xu1 is trade from i to j at time t, Yil is country i' s size (GDP) at time t, y1, is country 
j's size (GDP) at timet, r5 is the elasticity of substitution between all goods (and not the 
variance parameter from earlier equations), tu1 is the trade cost term of goods traded 
from i toj at time t, !lit and Pit are the price indexes of country i and country j, 
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respectively, and are the multilateral resistances. They are comprised of all country i and 
country j' s trade partner prices. The trade cost term captures all resistances to trade. 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) made the assumption of symmetric trade costs 
(tu=tJi) to solve their model, which is inappropriate, especially when there is a time 
dimension (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). The following derivation does not depend on 
whether a cross section or panel is being analysed and so the time subscript is dropped 
temporarily. 
To see how this can be split in a gravity model framework, we take the trade resistance 
term (what Anderson and van Wincoop call trade costs) between i andj, tu, which 
Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) define as 
(3.8) tu= f(distu,other stuff) 
and split this into man"made and geographic and subjective resistances27 : 
(3.9) 
tu= f(resistu) = f(geographic",subjectiveu,other) 
= h(geographicu )g(subjective" )/( COMPu) 
and the geographic resistances can be further expanded to 
h(geographic u) = h(r Distu, border,1 , ... ) 
= rDistu "' exp(border/' +landlocked,"' +landlocked/" + ... ) 
where rDistu is relative distance between countries i andj, border" is a dummy variable 
that takes the value one if i and j share a border, and zero otherwise; and landlocked is a 
dummy variable with value one if a country is landlocked. Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) only include distance and border effects for the trade resistance term but the 
choice of variable to include is arbitrary and Bald win and Taglioni (2006) include a 
currency union variable. In this study the choice of variable is set out in Chapter 2 and 
kept consistent. A complementarity variable, COMPu, is included to reflect the 
complementarity of endowment structures of the trading nations. The inclusion of this 
variable here may seem arbitrary but it is an important core determinant of trade which 
should not be included in the second stage estimation, which only includes policy 
27 This follows on from the discussion in Chapter 2 and although this does not account for objective 
resistances other than geographic resistances, such as tariff barriers, for simplicity they will be captured in 
the subjective resistance tenn. Most of the resistances are thought to be subjective. Equation (7) should 
really read: 
f(geographic, other objective, subjective). 
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measures and other subjective resistance variables. In the theoretical derivation of the 
gravity model, the term tif is the unobservable trade cost factor (Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2003). 
The gravity model Equation (3.7) can now be transformed into a frontier gravity model 
by 'forcing' all non-geographic objective resistances and subjective resistances to the 
non-negative error term. This allows a measure of all resistances in the non-negative 
disturbance term. The model becomes 
(3.1 0) 
lnxu, = lnj]0 + j], Iny;, + j]2 InyJI + fl3 lnh(geographic) 
+ fl4COM!ij, +(1-a-)IniT;, +(1-rr)InP1, +vu, -uu, 
where uu = g(subjectiveif)?:. 0 
Equation (3.10) includes the determinants of trade as discussed in Chapter 228 • To 
I . the deviation of actual trade to potential trade, the second stage of the estimation expam 
will expand to 
(3.11) exp( -uu,) = g(zu,o)= g(subjectiveu,o) 
Subjective resistances can be further expanded to include variables commonly found in 
gravity models. 
(3.12) g(subjectiveu,) = g(trade agreements,political dist,regional blocs,tariffi ,fang ... ) 
28 The multilateral resistances include a measure of trade costs. Splitting the trade cost term to estimate a 
frontier is problematic in this sense. This would require the assumption of multilateral resistances being 
defined from the sum of all trade relationships except for the partner country which the particular 
observation is covering. The multilateral effect of trade from i to j, for country j will be a sum over all k 
J 
not equal to i. P; = [2: (/V,t,
1 
)-a]J-a 
k" 
where tij is the iceberg trade cost factor, Pis a true cost ofliving index, cr is the constant elasticity of 
substitution (which is exogeneous). Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) sum over all i but this would 
create problems when splitting the tenn tu to facilitate an error components model for ftontier estimation. 
Here it is argued that without the inclusion of country i in country j's multilateral resistance tenn, when 
trade between i and j is being explained, there will be very little bias and the effect of the multilateral term 
will be the same. The solution for capturing the multilateral resistances is explained later in this chapter. 
The caveat here is justified on the grounds that the application of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
usually requires an approximation of multilateral resistances (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006; Shepherd and 
Wilson, 2008). 
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where trade agreementsu is a dummy variable indicating a trade agreement between i 
and} (this can be split into different types of trade agreements),political distu is a 
measure of political distance between i and j, and there is scope for inclusion of tariff 
measures, language similarity and other resistances29 
In the production and social efficiency literatures, there is ambiguity as to which 
variables should be included in the first stage, measuring inefficiency, and the second 
stage, explaining inefficiency (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Ravallion, 2003). The 
justification presented in Chapter 2 and the model presented here give clear reasons for 
the choice of variables to explain the distance between actual and potential trade. 
To proceed further with the model, it is first necessary to discuss the methods that are 
commonly used to control for multilateral resistances and explain the approach adopted 
in this study. 
Controlling for multilateral resistances 
To estimate a gravity model without the inclusion of multilateral resistances has been 
shown to omit an important explanator of trade. Anderson and van Win coop (2003) 
solved and estimated the model using an assumption of sy:nn:netric trade costs, an 
assumption which is appropriate for estimating cross section data but has significant 
implications for the results when panel data is used (Balisteri and Hillberry, 2006). 
Studies such as Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) estimate the various practical ways to 
control for the multilateral resistances with panel data sets. The solution that is often 
implemented is to use dummy variables to account for the unobservable multilateral 
resistances (see Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006; and Shepherd and Wilson, 2008i0. 
Of the various dummy variable combinations that can be included to eliminate or at 
least minimise the bias from omitting multilateral resistances, Baldwin and Taglioni 
29 The political distance variable was introduced in Chapter 2 and is elaborated on again in Chapter 4 
pages 98 and 99, and Chapter 7 on page 164. 
30 This method of controlling for multilateral resistances is common in the literature and is a practical way 
to control for the price index multilateral resistances that Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) describe. 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) call this inward multilateral resistance. 
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(2006) show that fixed effects across the time-exporter and time-importer dimensions is 
the preferred option and the most consistent with theory. Baldwin and Taglioni call 
these time varying-country dummies (Jl" and y}l). However, as they and Shepherd and 
Wilson (2008) point out, time varying country dummies are impractical to estimate for 
large data sets. IfN is the number of nations and T is the number of time periods, a uni-
directional data set (trade from country A to B) necessitates 2NT dummies and a bi-
directional data set (trade from country A to Band trade from B to A) requires 2N(N-
1 )T dummies (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). When estimating a gravity model using a 
world trade matrix of say 50 representative countries over ten years, the number of 
dummies is 49,000 (2*50*(50-l)* 1 0). 
The practical alternative options for dummy variables are to have country and time 
dummies separately (J11, y1 and 81), to have time-invariant country pair dummies (Jlij), or 
to have time-varying country pair dummy variables (Jlij1). 
The first option of country and time dummies separately is computationally less 
demanding than time-varying country dummies. Shepherd and Wilson (2008) use this 
method, which is admittedly less precise but a reasonable approximation after 
robustness checks. This still requires 2(N-1) +T-1 dummy variables. With anN of65 
countries and T of27 (the size ofthe panel to be estimated later) this is 154 additional 
variables. While this approach is less computationally demanding, a better solution is 
proposed below. 
The purpose of the estimation is to obtain a measure of variation across the country pair 
dimension and the variation across the country pair dimension over time. This allows 
analysis of the bilateral barriers and resistances to trade over time. The stochastic 
frontier allows a measure of both without differencing out the effects with dummy 
variables. The second and third options above would cancel out the unobserved 
variation in each of those dimensions with fixed effects across those dimensions. Take, 
for example, fixed effects across the time-country pair dimension. The fixed effect of 
the country pair-time dimension will not be included in the measurement of the trade 
potential and therefore the impacts of events such as WTO entry on Japan-China will be 
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cancelled out of the analysis. The study requires measurement of events in the country 
pair-time dimension (such as WTO entry in 2001 on China's trade) as well as the time-
invariant country pair dimension (resistances that do not change over time between 
countries) while also controlling for multilateral resistances. 
Greene (2004) shows that heterogeneity across the dependent variable observations, in 
this case country pairs, is captured in the inefficiency term, uu1• Fixed eflects estimation 
using panel data is a trivial extension of stochastic frontier models (Greene, 2005). The 
difficulty with the fixed effects approach is that the larger the data set, the more 
computationally demanding it becomes (as the example above shows) and with simpler 
models the fixed effects are absorbed in the intercept term so that the result is a firm (or 
dependent variable unit) specific intercept31 (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
Instead of using fixed effects (dummy variables), with the stochastic frontier method, 
the variables of interest such as the effect of China's WTO accession on a bilateral 
relationship (in this case Japan-China) will be 'forced into the inefficiency term' 
(Greene, 2005). Greene's hint (2004; 2005) that the unobserved variation across the 
dependent variable unit is captured in the inefficiency term allows estimation of the 
frontier variables without bias stemming from multilateral resistances. The choice then 
becomes whether the dependent variable unit is across the country pair dimension or the 
time-varying country pair dimension. 
This study applies both the time-invariant country pair fixed effects (flu) and time 
varying country pair fixed effects (flu1) to account for multilateral resistances. The model 
to estimate becomes: 
(3.13) 
with flu1 being captured in uu1• 
31 Another problem with this approach is that it requires one country (or firm in the original literature) to 
lie on the frontier (efficiency of 100 per cent) and the rest of the observations are calculated from that 
benchmark (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
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Kalirajan (2008) describes the same solution starting from a different but related issue. 
The assumption that geographic distance is a satisfactory proxy for economic distance 
causes inconsistent estimates of parameters in gravity models because of the 
heteroscedastic error terms. The unobservable resistances that comprise economic 
distance cause heteroscedasicity of unknown structure and non-normality in the residual 
term. Kalirajan (2008) proposes the application of the stochastic frontier model to 
correct for this heteroscedasicity. While Kalirajan (2008) proposes the stochastic 
frontier method to overcome the problem of economic distance not being equivalent to 
geographic distance, as identified by Anderson (1979), the proposed solution in this 
study also means the stochastic frontier can account for multilateral resistances. 
Estimation 
The model and data 
The full model to be estimated is Equation (3.13) with geographic resistances specified: 
(3.14) 
All variables are as described previously but Table 3.1 includes more detail and the data 
sources. 
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Table 3.1 Variable description and data sonrces 
Variable Description Data source Notes 
Xijt trade from i to j at IMF's Direction of Trade Calculated from imports 
timet Statistics (various years) and instead of exports for 
gaps in the data are filled in accuracy*. 
from the International 
Economic Databank (IEDB) 
Yit Country i's size (GDP) World Development 
at timet Indicators (WDJ) and at 
current prices 
rDistu Relative distance from i Great circle distance 
to} between capital cities of rDLvt11 ::::: 
each country was collected kcri 
from the Chemical Ecology 
of Insects website: 
h!!Q://www.chemical-
ecology.net! 
Borderij Variable that takes on 
the value of one if i and 
j share a common land 
border, zero otherwise. 
COMPij, Complementarity index IEDB, Australian National (X' 11 M M') c - I 1 ~·- J j of i's trade with} at University '!I- I X'Mk -Alk. M 
time 1. k I W I j 
[see below] 
Notes:* Importers have less incentive to under-report and imports are a more accurate reflection of trade 
flow values than reported exports. The exception is European trade where there is a tax incentive to under-
report imports due to the value added tax structure but import flows were used for consistency. This is 
common practice. 
The complementarity index used here is from Drysdale (1967) and Drysdale and 
Garnaut (1982): 
where X is exports, M is imports, subscripts denote country (i, j and world) and 
superscript k implies commodity k. The index is calculated at the three digit level from 
the Australian National University's International Economic Databank32 for all 
combinations of countries and years. The index captures the complementarity of trade 
structures between countries and the higher the index the higher degree of 
complementarity. 
32 http://iedb.anu.edu.au/ 
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The model is estimated for an unbalanced panel between 1980 and 2006. The data 
includes a representative sample of world trade with the bilateral trade flows of 65 
countries by 65 countries. The countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Jordan, South Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan33, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, an Vietnam. Some bilateral flows are missing for some years due to data 
availability but given the large numbers of observations, this is a relatively complete and 
balanced panel. 
The model can be estimated using any one of the following programs: GAUSS, STATA, 
LIMDEP, and FRONTIER 4.1. 
Trade performance results 
Table 3.2 shows results for OLS estimation in column (1). Column (2) is the model 
estimated over the time-invariant country pair dimension and column (3) is the same 
model as column (2), with additional time dununy variables which are not presented in 
the results (to save space). 
All coefficients are statistically significant at the one per cent level and the signs are as 
would be expected. The larger two countries are, the more they trade and the further 
they are apart, the less they trade. A complementary trade structure with a partner helps 
explain an increase in trade as does sharing a border. The OLS coefficients on the GDP 
variables are unity, which is a result consistent with the gravity model literature. 
33 Trade and GDP data for Taiwan are from the International Economic Databank (lED B), Australian 
National University, http://iedb.anu.edu.au/ 
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Table 3.2 OLS and MLE stochastic frontier estimation results 
(J) (2) (3) 
Dependent Frontier Frontier w 
variable OLS country pair country pair & In( trade,,) time dummies 
Constant -33.3T'' -J 8.49''' -20.39"' 
(0.2303) (0.1423) (0. I 552) 
lnGDP,, 0.99'" 0.70'" 0.74'" 
(0.0066) (0.0041) (0.0049) 
lnGDPi, 1.00"' 0.78'" 0.80'" 
(0.0061) (0.0038) (0.0039) 
rDist;_i -3.59"' -2.28''' -2.28'" 
(0.0486) (0.0278) (0.0444) 
Compijt 2.48"' 2. 10'" 2.06"" 
(0.0265) (0.021 0) (0.0331) 
Border,, 0.92'" 0.98'" 0.98"" 
(0.0669) (0.0403) (0.0373) 
sigma-squared J 1.04 52.04"' 49.01'" 
(0.298) (0.3795) 
Gamma 0.976'" 0.98'" 
Mu -14.26 -13.85 
log likelihood 
function -244612 -212727 -211240 
Number of 
observations 93382 93382 93382 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.' p < 0.05, "p < 0.01, "' p < 0.001 
A positive coefficient on the complementarity variable means the more complementary 
two trading partners' trade stmctures are, the more they will trade. This reflects an 
underlying complementarity in resource, economic and factor stmctures. For Japan and 
China, the complementarity measure is above unity for all but a few years in one 
direction (1980 and I 983 to 1985) and in most cases by a significant amount (ranging up 
to a value of 1.56). The complementarity of Japan's and China's trade stmctures with 
each other contributes to their level of trade. 
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The choice of the time-invariant country pair model is due to the limit of the stochastic 
frontier method used over time. A panel data set is forced to have either no time 
dimension, and therefore only one result for 27 time periods, or to have results that vary 
systematically over time with uu1 defined as: 
uu, = uu exp(-IJ(t-1)) 
where the performance of trade over time is limited to decline in a log-linear fashion, or 
to increase in a log-linear fashion based on a parameter 17 (eta) to be estimated (Battese 
and Coelli, 1992). The variation over time is limited to moving in one direction and in a 
systematic way, which does not allow for variation as shown in Figure 3.2 and the 
movements due to policy variables such as China joining the WTO. The results are 
presented in Appendix 3A with a comparison and discussion. 
The likelihood function is (significantly) larger for the model when relative geographic 
distance is used instead of absolute distance (kilometres), confirming the importance of 
the relative distance measure as discussed in Chapter 2. Including time dummy variables 
does not alter the results significantly. The results for the models estimated using 
absolute distance instead of relative distance and for the time-varying country pair 
dimension, are presented in Appendix 3A. Another issue is the stability of the parameter 
estimates over such a long period of time (27 years). Appendix 3C shows results for the 
period truncated into two sub-periods with the results showing the signs of all the 
coefficient estimates consistent over the two periods and magnitudes remarkably similar. 
Such results confirm the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation (Arellano and Bond, 
1991 ), which was also conducted and which shows no autocorrelation. 
Other model specification choices are whether to include f.1 (mu) and whether they 
(gamma) is significant. If the importance of f.1 is confirmed, it means that a truncated 
normal distribution fits the one-sided disturbance term better than a half normal 
distribution. y is the proportion of total variation that is explained by variation in the 
non-negative disturbance (the rest is the variation explained by the normal error term). 
The statistical tests that confirm these model specification tests are presented in 
Appendix 3A. 
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The trade performance results (actual trade as a ratio to potential trade) are presented in 
Table 3.3 for a selection of countries. High trade performance (a high actual to potential 
trade ratio) is associated with low trade resistances (most of which are subjective 
~esistances)34 . Conversely, low trade performance is associated with that trade flow 
across which there are high resistances to trade. Appendix 3B has a more complete list 
of all countries. 
The average world trade performance is 0.30 over the entire time period. This means 
that only 30 per cent of potential trade is realised worldwide. The low number is 
expected for three reasons. Firstly, this number, which is a world average, is not low by 
the standards of other findings. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) estimate trade costs 
add a 170 per cent ad valorem tax to exports, on average. Balisteri and Hillberry (2006) 
estimate that 'at least 50 per cent' of the value of a traded good 'melts' in transit when 
thinking in terms of iceberg transportation costs35. In fact, a low overall performance 
number is to be expected given the resistances to trade. Secondly, the larger the 
variation in the sample, the lower the average will be as there will more likely be trade 
flows that experience less friction, which 'pushes the frontier up' (Armstrong et al., 
2008). In this study a large data set was used with over 93,000 observations and a low 
average is thus expected. Thirdly, the absolute number is sensitive to the model 
specification and specifically the choice of distribution of the non-negative disturbance 
term. In this case a truncated normal distribution fits the data best but a half normal 
distribution would have meant a lower world average. 
What matters more than the absolute numbers is the relative position of trade 
performances compared to other trade flows and the world average trade performance. 
The choice of distribution of the non-negative disturbance term does not significantly 
alter the relative positions. The most liberal and resistance free trade flow will achieve 
best trade performance regardless of the choice of distribution. 
34 For full discussion see Chapter 2. 
35 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of iceberg transport costs. 
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Table 3.3 Trade performance results, selected countries and years 
.1i:xpOrtfr Imp()rter 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006 
China Japan 0.43 0.46 0.34 0.34 0.40 0.44 
Japan China 0.36 0.36 0.30 0.37 0.38 0.42 
World World 0.37 0.34 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.28 
Chinese exports 
China Australia 0.35 0.34 0.43 0.47 0.48 0.51 
China Germany 0.27 0.30 0.40 0.41 0.48 0.50 
China Hong Kong 0.41 0.40 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.50 
China Singapore 0.65 0.72 0.65 0.60 0.60 0.63 
China USA 0.29 0.42 0.48 0.53 0.55 0.58 
China World 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.38 0.45 
Chinese imports 
Germany China 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.42 0.47 
Australia China 0.57 0.53 0.49 0.34 0.37 0.43 
Hong Kong China 0.50 0.59 0.57 0.45 0.43 0.26 
Singapore China 0.53 0.44 0.54 0.54 0.47 0.46 
USA China 0.33 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.39 0.40 
World China 0.27 0.36 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.32 
Japanese exports 
Japan Australia 0.44 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.39 0.37 
Japan Germany 0.47 0.52 0.45 0.38 0.40 0.34 
Japan Hong Kong 0.57 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.58 
Japan Singapore 0.67 0.67 0.61 0.55 0.56 0.53 
Japan USA 0.55 0.53 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.47 
Japan World 0.44 0.44 0.37 0.32 0.34 0.34 
Japanese imports 
Australia Japan 0.44 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.20 
Germany Japan 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.38 0.40 0.41 
Hong Kong Japan 0.48 0.46 0.32 0.16 0.09 0.11 
Singapore Japan 0.63 0.58 0.51 0.46 0.43 0.43 
USA Japan 0.58 0.52 0.48 0.45 0.44 0.41 
World Japan 0.41 0.35 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.23 
Other 
Singapore Hong Kong 0.72 0.71 0.67 0.68 0.64 0.65 
Singapore USA 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.61 0.62 0.58 
United States Singapore 0.73 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.63 
United States Australia 0.54 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.48 0.44 
United States Hong Kong 0.64 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.58 0.55 
United States World 0.45 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.30 
World USA 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.34 
Source: Author's calculations 
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The realisation of trade potential on average across the world is !rending downwards. 
Given the reductions in transportation and communications costs and the reduction of 
barriers to trade, both at the border and beyond the border, reflected in rapidly 
increasing world trade values, one might expect mean trade performance (realisation of 
potential) to be increasing. The nature of stochastic frontier analysis means that the 
more variation there is in trade performance, given the core determinants of trade, the 
lower the average is likely to be. The best performers push the elasticities higher and the 
frontier shifts outwards (an improvement in 'trade technology'), meaning the average 
trade relationship has to keep up with the best performers for average to grow. This is 
consistent with the findings ofDowrick and DeLong (2003), who show that in the 
second half of the 20th century there was divergence in growth between those countries 
that have been at the global table and those that have not, and that there has been 
convergence among those economies that have opened their economies. World trade is 
also becoming more distorted with the proliferation of preferential trade agreements 
(PT As), which not only expand trade but also divert it (Viner, 1950), reducing trade 
efficiency (Garnaut, 2002; Adams et al., 2004; Panagariya, 2007; Garnaut and Vines, 
2007). 
The top performing trade flows in Table 3.3 are open economies such as Hong Kong 
and Singapore, which is to be expected. Japanese and Chinese trade to Singapore and 
Hong Kong achieve closer to potential than the other trade flows and trade between 
them is high. Table 3B in Appendix 3 confirms that the East Asian economies of 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Malaysia are achieving, while in Europe it is the 
historically open and known trader, the Netherlands, and the open Belgium-Luxembourg. 
Panama is also a high export achiever but not importer. Being relatively small open 
economies (or acting as a port for the larger economies) close to large economies means 
that more trade flows to them than the determinants would suggest. It is the trade 
relationships of these countries that helps define the trade technologies that define the 
frontier. 
The results for China and Japan are expanded for the entire time period in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 Japan-China trade performance results, per cent 
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Figure 3.2 shows clearly the declining world average trade performance over time. In 
contrast to this, China's average exports, Chinese trade to Japan and Japanese trade to 
China have been increasing their realisation of potential trade time from the mid 1990s. 
Average Chinese import performance was declining until 1997 or 1998 and has been 
increasing since. There appears to be a small kink in Japanese export performance to 
China and Chinese imports around the time of China's WTO accession in December 
200 l, as discussed in the next section. 
The performance of Chinese imports was lower than the world average over the 1990s 
and only seemed to rise above world average in 2002. Japanese import performance is 
well below world average for most years. China is a relatively open country for its level 
of development but the results suggest that imports into China faced similar resistances 
as that of the world average untill995, where it faced higher resistances than world 
average until 2002. Japanese exports to China faced fewer resistances than Japanese 
exports overall and Chinese imports. These results control for the core trade 
determinants of scale, distance, complementarity and multilateral resistances. 
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Explaining the performance of trade 
In identifying the most important factors among many potential factors affecting trade 
efficiency, the use of a method such as principal components analysis is appropriate. In 
models such as those of Rose (2004a; 2005) with many variables (up to 21), the most 
important, or principal components, can be identified while controlling for potential 
inter-correlation between explanatory variables (multicollinearity). For example, many 
indicator variables such as WTO membership, PT As, regional trade arrangements 
(APEC) can be included with average tariff and tax rates, measures of openness, indices 
of economic freedom, indices of competitiveness36 and other measures.37 
The inclusion of a WTO variable and APEC variable in the context of explaining the 
gap between actual and potential trade could have implications for some controversial 
results in the literature. Rose (2004a; 2005) repeatedly finds a lack of empirical 
evidence of WTO membership increasing trade and Polak ( 1996) disputes that APEC 
increases trade. An alternative hypothesis is that these multilateral institutions reduce 
subjective trade resistances and therefore narrow the gap between actual and potential 
trade. 
An important part of the empirical analysis of trade policy is the analysis of PT As, and 
the effect of trade policy variables, on the welfare of trading partners. The standard 
gravity model has been employed to do this by identifying the impact of PT As on trade 
flows between members and non- members. 
Equation (3.11) is estimated using frontier results from the previous section and 
variables from Equation (3.12). The two stages of estimating the frontier and then 
explaining the performance are not conducted simultaneously here, as the binding 
constraint is the data availability in the second stage. The number of observations in 
each stage illustrates this, as the first stage has 93,382 observations (Table 3.2, p.63) and 
the second stage ranges from 42,162 to 85,172 observations (Table 3.4, p. 72). 
36 The World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report is one source for potentially many trade 
related variables such as port efficiencies, transport efficiencies and many policy indices. 
37 Drysdale et al. (2000) obtain some unexpected results and explain that their freedom index includes a 
tax component, which is another explanatory variable. 
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Separately estimating the two stages means that a distribution for the non-negative 
disturbance tenn has to be chosen (the choice of a truncated normal distribution is 
discussed above and tested in Appendix 3A and, specifically, in Table 3A.2 of 
Appendix 3) instead of fitted from the data in the second stage. In this case, however, 
the low R-squared in the second stage (Table 3.4) means that the performance results in 
the first stage will be simultaneously estimated from a set of variables that only explain 
16 per cent of variation in the performance results. Nonetheless, results for frontier 
coefficient estimates from the simultaneous model are presented in Table 3C in 
Appendix 3. The coefficients are relatively similar to the separate estimation results. 
Indexes of economic freedom are included for both exporter (i) and importer (j) and are 
from the Fraser Institute (Gwartney et al., 2008). The average tariff rate for each 
exporter and importer is also extracted from the index of economic freedom. There is 
assumed to be very little correlation between the economic freedom index and the tariff 
rate, as the economic freedom index is calculated from many variables of which the 
tariff rate is only one. 
The language index is based on Boisso and F errantino (1997) and is an index that takes 
a value of 0 if none of the population of country i speaks the same language as in 
country j and a value of I 0,000 if all of the population in both countries speak the same 
language. Due to the lack of data availability, the language similarity index does not 
change over the 27 year period. 
Variables for China's WTO membership (both Chinese exports and Chinese imports) 
are included. The WTO variable for Chinese outward trade takes the value of one for 
Chinese export flows after 200 I and zero otherwise. The import equivalent is 
constructed similarly. APEC, MERCOSUR, ANDEAN, ASEAN, EU and NAFTA 
regional agreement variables are included. For each of these arrangements, two variables 
are included: one to account for any trade diversion for non-members and another to 
measure the increase in trade for members of those regional groupings38. The first 
variable takes the value of one if, within a bilateral trade flow, one country is a member 
38 A priori it is not expected that APEC will have any trade diversion as it is not preferential in nature. 
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and the other is not. The other regional agreement variable takes the valne of one if both 
are members and zero otherwise. 
The reason that the regional agreements are included in this manner is to deal with trade 
creation and trade diversion, first introduced by Viner (1950), in the frontier gravity 
model. Trade creation is the amount of increased trade due to a trade agreement, 
preferential or otherwise or lowering of tariffs in a grouping, and trade diversion is the 
reduction in trade with third party non-members that results from a shift away from the 
lowest cost non-member to a higher-cost regional partner. The net effect for the country 
granting tariff or other trade concessions, on the members of the PT A or regional 
agreement and for the world as a whole, is unclear in principle because the welfare 
effects, beyond the net change in trade volumes, are difficult to measure (Adams et al., 
2003). Adams et al. employ the gravity model to measure the impact of PT As on trade 
using a series of PT A indexes and dummy variables, importantly including third party 
non-member effects, and find that there is net trade diversion among most of the PT As 
they analyse. Organisations such as APEC are non-discriminatory and therefore no trade 
diversion is expected a priori. Other regional agreements that are preferential, such as 
NAFTA, are expected to involve a degree of trade diversion. 
A positive coefficient on the variable with both countries members of the regional 
agreement would mean the policy helps explain why there is higher trade (and lower 
resistances to) along that bilateral route bringing actual closer to potential trade. A 
negative coefficient on the variable to measure the extent of additional trade between a 
grouping member and non-member would show trade diversion or a corresponding 
increase in relative resistances between non-partner and partner country trade. 
Finally, a political distance measure is included. A full description of the data can be 
found in Appendix 3D. There is a variable for annual net positive actions (or news 
events) from exporter towards importer, for importer towards exporter and a sum of 
those. The number of observations is reduced, as the political distance variable is only 
available between 1990 and 2004. 
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Table 3.4 ExJ.llaining trade J.lerformance 
(I) (2) (3) ( 4) 
Dependent OLS OLS with FE FE with political 
variable TE rolitical dist dist 
constant 0.1 15'" 0.0425'" 0.261"' 0.252"' 
(0 004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) 
WTOCh exp 0.144'" 0.102'" 0.1 It'" 0.0517'" 
(0 007) (0.0076) (0.0062) (0.0065) 
WTOChimp 0.0375'" -0.00855 o.o5o8"' 0.0461··· 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.0063) (0.0069) 
APEC one 0.0221'" 0.0242'" 0.00704'" 0.0123'** 
(0.0016) (0.002) (0.001 5) (0.00307) 
APEC both 0.0965··· 0.0904"' 0.0164"' 0.0302'" 
(0.002) (0.00296) (0 00293) (0.00472) 
Freedom exp 0.0149'" 0.0126* .. -0.00167' -0.00591 ... 
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.00065) (0.00108) 
Freedom imp 0.0217"' 0.0192'" 0.00822'" 0.00874'" 
(0.0005) (0.00065) (0.00064) (0.00095) 
Tariff exp 0.00286'" 0.00131 ... 0.00101'" 0.000376 
(0.000193) (0.00024) (000017) (0.00023) 
Tariff imp -0.000185 -0.00298··· 0.000701'" 0.000490' 
(0.000 198) (0.00026) (0.00017) (0.00023) 
ASEAN one 0.0625'" 0.0661"' 0.168'" o.092o··· 
(0 001 74) (0.0024) (0 00547) (0.0087) 
ASEAN both 0.0868'" 0.0560 ... 0.209'" 0.11 I"' 
(0.006t4) (0.0082) (0.0155) (0.0227) 
NAFTA one -0.0285··· -0.0361'" -0.00305 0.00966 
(0.00201) (0.0026) (0.00270) (0.006) 
NAFTA both -0.0119 0.0533'" 0.0822'" 0.0920" 
(0.00849) (0.0065) (0.0174) (0 03) 
EU one 0.0236'" 0.0160'" -0.0195 ... -0.01 14'" 
(0.00118) (0.001 7) (0.00164) (0.0022) 
EU both 0.0496 ... 0.0544"' 0 01 86"' 0.0170··· 
(0.00216) (0.003) (0.00331) (0.0045) 
ANDEAN one -0.0!48 ... -0.0224'" 0.0376'" 
(0.001 76) (0.002) (0.00391) 
ANDEAN both 0.107'" 0.104'" 0.00847 
(0 00730) (0.01 19) (0.01 19) 
MERCOSUR -0.0142'" -0 01 53'" -0.000227 0.00204 
one (0.00184) (0.0022) (0.00226) (0.00447) 
MERCOSUR 0.0995'" 0.126'" -0.0462'" -0.0488" 
both (0.00789) (0.0085) (0.0113) (00171) 
Languageii 0.000012'" 0.0000131 ... 
(0.0000003) (0.0000005) 
Time trend -0.0069'" -0 00341'" -0.00112"' 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00016) 
Political dist -0.0000593 
exp to imp (0.0000566) 
Political dist 0.0000971' 
imp to exp (0.000056) 
Political dist sum 0.0000319' 
(0.0000193) 
R squared 0164 0.163 
observvations 85172 42162 85172 42162 
Notes: TE is trade performance. Standard errors in parentheses. 
. 
p < 0.05, .. p < 0.01, ... p < 0.001 
FE stands for fixed effects maximum likelihood (MLE) estimation. 
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Model (I) is the base model estimated using OLS with (2) including a measure of 
political distance; (3) and (4) use fixed effects estimation39 with (4) also including a 
measure of political distance. Although they are not presented here, the inclusion of 
bilateral political distance into the OLS models or the inclusion of the sum of those 
political distance variables into the fixed effects estimation does not alter the results of 
other parameter estimations and the finding that political distance does not have a 
statistically significant effect on trade performance. 
The OLS specifications result in a relatively low R-squared of just over 16 per cent 
meaning most of the variation in the data is not explained by the variables used. This 
result is expected, as it is accepted in gravity model and other trade literature that most 
of the resistances are unobservable and difficult to measure (see Chapter 2 for 
discussion). Estimating the frontier, and then trade performance, allows a measure of 
aggregate resistances to trade of which the estimation in Table 3.4 explained some of the 
measurable resistances. 
The results in Table 3.4 show that regional grouping variables, language similarity and 
economic freedom help explain trade performance and trade resistances. The results for 
the effect of average tarifflevels are mixed. China's entry to the WTO increased both its 
export and import performance by reducing resistances (except for imports in Model 
(2)). These two variables have the largest estimated parameters and their effects on trade 
performance are the largest among the trade policy related variables. 
APEC and ASEAN both increase realised trade among members and between members 
and non-members. This is due to the fact that APEC and ASEAN are regional 
organisations that have promoted trade liberalisation in a non-discriminatory way 
(Drysdale and Terada, 2008). In contrast to this result, there is evidence ofNAFTA, the 
EU, ANDEAN and MER CO SUR all reducing trade performance with non-members. 
These RTAs liberalise trade in a preferential manner and therefore increase relative 
resistances with trading partners outside their regions. 
39 A series of Hausman tests were conducted for different specifications which repeatedly rejected the null 
hypothesis of there being no systematic ditference between fixed effects and random effects. it was 
concluded that fixed effects is the preferred model. 
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Economic freedom has a positive and significant effect on reducing trade resistances for 
both importers and exporters (except when fixed effects estimation is used, where it has 
a negative effect for exporters). 
When a time trend is included, the tariff! eve! of the importer is not statistically 
significant but without the time trend it is negative and significant for the OLS 
estimation (the results for no time trend without political distance are not presented). As 
tariff liberalisation occurred over time in a uniform direction, the time trend is thought 
to capture the effect of the tariff reductions. 
Language similarity helps narrow the distance between countries and is a significant 
explanator of reducing trade resistances. This was a robust result across different 
specifications and when random effects were used. 
When all determinants are controlled for and a measure of political distance included 
along with other resistance measures in explaining trade performance, political distance 
does not appear to have a strong effect on aggregate world trade flows. The results here 
suggest that the effect of other resistances is more important. The study will investigate 
the effect of politics on investment flows in Chapter 4. 
The absence of strong evidence that political distance affects trade performance, in 
terms of increasing or decreasing trade resistances, can be explained by the findings in 
the literature that examines trade and politics. First, the direction of causality between 
political distance and trade is not clear (Polachek, 1980; Reuveny and Kang, 1998; 
Mansfield and Pollins, 2003) and the direction of effect is also unclear. While improved 
political relations (a narrowing of political distance) is usually associated with an 
increase in trade, trade has been found to increase as well as decrease political amity and 
enmity between countries (Barbieri and Schneider, 1999; Mansfield and Pollins, 2001 ). 
The Jag lengths of effect often also vary40 (Reuveny and Kang, 1998). There is some 
evidence in this study, however, of political distance affecting trade. This complex link 
40 Political distance with a one-year lag was included in this study but the results were not significantly 
affected and no relationship was found. 
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between political distance and trade requires further analysis and that is undertaken in 
Chapter 7. 
Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the specific functional forms and the derivation ofthe frontier 
gravity model introduced in Chapter 2. 
Scale (economic size), complementary endowment structures and geographical distance 
(including border effects) explained that the scale of trade and its geographic structure 
are important in estimating, and significant in defining, a world trade frontier. 
Multilateral resistances were taken into account in estimating the frontier by using a 
feature of the stochastic frontier model that is consistent with the accepted method for 
controlling for multilateral resistances (fixed effects across certain dimensions). This 
method allowed resistances to be measured, and not differenced out (and controlled for). 
The results show that economic distance, when measured in this way, is very different 
from geographic distance. One implication of this study is that, as Kalirajan (2008) 
suggested, the heteroscedasticity from unobservable country-specific factors leads to 
inconsistent parameter estimates. The frontier gravity model not only accounts for the 
unknown heteroscedasticity, it allows a measure of total resistances to trade (observable 
and unobservable ). 
The results reveal that, on average, Japan-China trade achieves more of its potential than 
do all other trade flows and that there are fewer resistances to trade between the two 
countries than there are in most trade flows, given the structure of their trade. The 
bilateral relationship faces less resistance than Japanese trade does on average, and that 
gap has widened since China's WTO accession. The performance of China's exports to 
Japan is similar to China's average export performance but Chinese imports still face 
relatively high resistances in the Japanese market. 
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As to the question raised at the beginning of the chapter as to why Japan's share of 
China's trade is falling behind that of the United States and Europe, it is clear that poor 
or worsening political relations have not been an important factor in this .. Declining 
relative trade share is not an adequate indicator of the impact of political relations on 
trade (see Chapter 1). The evidence from this analysis is that China and Japan enjoy 
falling resistances to trade overall and that political distance does not strongly affect 
trade performance. Declining relative trade shares are clearly a function of other 
economic structural factors, such as changing relative economic and trade size. Policy 
variables, such as trade and regional agreements, are significant in their effect on 
resistances to trade in explaining these results. 
Some further conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. First, countries that are 
relatively open and situated near large economies such as Hong Kong and Singapore, or 
are large ports for large neighbouring economies such as the Netherlands, face the 
fewest resistances to trade. Also, there is evidence of trade diversion from some of the 
discriminatory RTAs and most increase performance within the group's membership. 
Finally, economic freedom affects trade resistances as an increase in the measure of 
economic freedom is associated with a reduction in resistances. Language similarity is 
also associated with a lower level of subjective resistances. 
There was some evidence that political distance affects trade. This conclusion will be 
explored further in later chapters. 
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4 Japanese FDI in China: determinants and performance 
FDI is one of the most important dimensions of the economic relationship between 
Japan and China. China's economic rise has been achieved in large part because of its 
openness to the rest.ofthe world, and importantly through its policies aimed at attracting 
foreign firm participation, first in production for export and later in its domestic 
economy as well. At the same time, Japanese MNEs in key manufacturing industries 
such as electronics have been able to stay competitive by moving much of their 
production to China and the rest of East Asia. 
China's rapid economic growth and openness have attracted FDI to China on a large 
scale, most of which is from Hong Kong but increasingly from Japan, the United States, 
Taiwan and Europe as well (see Table 1.1, p.S). Japanese FDI in China has seen 
remarkable growth. 1n 1982 the total stock of Japanese FDI in China was roughly US 
$72 million41 , which had increased to US$37 billion by 200742 Although FDI flows are 
'lumpy', with big projects some years making the FDI stock growth less smooth than 
trade numbers, the average annual growth rate has been over 22 per cent in the entire 
period. The growth in FDI stock understates the growth in FDI flows as the stock values 
include depreciation of the capital stock. What explains this rapid growth and how does 
it compare to other sources ofFDI to China? This chapter sets out to explain the 
determinants ofFDI in China and growth in FDI from Japan to China. 
The rapid growth in FDI from Japan to China has occurred with the backdrop of 
fluctuating political tensions. The two neighbouring countries have ongoing territorial 
disputes, unresolved historical issues and a political rivalry that occasionally flares up. It 
is important to investigate whether the political distance, as described in previous 
chapters, affects the investment relationship. Furthermore, as described in Chapter 2, 
this is best done in the context of other factors that determine and influence FDI. 
Understanding all relevant factors and the relative importance of those different factors 
is important to understanding what exactly is driving FDI. 
41 Author's calculation based on the perpetual inventory method (see Appendix 4A) and the earliest 
available bilateral FDI data in 1985. 
42 Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan and OECD.stat. See Chapter 1 for more complete statistics. 
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Is the rapid growth and large stock of Japanese FDI in China to be expected given the 
proximity of the two economies, their respective scales and their economic structures? 
This chapter will measure how well FDI is performing between Japan and China against 
other bilateral relationships, Japanese FDI overall and other sources of FDl into China. 
The determinants and the concept of an FDI frontier are introduced in Chapter 2. The 
FDl frontier allows a measure ofFDI performance against a frontier which can be 
thought of as a measure of economic distance43 The economic distance, comprised of 
different resistances, can be measured over time. On average, FDI will flow to countries 
which are less distant, not necessarily or only in terms of geography as they face lower 
(explicit and implicit) barriers to investment. Economic distances vary due to the ease or 
resistance to capital flows and other economic transactions between countries. 
This study measures the resistances to FDl flows by combining two important streams 
of literature which have sought to analyse FDI relationships. One is the international 
business or global strategy literature that concerns itself with cultural differences, 
institutional differences and the choice of mode of entry of MNEs given uncertainty 
caused by those and other resistances (Hymer, 1960; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Ghemawat, 
2007). The other is younger and less established than the international business or 
international trade literature and is concerned with modelling MNE activity with such 
factors as country resource endowment differences reflecting comparative advantage, 
spatial effects in a multilateral sense and also scale of economies (Helpman, !984; 
Markusen, 1984; Carr et al., 2001; Markusen, 2002; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004; 
Davies, 2008). This literature does not often justify inclusion of resistances, on which 
the international business literature focuses. 
Combining analysis of both strands ofFDI literature allows modelling consistent with 
different modes ofFDI and accounting for resistances similar to those on which there 
has been more focus in the international business literature (see Ghemawat, 2007). A 
frontier FDI model allows explanation of the determinants and structure of FDI and 
measurement of a counterfactual amount of FDI. FDI perfmmance, relative to the 
counterfactual, of Japanese FDI into China is compared to overall Japanese outward FDI 
43 FDI performance here means realisation of potential FDI and not a return on capital. 
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as well as FDI from the United States and Europe, the other main sources of FDI into 
China. Then a second stage analysis can explain these performance results using 
resistances. 
This chapter also includes a measure of political distance into the analysis and 
explanation ofFDI performance. Chapter 3 did not find empirical evidence of political 
distance affecting annual aggregate trade flows and this chapter tests the case for FDI. 
FDI is potentially more sensitive to political distance as bilateral political tensions can 
erode confidence in the investment environment and increase uncertainty. The chapter 
will measure the influence of political factors on flows of investment worldwide with a 
focus on the relationship between Japan and China. 
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section is an explanation of the FDI model 
and data used. Then the results are presented for the estimation of the frontier and the 
FDI performance results are discussed with a focus on Japanese FDI into China. The 
analysis then proceeds to estimate the effect of resistances that explain the performance 
of FDI relationships before concluding. 
Modelling FDI 
Chapter 2 reviewed the importance of including scale, distance, relative factor 
endowments, and the interdependencies between markets and networks of production 
(multilateral effects). There are many different models that explain FD! and some are 
similar to gravity models oftrade44 . However, gravity models do not account for FDI 
entering countries for different reasons. Some MNEs use FDI to avoid trade barriers in a 
host nation and sell to the market in the host nation (horizontal FD!) while others take 
advantage of cheaper factor prices to produce in a host nation and then export that good 
(vertical FD!). There is also a more complex form ofFDl where a source country 
manages the knowledge-intensive input in production and uses a number of FDI 
destinations with different relative factor prices to produce parts and components which 
44 See Chapter 2 for full discussion. 
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are then traded to a third country (knowledge capital or complex vertical FDI). 
Conventional gravity models cannot capture these different forms of FDI. 
Denoting the parent company country (FDI source country) as d, the host country of the 
investment as i and the third market as j, Baltagi et al. (2007) and Dee (2007) explain 
export platform and complex vertical FDI modes as follows.: 
Horizontal: plants in d and i, exports from d to j 
Export platform: plants in d and i, exports from i to j 
Vertical: plants in i and j, exports from i to d 
Complex vertical: plants in i andj, exports from) to d 
An MNE' s decision to invest in one country is dependent on factors in its country of 
origin, factors in the potential host country and also in neighbouring countries that could 
act as both a substitute or complement for FDI. The multilateral resistances in Baltagi et 
al. (2007) are captured differently from the case of gravity models and include inverse 
distance weighted averages of all third country effects for all determinants. Baltagi et al. 
and other FDI models ofMNE behaviour45 have shown the importance of including 
scale, distance, relative factor endowments and multilateral effects in explaining FDI. 
These determinants are chosen from models derived from firm level behaviour and 
confirmed through empirical results that out-perform studies using only gravity model 
variables. 
Many studies model a two-factor world, some with skilled and unskilled labour (see, for 
example, Davies, 2008) and others with capital and labour. Results found in studies 
such as Egger and Pfaffermayer (2004), Baltagi et al., (2007) and Dee (2007) show that 
a three-factor world with skilled labour (or human capital), unskilled labour and 
physical capital, gives a better explanation of FDI flows. This study builds on the 
models of Baltagi et al. (2007) and Dee (2007) following the discussion in Chapter 2. 
The model used here to estimate a frontier differs from Baltagi et al. (2007) in two 
important ways. First, Baltagi et al. do not include a measure of distance, as they 
implicitly control for distance in the spatially correlated error term. They do this by 
45 See Blonigen (2005) for a review. 
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using the Gauss-Markov estimator to control for spatially correlated error terms. 
Spatially correlated error terms capture the fact that a shock to one country affects other 
countries, and affects those closest the most. This study follows Dee (2007) in its 
treatment of potentially spatially correlated error terms deterministically with the 
inclusion of a free trade variable (FTA) variable and a weighted FTA variable. The FTA 
variable would usually be included in the second stage of explaining the performance 
results but is used in the first stage to estimate performance to control for spatially 
correlated error terms. Relative distance and the FTA variables are used in this study to 
estimate the frontier and deterministically account for spatially correlated error terms. 
Secondly, a measure of risk is included in Baltagi et al. (2007) without theoretical 
justification. However, the inclusion is justified as it relates to the empirical evidence of 
uncertainty increasing in one country, affecting all FDI to that country. The increase in 
uncertainty increases resistance to FDI. Dee (2007) follows this approach and both 
studies find that the measure of risk is a significant explanator of FDI. In this study a 
measure of risk and other measures that affect uncertainty such as language, trade and 
investment protection and other policy variables are not included in the estimation of an 
FDI frontier but instead in explaining why some FDI relationships perform closer to 
their potential and others do not. 
Model and data 
The model used in this study follows closely that of Dee (2007), which is based on 
Baltagi et al. (2007). The difference from Dee' s model is that this model does not 
include a risk variable and that a non-negative disturbance term is included that makes it 
a stochastic frontier model. 
( 4.1) F, = fJo + /J1 dist + fJzG, + f33S, + /J4kt + /Jsh, + fJ61t + /JJr, + fJs0, + fJgFTA, 
+ /J10WG,+ /J11WS, + fJ1zWk, + f313Wh, + /J14Wl, + fJ1sWr, + /J16W0, 
+ fJ 17WR, + fJ18WFTA1+ v, + u1 
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Where boldface notation indicates a vector (with dimensions i xj) and 
F, is the log ofFDI (for FDI stock- FDI flows are also tested) 
dist is the log of the great circle distance between capital cities of d and i. 
G, is the log of the sum of country d and country i GDPs: ln(GDPd + GDPi) 
S, is a measure of GDP similarity: (I - sl- s?) 
where sd = GDPd /(GDPd + GDPi) and Si= GDPi /(GDPd + GDPi) 
k, is the log of the ratio of source country to destination country capital stock: ln(Kd/Ki) 
h1is the log of the ratio of source country to destination country human capital: 
ln(Hd/Hi) 
I, is the log of the ratio of source country to destination country unskilled labour: 
ln(Ld/Li) 
r, is an interaction term between G, and k,: G, k, 
0 1 is an interaction term between distance and the difference in capital and labour ratios: 
dis(k, -11) 
FT A, is a variable that takes the value of one if country d and i have a free trade 
agreement in force in year t. 
W is a measure of multilateral effects interacted with each term. WG, for example, is 
the inverse distance weighted average of G, between the source country and all third 
country markets. 
v1 is an independently and identically distributed normal residual term that captures the 
usual model disturbance from measurement error and other shocks that are not 
associated with resistances to FDI. 
u1 is an independently and identically distributed non-negative variable that captures the 
resistances to FDI. The details of this variable are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
This model fits the core determinants as described in Chapter 2 as follows. Economic 
distance consists of dist and u, of which u1 captures all resistances other than geographic 
distance. G1 and S1 are the economic scale variables and k, h1 and I, capture the relative 
factor endowments. r, is an interaction term between scale and a factor endowment 
while 0 1 is an interaction term between distance and another dimension of the factor 
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endowments. The multilateral resistances are all accounted for by the inverse distance 
weighted terms. 
The initial analysis will estimate an FDI frontier (Equation 3.1) which then gives results 
for the performance ofFDI, defined as the actual amount of FDI relative to the frontier. 
Those FDI relationships between source and host countries that perform well have lower 
resistances compared to those that do not perform well which face higher resistances. 
The second stage of the analysis explains some of the performance results with various 
resistances including political distance. The second stage estimation and results are 
discussed later in this chapter. 
FDI source countries are the United States, Japan, Canada, Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, comprising seven of the largest eight FDI sources 
globalll6. The share of world FDI covered by this set of countries ranges from half to 
70 per cent depending on the year47 These source countries were chosen to minimise 
the missing data problems and to make the panel as balanced as possible. There are 
ninety recipient countries used and they are listed in Appendix 4A. Both FDI stocks and 
flows were used and FDI data are from the OECD, which has FDI data reported by 
OECD countries to OECD and non-OECD member countries. The panel is highly 
unbalanced from 1982 to 2006. Dummy variables for time are included and results for 
OLS and the frontier using maximum likelihood estimation are presented. 
GDP at purchasing power parity is used and is from the World Development Indicators, 
along with labour force and gross fixed capital formation data. Capital stock is 
calculated from the perpetual inventory method from Leamer (1984) and explained in 
Appendix 4A. The human capital data, from the International Labour Organisation and 
various national statistical agencies, is the absolute number of graduates from tertiary 
institutions, such as universities, in that country. The sum of the unskilled labour 
population and the population with a tertiary qualification is equal to the total labour 
force. 
46 Switzerland ranks higher than the Netherlands but is not used, as the coverage of recipient countries was 
not as wide ranging as Dutch FDI. 
47 Source: OECD.Stat and UNCTAD FDI data. 
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Before the results are presented, it is worth reproducing the hypothesised signs of 
coefficients based on the theoretical model developed in Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004), 
as set out in Baltagi et al. (2007). This will allow a comparison of results to the 
theoretical model. 
Table 4.1 Hypothesised signs of variable coefficients in FDI model 
Explanatory variable ModeofFDI 
Horizontal Export -platform Vertical Complex 
Bilateral size of d + i (g) + + + + 
Similarity in size (d, i) (s) +I- + -/+ +I-
Capital ratio (KiK,) (k) + + + + 
Human K ratio (Hd/H,) (h) + + + + 
Labour ratio (LiL;) (I) 
Bilateral size* KiK, (f) + + + 
(KiLd)/(K/L,)*t (El) + + +I-
Multilateral effects 
Bilateral size of d + j (wg) + + + + 
Similarity in size (d,j) (ws) + + +I- +I-
Capital ratio (KiKj) (wk) + + 
Human K ratio (HiHj) (wh) + + 
Labour ratio (LiLj) (wl) + + 
Bilateral size* KiKi (wr) + + + 
(Kd/Ld)/(K/Li)*t (we) + + +/- + 
Source: Baltagi et al. (2007). 
Results 
The results for estimating FDI stock are presented in Table 4.2. Columns (I) and (2) are 
for the OLS model with (l) only including bilateral variables and (2) including 
multilateral variables as well. Columns (3) and ( 4) are estimates for the frontier MLE 
model with (3) only estimating the bilateral variables and (4) estimating the model with 
multilateral variables. 
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Most variables are statistically significant at a high degree of significance in explaining 
FDI stock, All bilateral variables are statistically significant. The similar Baltagi et al. 
(2007) specification and even closer specification ofDee (2007) did not have as many 
variables with statistical significance as do the results in Table 4.2. This could be due to 
the different country coverage and time period in the Dee model or the different model 
specifications- no distance and a Gauss-Markov estimator in the Baltagi et al. model-
as the frontier model fits the data better than an OLS or fixed effects model (see 
Appendix 4B). As was the case in Baltagi et al. (2007) the multilateral variables (those 
weighted by inverse distance) are jointly significant, confirming their importance in 
explaining FDI. A simple F test on the multilateral variables in the OLS model confirms 
joint statistical significance and a likelihood ratio test comes to the same conclusion 
using the frontier case. 
The unbalanced panel was tested for autocorrelation using the method described in 
Arellano and Bond (1991), and the existence of autocorrelation was rejected. Tests for 
the appropriateness of a frontier model and tests for the statistical distribution of the 
one-sided, non-negative error term are presented in detail in Appendix 4B. The first test 
confirms that a significant proportion of the variation is due to the non-negative term 
and that a stochastic frontier is suitable for the data. The result of the second test is that 
a truncated normal distribution is chosen instead of a half normal distribution. 
In Table 4.2 distance is negative and highly significant. Baltagi et al. (2007) do not 
include distance as they are implicitly controlling for it in the spatially correlated error 
terms. The inclusion here explicitly confirms previous empirical studies that distance 
matters48 • Bilateral economic size and similarity ofGDPs are positive and significant, 
lending support to horizontal models ofFDI (Markusen, 1984). Scale is a significant 
explanator of FDI. 
48 See, for example, Carr et al. (2001) and Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004), and Blonigen (2005) for a 
survey. 
85 
Table 4.2 Stochastic frontier outward FDI determinants 
Dependent variable 
log ofFDI stock (I) 
Log of distance -0.77'" 
(0.05) 
Bilateral GDPs (g) 2.28"' 
(0.06) 
GDP similarity (s) 4.44"' 
(0.3) 
Rel. capital ratio 2.6*'* 
(0.4) 
Re!. human K ratio 0.09'" 
(0.03) 
Rei. labour ratio (I) 0.46'" 
(004) 
GtKt(r) 
-0.11"' 
(0.01) 
Dist(kt-lt) (El) 0.22'" 
(0.04) 
FTA 063'" 
..... --· .. . .. .. . . .. . .. . . . . . . (0 09) 
wg 
ws 
wk 
wh 
wl 
wr 
wFTA 
Constant 
Sigma-squared 
Gamma (y) 
Mu 
Log likelihood fn 
R-squared 
N 
-53.74"' 
(1.68) 
-8464 
0.537 
4397 
OLS 
(2) with J'd country 
-0.82'" 
(0.05) 
2.24'" 
(0.11) 
3.97'" 
(0.31) 
2.43 ... 
(0.43) 
0.17"' 
(0.03) 
0.38 ... 
(0.04) 
-0.11'" 
(0.02) 
0.21"' 
Frontier (MLE) 
(3) (4) with 3'd 
-0.78'" -0.83'" 
(0.05) (0.05) 
2.19'" 2.35'" 
(0.05) (0.05) 
4.43*** 4.11 ... 
(0.28) (0.29) 
2.19 ... 1.91 .. * 
(0.38) (0.35) 
0.06 •• 0.16*** 
(0.03) (0.03) 
0.48··· 0.42 ... 
(0.04) (0.04) 
-0.1**" -0.09"' 
(0.01) (0.01) 
021" .. 0.2'** 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
0.57'" 0.53"' 0.48'" 
- ........ - (0.09)_ -- ------- JQ Qil)__ ______ (0.08)_ _________ _ 
Multilateral variables 
0.1 
(0 05) 
-7.23' 
(4.24) 
0.76'"* 
(0.32) 
-1.18'" 
(0.13) 
0.23* 
(0.12) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.13' 
(0.07) 
2.23'" 
(0.8) 
-52.79 ... 
(3.2) 
-8396 
0.5513 
4397 
-50 ... 
(1.5) 
13.24 
(1.64) 
0.9 
(0.01) 
-6.89 
(1.42) 
-8364 
4397 
(0.04) 
-2.52 
(1.6) 
0.83*** 
(0.28) 
-1.21'" 
(0.12) 
0.22'" 
(0.09) 
-0.02" 
(0.01) 
-0.12'" 
(0.05) 
1.41 ... 
(0.41) 
-54.3m 
(1.25) 
13.26 
(1.93) 
0.9 
(0.01) 
-6.92 
(!.58) 
-8295 
4397 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **and *** indicate significance at the I 0 percent, 5 percent 
and I percent levels. 
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The source to destination fixed capital ratio is positive and significant across all model 
specifications. This is what is expected for all modes of FDI according to the theoretical 
hypothesised signs in Table 4.1. 
The OLS results do not differ markedly from the frontier results. The correct 
comparison to be made is between a more suitable non-frontier model such as a fixed 
effects or random effects model as was done in Baltagi et al. (2007). Those results are 
shown in Appendix 4C (Table 4C.l) and show that the suitable fixed effects and random 
effects models have significantly different coefficient estimate results to the frontier 
results in Table 4.2. Such results confirm the tests reported in Appendix 4B showing 
that the frontier model fits the data better than the OLS, fixed effects or random effects 
models. 
The long time period of 1982 to 2006 is of concern, as it was for the trade frontier 
estimation in Chapter 3. Appendix 4C (Table 4C.2) shows results for two truncated time 
periods: 1982-1994 and 1995-2006. The coefficient estimates for the bilateral variables 
seem relatively stable over the two periods and compared to the third column which is 
the whole time period, as estimated in Table 4.2. The signs of these coefficients are 
consistent and the magnitudes are relatively stable for most of them. The differences are 
in the FT A variable which is used to control for spatially correlated error terms and most 
of the multilateral variables. These results show that the frontier is changing shape over 
time from the multilateral resistances. The analysis proceeds with the model using the 
entire time period, as the bilateral coefficient estimates are relatively stable over time 
and these are the dominant determinants (with multilateral resistances playing a role). 
The human capital ratio between source and destination is positive and statistically 
significant, which is consistent with all four modes ofFDI. Unskilled labour ratios are a 
significant explanatory factor in FDI, meaning FDI from countries with low 
endowments of unskilled labour, such as Japan, is aimed at countries with a relative 
abundance of low skilled labour once all else is controlled for. The result is consistent 
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with the fixed effects results of Baltagi et al. (2007)49 However, the spatially weighted 
unskilled labour variable is statistically significant and has a positive effect across both 
specifications (OLS and frontier MLE), consistent with modes of horizontal FDI and 
vertical FDI but not knowledge capital FDI (Table 4.1 ). This may be a result of the 
length of the time period considered, which dates back to 1982, before MNEs had 
complex network behaviour in their FDI and trade patterns. A substantial period after 
1982, up to the latest data available, 2006, was covered and the statistical significance of 
the other spatially weighted variables and the joint significance for all spatially weighted 
variables is evidence of complex FDI. The joint significance of the multilateral 
resistances shows the importance of accounting for third party influences on bilateral 
FDI. Japan's FDI to China depends on influences of other countries, acting both to 
increase and decrease FDI from Japan to China. The bilateral economic relationship is 
nested in a multilateral world and therefore the bilateral analysis is conducted in a 
multilateral setting. 
The GDP and capital ratio interaction term is negative, meaning the positive impact of a 
capital endowment difference diminishes with market size. This pattern ofFDI is 
consistent with vertical FDI (Baltagi et al., 2007). 
FT As between source and destination countries have a positive and significant effect on 
FDI. The negative sign of the inverse-distance-weighted FTA variable, WFTA, in the 
results controlling for country pair effects means that FT As between source country and 
third party countries increase FDI from the source country to the destination country, 
which is unexpected. FT As may be causing trade diversion (see RT As in Chapter 3) but 
be causing FDI to increase between source and third party countries. Dee (2007) found 
that investment provisions in FT As and other agreements did not impact on FDI patterns 
in the Asia Pacific region and this is consistent with the positive parameter estimated in 
this study. The destination countries are not aggregated into regions and detailed 
investment provisions in FT As are not included as in Dee (2007), so that these 
agreements are not directly comparable. 
49 Baltagi et al. (2007) produce results for both fixed effects and random effects estimation and the 
random effects results show the unskilled labour ratio as not statistically significant. 
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Results for FDI flows are similar to those of FDI stock estimation but the number of 
observations is less for FDI flows than FDI stock, as the FDI data in the OECD data set 
was sparser for flows. Results for FDI flows are included in Appendix 4C, where other 
sensitivity and robustness tests are shown. They show the similarities in variable 
significance and consistency between stock and flow variables. FDI stock data are used 
in Baltagi et al. (2007) and Dee (2007) as is common in modelling FDI activity. The 
results from Table 4.2 (p.84) column (4), will be the focus of the rest of the study. 
Performance 
FDI performance is defined as a ratio of actual to potential FDI and ranges between 0 
and 1 -performance of 1 means full potential is reached and the actual FDI lies on the 
frontier. As was the case in the frontier gravity model of Chapter 3, the absolute level of 
performance is not important; it is the relative positions that are important. The higher 
the performance, the less the economic distance that FDI relationship experienced. 
Table 4.3 shows results for source country average FDI performance and selected host 
country average FDI performances. 
The FDI frontier allows a measure of what FDI would be in a world of no resistances, 
given the determinants ofFDI. The frontier is defined by the characteristics ofthe most 
liberal and free flowing FDI relationships in the sample. The actual to potential FDI 
provides a measure of all non-random resistances (both observable and unobservable) 
that are faced in that relationship. In Figure 4.llower values of performance face higher 
resistances, as the other determinants- scale, relative factor endowments, multilateral 
resistances geographic distance- have already been controlled for. 
89 
Table 4.3 Average FDI performance results 
1982-86 1987-91 1992-96 1997-01 2002-06 
FDI source country 
Canada 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.41 
France 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.43 
Germany 0.40 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.45 
Japan 0.44 0.52 0.44 0.43 0.46 
Netherlands 0.61 0.55 0.39 0.47 0.47 
UK 0.42 0.47 0.38 0.47 0.46 
USA 0.24 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.41 
Selected FDI destinations 
Australia 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.60 0.62 
Brazil 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.52 0.52 
China 0.13 0.26 0.29 0.34 0.32 
France 0.22 0.38 0.38 0.28 0.48 
Hong Kong 0.57 0.61 0.63 0.57 0.56 
Mexico 0.30 0.35 0.39 0.39 0.39 
Russia 0.03 0.27 0.41 0.45 
Singapore 0.68 0.66 0.63 
South Korea 0.43 0.40 0.32 0.34 0.40 
Taiwan 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.46 
Thailand 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.57 
UK 0.49 0.52 0.53 0.57 
USA 0.62 0.57 0.50 0.51 0.49 
World 0.40 0.44 0.40 0.42 0.44 
Source: Author's calculations 
Of the FDI source countries, Dutch outward FDI faced, on average, the least re si stances 
in the 1980s but the performance falls rapidly in the 1990s, before rising again to 
achieve the same level as average German, Japanese and British FDI. Canadian, 
American and French FDI perform below world average, of between 40 and 45 per cent 
of potential. Of the FDI host countries presented, Australia and Singapore are the most 
open while transitional economies like China and Russia have the fastest improving FDI 
performance. The resistances and barriers to receiving FDI tall rapidly in the period 
analysed. Hong Kong and Thailand are two East Asian economies that have higher than 
average performance, as does the United Kingdom. 
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Figure 4.1 shows the performance ofFDI in China by Japanese, French, Dutch, German 
and US firms, as well as world average bilateral FDI performance. There is a structural 
break in Japanese FDI data between 1994 and 1996, which is controlled for using 
structural dummy variables. 
Figure 4.1 FDI performance into China, 1982-2006, per cent 
0.6 
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0.1 
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
······· France-Germany-Japan--Netherlands-- USA-WLDavg 
Source: Author's calculations 
World average FDI performance for all source to destination bilateral pairs ranges from 
roughly 40 per cent to 45 per cent over the sample period. Japanese FDI to China is the 
highest performing in 2006, after controlling for the determinants, and is in fact the 
highest performing for most of the 1990s. The only two FDI source countries investing 
in China to exceed the world average are Japan and Germany. Since the 1990s direct 
investment to China has been performing at around the level expected by determinants 
of FDI. 
Trade and FDI are known to have gone through Hong Kong to avoid barriers that 
stopped direct investment in China (Hanson and Feenstra, 2001). This is the case in the 
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1990s and especially before 1986. Ideally, FDI from Hong Kong to China should be 
included in Figure 4.1 or at least China plus Hong Kong, less intra Hong Kong-China 
FDl, could be considered as a single destination. Data paucity and lack of reliability 
prevents this. 
It is useful to review Japanese FDI performance in China in three sub-periods. The first 
was a period in which there was considerable underperformance, in the early 1980s, the 
second is the high performance period, in the 1990s and lastly is the final period from 
2001. 
The 1980s 
Japanese FDI was well below what the determinants predicted until1986. The rise 
occurred after the Plaza Accord and the subsequent rapid appreciation of the Japanese 
yen. The sudden appreciation of the Japanese yen made Japanese exports less 
competitive and so many Japanese MNEs shifted production offshore. However this is 
not the relevant change for Japanese FDJ into China. Judging from Figure 4.2, the Plaza 
Accord was not the cause of Japanese FDI increasing into China, as Japanese FDI to 
Hong Kong and elsewhere was performing close to what determinants would predict 
throughout this period. The Plaza Accord affected all Japanese outward FDI in a similar 
way, as it was not just an appreciation vis-a-vis the Chinese currency but against the US 
dollar and most international currencies. Figure 4.1 shows performance of German FDI 
which also rose in this period, which confirms that the Plaza Accord alone was not the 
cause of the rise in performance. 
The under-utilisation ofFDI potential was related to the still relatively closed Chinese 
domestic market. Japanese firms were risk averse in investing in China when there was 
little access to the domestic markets and they feared that Chinese partners would 
appropriate their teclmology for production directed at their home and other 
international markets (the so called 'boomerang effect') (Fukuda, 1998; Luo, 2001). 
Only 16 per cent of Japanese FDI in China was by large MNEs in 1986, with FDl being 
dominated by small and medium enterprises (Luo, 2001: 74). 
92 
There was a fundamental change in Japanese perceptions of investment in China around 
1986 in response to a strategic shift in investment policy in China as access to domestic 
markets by foreign investors was opened up. It was in 1986 that Chinese policy changed 
in two significant ways. Firstly, fiscal and financial incentives were offered to attract 
foreign companies in a move to open up China to the rest of the world 5° In fact, this 
was the year in which solely foreign-owned enterprises were legalised in China 
(National People's Congress, 1986). Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, it was 
the year that talks resumed for China to enter the GATT. The bandwagon efiect 
(Knickerbocker, 1973), where MNEs will follow rivals into a foreign market, can be 
seen by the sudden flood of Japanese FDI inflow at that time. 
The further opening up of China in 1986 and the subsequent large inflow of Japanese 
FDI necessitated the signing of the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) of !988 as an 
investment framework did not exist between the two countries to manage the investment 
relationship. By 1987 FDI performance had become positive and high (above world 
average). The BIT helped increase confidence in Japanese investing enterprises as well 
as on the Chinese side. Japanese investing enterprises had an agreement that put certain 
constraints on Chinese policy makers (having to abide by the framework set out in the 
BIT) and both sides had a mechanism for dispute settlement, as primitive and 
undeveloped as it was. 
It appears Japanese FDI was the first to react to the opening of the Chinese economy in 
such a way with other major investing countries slow to respond (Figure 4.1 ). The 
United States took until the early 1990s to reach world average performance, roughly 
the same time as Germany and before other major investors51 • 
The period leading up to 1986 can be characterised as one in which Japanese FDI faced 
high resistances in moving to China because of an FDI policy environment that limited 
access to domestic markets and caused particular uncertainty about investing in China 
50 National People's Congress ( 1986), Promulgated by Order No. 39 of the President of the People's 
Republic of China and effective as of April 12, 1986. 
51 Germany's investment in the Automobile industry in China is probably an exception. 
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within Japanese (and other source country) firms. Other resistances, such as certain 
barriers to foreign firm entry that could be overcome at a cost, such as by entry into the 
Chinese market via Hong Kong, also played a role but the high level of uncertainty 
about Chinese policy and the asymmetric information from a less open market would 
have been the· resistances that dominated. 
The 1990s 
Performance in the 1990s was very high as Japanese FDI into China accelerated and was 
significantly higher (closer to the frontier) than for other country FDI into China. It 
stayed roughly over 50 per cent throughout most ofthe 1990s until 1997 and 1998, 
when it started to drop significantly around the time of the Asian financial crisis. The 
1990s were when China embarked on large scale trade liberalisation and other reforms 
aimed at WTO accession (Drysdale and Song, 2000; Lardy, 2002a). Commitment to the 
global trading system through unilateral trade liberalisation and reforms that were 
difficult, if not impossible, to reverse (Drysdale and Song, 2000) gave Japanese and 
other firms confidence in investing in China. Trade liberalisation would have reduced 
tangible resistances such as barriers to trade, but again, intangible resistances would 
seem to have played a larger role as China's refmms, aimed at moving towards a market 
economy system closer to what the Japanese fim1s were used to, would have reduced 
uncertainty. The gradual opening up of the Chinese domestic market would also have 
reduced asymmetric information. 
Chapter I showed that the Survey Report on Overseas Business Operations by Japanese 
Manufacturing Companies (JBICI) results of potential destinations for Japanese FDI 
have consistently ranked China as number one. The survey is conducted by JBICI and 
since 200 I has been comprehensive, with an average of around 600 Japanese MNEs and 
over I 0,000 overseas affiliates surveyed each year. China has been ranked number one 
every year since at least 1995. 
Resistances to FDI were low during most of the 1990s, as the BIT and Chinese 
institutional reforms reduced resistances which continued to fall as China further 
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liberalised trade. The JBICI survey reveals the growth of confidence that Japanese fim1s 
had in investing in China throughout the 1990s. 
The 2000s 
The period from 1997 is of particular interest for Japanese FDI into China as there is a 
significant and large fall and then, in 2001, a small yet significant trend upwards. The 
few years from 1999 show Germany performs better than Japan (Figure 4.1 ), with both 
Germany and the United States narrowing the economic distance to China. 
Is the fall in Japan's FDI performance to China to below world average during that time 
because Japanese firms faced more resistances (and hence faced higher economic 
distance) compared to firms from other source countries? The rise of China, as by far 
the most attractive destination for FDI from Japan over that period, shows an 
inconsistency with the performance of Japanese FDI in China, which falls in that period. 
Figure 4.2 shows Japanese FDI performance to selected destinations as well as the rest 
of the world. Japan experiences very little economic distance in FDI to Indonesia and 
Hong Kong. FDI performance of FDI into Hong Kong is relatively stable and it does not 
appear that Hong Kong was a major substitute destination for FDI into China in the 
early 1980s. 
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Figure 4.2 Japanese F.DI performance, selected destinations, per cent 
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Japanese FDI to China performed better than FDI to Europe and India and has been 
close to the average of its FDI to the rest of the world since the early 1990s. It has been 
slightly below FDI to the United States since the time of the Asian financial crisis in 
1997. The fall in Japan's FDI performance to China in 1997 was sharper than its fall 
elsewhere but there can be seen falls in FDI performance to Indonesia, Hong Kong and 
the rest of the world. Japan's FDI to China has not experienced significantly higher 
resistances than to other destinations since the late 1980s (Figure 4.2) and has been 
close to the world average performance (Figure 4.1) since then. For FDI into China, 
there is a turning point around 200 I and a steady rise in Japanese FDI performance since 
(Figures 4.1 and 4.2). 
The year 2001 was an interesting year for the Japan-China relationship as it marked the 
beginning of a period of high political tensions, which resulted in suspension of 
leadership visits for six years and coincided with China's becoming a member of the 
WTO. The performance of Japanese FDI into China from 2001 improved in this period 
so it is likely that the positive effect of WTO entry dominated the negative political 
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developments or that political distance did not affect FDI. This issue is explored in the 
next section. 
Resistances to FDI 
Before proceeding to the discussion and estimation of the effects of political distance on 
FDJ, this next section reviews some of the relevant features of the international business 
literature which is involved with the study ofresistances (barriers) to FDI. The MNE 
international business literature focuses on differences between countries and the 
implications for the modes of entry into markets by MNEs. Resistances have a 
significant impact on the scale and structure of FDJ (Ghemawat, 2007). 
Trust and measures of cultural similarity, determined by religion, history of conflicts 
and genetic similarities, are all factors that have been identified as having an effect on 
economic linkages, including FDJ (Guiso et al., 2004; Ghemawat, 2007). These 
resistances have also been termed cultural distance and used to describe the uncertainty 
that a firm faces in investing in another country (Erramilli and D'Souza, 1995). 
Uncertainties can be separated into internal and external uncertainty, where internal 
uncertainty is related to a firm's uncertainty about the potential host market and external 
uncertainty is volatility in the host market itself and is unrelated, or external, to the 
home country of the firm deciding to invest. An increase in political distance between 
Japan and China, which increases uncertainty and therefore resistance, is an internal risk 
and should only affect Japanese firms and not other sources ofFDI. This 
characterisation of uncertainty into internal and external uncertainty is useful for 
understanding the effects of resistances on FDI performance. 
The measure of risk which is included in other studies is not bilateral relationship 
specific and therefore can be thought of as a measure of external uncertainty- involving 
risk external to a bilateral relationship. The measure of host country risk introduced in 
Baltagi et al. (2007) is not found to be statistically significant in explaining FDJ stocks 
or foreign affiliate sales in their model but the same variable is significant in Dee (2007). 
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The present study uses a measure of risk in the second stage of explaining FDI 
performance and not in the first stage of estimating it. 
In this study the Economic Freedom Index of the Fraser Institute52 is used and is 
expected to have a positive effect on FDI. The risk variable used by Baltagi et al. (2007) 
and Dee (2007) had a negative coefficient. Sensitivity tests in the present study are 
conducted using the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index53 and the 
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators54 with the assumption that all three 
variables are indicators of country risk. These country specific risk variables all affect 
external uncertainty and are external to (not exclusive to) bilateral relationships. An 
increase in the measure of host country risk will affect all source country FDI. 
Political distance is one measure of internal uncertainty. A bilateral measure of political 
distance has not been included in any cross country analysis of FDI flows but a measure 
or host country domestic political risk has been in studies such as Baltagi et al. (2007). 
The interaction between trade and a measure of political distance has a rich literature 
(See Polachek, 1980; Pollins, 1989a; Pollins, 1989b; Polachek, 1997; Reuveny and 
Kang, 2003). This study introduces the analysis of the influence of political distance on 
FDI. 
The political distance variable is shown in Figure 4.3 and shows Japanese 'sentiment' 
towards, separated into both positive and negative, comprised of event coding from 
newspaper articles. The data are from King (2003), which is updated to 2004 data in the 
Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) dataset. The data is the same as that used in 
Chapter 3, and in Chapter 7 where it will be explained in greater detail. The scale on the 
vertical axis is an index (used as a relative measure). 
52 http://www.freetheworld.com/ 
53 http://www.icgg.org/corruption.index.html 
54 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
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Figure 4.3 Japanese political distance towards China, 1990-2004 
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Source: King (2003). 
The net effect of the political positives and negatives is difficult to determine from 
Figure 4.3 alone. As in many confliet and cooperation event data, which is a measure of 
political distance, events are weighted according to a scale to reflect severity and 
significance of events. Given the Gold stein (1992) weighting of events, used in this data 
from King (2003), Figure 4.3 shows China's WTO accession offsetting the rising 
negative political sentiment with positive economic sentiment. The positive line 
continues after that as economic news continues to be positive. The next section 
investigates the effect of political distance, and other resistances, on FDI. 
The negative events are subtracted from the positive events to obtain a measure of net 
political closeness. As in utility theory, the assumption here is that positive events 
cancel out negative events to a certain extent. Therefore, a positive value for the 
political variable indicates political closeness and a negative value indicates widening 
political distance. A movement in a positive direction implies a narrowing political 
distance. The variable that will be used will be based on the FDI source country 
reporting news events towards the FDI host country. Event data based on news reported 
in the source country vis-a-vis the destination country will reflect the sentiment and 
political distance experienced by the parent firm choosing to invest in the host nation. 
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The effect of political distance on explaining FDI performance and the economic 
distance between FDI source and host is measured beside other variables that capture 
resistances. These include variables that reflect resistance that is both internal and 
external to that bilateral relationship. 
Actual to potential performance is given by the value exp(-uij) (see Chapter 3) and is 
explained here by 
(4.2) exp(-uu) = fio + fJ1freedom, + fizLanguage + /JJtariff, + fi4WTO, + fi5APEC, 
+ /J6Politica1Dist, 
where freedom, is an index of economic freedom of the FDI host nation in year t and 
drawn from the Fraser Institute (Gwartney et al., 2008). 
Language is a language index is based on Boisso and Ferrantino (1997) and is an index 
that takes a value ofO if none of the population of country i speaks the same language as 
in country j and a value of 10,000 if all of the population in both countries speak the 
same language. Due to the lack of data availability, the language similarity index does 
not change over the sample period. 
tariff, is the average tariff rate for the FDI host country at time t and is also extracted 
from the index of economic freedom by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney et al., 2008). 
WTO, is a variable that takes the value I if China was in the WTO in year t and zero 
otherwise. 
APEC, is a variable that takes the value I if the host country is a member of APEC in 
year t. 
PoliticaiDist, is a measure of political distance between FDI source and host countries 
in year t. Further details on this variable are given below. 
The choice of variables follows the reasoning set out in Chapters 2 and 3. They are 
common resistances variables used in trade and FDI models. The OLS estimation results 
are presented in Table 4.4. The dependent variable is the FDI performance results found 
earlier. 
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As in Chapter 3, the two stages (Equations 4.1 and 4.2) were estimated separately, with 
the performance results of Equation 4.1 being the dependent variable in Equation 4.2. 
The binding constraint of data availability in the second stage was even more restrictive 
in the FDI case, compared to the trade case, with the number of observations used in 
estimating the frontier being 4,397 (Table 4.2) and the nun1ber for explaining the 
performance ranging from 2,441 to 2,643 observations (Table 4.4). 
The low R -squared is similar to that of Chapter 3, when trade performance was 
explained. Since FDI performance is thought to be a measure of economic distance, it 
captures and is influenced by all resistances other than geographical factors. The low R-
squared is a reflection of the significant proportion ofresistances that are difficult to 
measure or even unobservable. The low R-squared is also an indication of the 
difficulties that a simultaneous estimation of Equations 4.1 and 4.2 would face. The 
inclusion of a set of time dummy variables or a time trend does not change the results in 
any significant way except to nullify the effect of host country tariff level. 
The economic freedom of the host country has a positive and significant effect, as would 
be expected. Estimations are conducted using indexes of governance and corruption 
instead of economic freedom to test the sensitivity of the variables that proxy for risk 
(Appendix 4C). The statistical significance of both the corruption and governance 
measures, and comparable results for other variables, show the model is not particularly 
sensitive to the kind of measure used for risk. This is not surprising, as Baltagi et al. 
(2007) include 'a measure of risk' as an afterthought in their model derivation and could 
have just as easily included a measure of economic freedom or governance. 
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Table 4.4 Explaining FDI performance 
Dependent variable: actual/potential FDI 
(I) (2) 
·· H~~tr;~-;;ct~~------ - o:o364, .. -----------o~o346"'-
(o.oo267) (0.00303) 
Language;i 0.0000154"' 0.0000146'" 
(0.0000021 0) (0.00000210) 
Host tariff 0.00263' 0.00208 
(0.00112) (0.00118) 
China WTO -0.137'" -0.141'" 
(0.0349) (0.0307) 
HostAPEC 0.064!'" 0.0502"' 
(0.00753) (0.00751) 
Political dist 0.000175"' 
(0.0000380) 
Lagged 0.000162"' 
Political dist (0.0000393) 
Constant 0.134'" 0.163'" 
(0.0172) (0.0202) 
R-squared 0.1656 0.1327 
N 2643 2441 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses' p < 0.05, "p < 0.01, '" p < 0.001 
There is ample evidence that causality runs both ways between trade and political 
distance and that the lag lengths of causation vary (Pollins 1989a; Pollins, 1989b; 
Reuveny and Kang, 2003). To account for this in the link between FDI and political 
distance, a lagged political distance variable is included. The one-year lag is roughly 
consistent with other findings and more appropriate than a two-year Jag (Reuveny and 
Kang, 2003) and also controls for causality running from economic distance to political 
distance. There is much evidence that changes in economic relations inf1uence political 
relations (Polachek, 1980; Mansfield and Pollins, 2003). Improvements in a political 
relationship would not be expected to have impacts on the economic relationship, and 
vice versa, immediately, but often with a lag as economic agents and foreign policy 
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stances adjust. The results with a lagged political distance variable are shown in column 
2. The results do not vary significantly. 
A measure of improving political relations is associated with a reduction in economic 
distance and an increase in actual achievement of potential FDI. The inverse-distance 
weighted political distance variable was not found to be statistically significant. The 
results in Table 4.4 only include the political distance measure for source country event 
analysis reporting on the FDI host country. For example, the results shows that an 
increase in positive news reports from a source country which mention the host country 
-an indicator of the source country warming to the host country- is associated with an 
increase in FDI from source to host. Appendix 4C sets out sensitivity test results, where 
FDI from country A to country B is similarly affected by political distance measures 
based on reports in country B towards country A, as well as the sum of both directions 
of political distance. The results do not differ significantly and suggest that a measure of 
one country's perceptions towards another is con-elated to the other country's 
perceptions of it. 
Language similarity increases performance and this is also of the expected sign. This is 
a resistance (reducing) measure that is internal to a bilateral relationship and can be seen 
to reduce uncertainty. 
The average tariff level for the host country is positive but only statistically significant 
in one of the specifications. This is perhaps because different FDI modes are affected by 
tariff levels in different ways. Higher tariffs often increase horizontal FDI as FDI 
becomes a way to sell to that domestic market and avoid tariffs (Markusen, 1984). More 
complex forms of FDI which include trade in parts and components favour lower tariffs. 
The dummy variable indicating China's WTO membership is negative and statistically 
significant. This is an unexpected result as overall, FDI increased into China following 
WTO accession. One reason could be that the sample countries are the large FDI 
sources that would have either already had a significant presence in China, or had 
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anticipated and pre-empted the WTO accession, or most likely, taken different Jag times 
to get large-scale investments on board. This is a puzzle and perhaps the small number 
of source countries (seven) is not providing the data enough variation to identifY the 
coefficient. Other studies such as Xing (2008) conclude that the increase in FDI into 
China in 2002, especially from East Asian sources such as South Korea and Japan, was 
due to WTO entry in 200 I. 
Conclusions 
An FDI frontier for seven of the world's largest eight FDI source countries was 
modelled with multilateral effects. The results confirm the importance of including 
multilateral effects that are inverse distance weighted effects of third country variables, 
which is a recent development in the literature. The importance of other determinants-
scale, distance and relative factor endowment- was confirmed. 
The estimated FDI frontier showed that some FDI relationships face much higher 
resistances, and therefore economic distances, in FDI, than others. Japanese FDI to 
China faced very high resistance in the early 1980s and vastly underperformed. In that 
period risk averse Japanese firms faced a high degree of uncertainty in investing in 
China and MNEs did not start to enter on any substantial scale until Chinese policy 
shifted in the mid 1980s. In 1986 China relaxed foreign ownership regulations and also 
started its negotiations to enter the WTO. 
The rapid inflow of Japanese FDI into China necessitated a bilateral investment treaty 
which facilitated and managed the growing relationship. Such measures reduced 
uncertainty and gave investing finns a framework which increased confidence in 
committing resources in China. Most of the 1990s saw Japanese FDI into China perform 
above what could be expected compared to other FDI relationships, given the 
determinants ofFDI. 
Chinese trade liberalisation and domestic reform in the 1990s- which continued 
China's opening up and was aimed at WTO accession- resulted in Japanese FDI 
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performing highly through most of the I 990s, until the Asian financial crisis. The 
commitment from China to the international trading system, as well as gradual reforms 
towards a well functioning market economy, through difficult-to-reverse reforms, 
reduced resistances by increasing confidence and reducing uncertainty. The Asian 
financial crisis saw all Japanese FDI fall, but especially to China. 
A measure of political distance was included to capture uncertainty and shown to have a 
significant effect on FDI. A worsening of the political relationship, or widening of 
political distance, had the effect of reducing FDI between those two countries, holding 
all else constant. 
Bilateral political tensions rose significantly in 2001 but the measure of political 
distance did not widen significantly, as China's WTO accession offset negative political 
sentiment with positive economic sentiment. The result was a turning point in Japanese 
FDI performance, which had been !rending downwards. There was no significant 
underperformance in the period 2001-2006 when political tensions were high. In fact 
compared to Japanese FDI performance overall, Japanese FDI into China performed at 
the level that is expected given the scale of the Chinese economy, Japanese economy, 
their proximity to one another and their economic structures. This result will be to some 
a surprising finding but it is also an important finding, as discussed further in Chapters 6 
and 7. 
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5 The impact of China's accession to the World Trade 
Organization 
China's accession to the WTO in December 200 I after 15 years of negotiations was a 
major event in international trade and economic policy (Branstetter and Lardy, 2006). 
The effect on Japanese trade with and investment in China that resulted was profound, 
as it was for the rest of the international economic community. There is no single trade 
policy initiative likely to result in larger gains in international trade in the foreseeable 
future than China's accession to the WTO (Drysdale and Song, 2000: 2). According to 
the WTO's former director general, Supachai Panitchpakdi, and Mark Clifford 'China's 
accession ranks in importance alongside China's first nuclear weapons test in 1964, and 
will make it possible, ... [for] China [to become] one of the two or three most 
prosperous economies of the mid twenty-first century' (Panitchpakdi and Clifford, 2002: 
1-32). 
The effect of China's accession on its economic relationship with Japan was significant. 
Chapter 3 showed how Japanese trade to China was lifted closer to potential trade after 
WTO accession. The increase in trade due to WTO accession is roughly 12.3 per cent a 
year for Chinese trade to Japan and 11 per cent for Japanese exports to China 55. Chapter 
4 showed how FDI also achieved better performance after WTO entry, with evidence 
that 200 I was a turning point for Japanese FDI performance in China from a downward 
trend to a positive trend. Yet most of the tariffliberalisation happened in the lead up to 
WTO accession (Lardy, 2002a) and significant FDI liberalisation occurred in the 1990s 
(Branstetter and Lardy, 2006). This raises an interesting question as to the effect of 
WTO accession for China. 
This chapter explains how China's accession to the WTO lifted Japanese trade with and 
investment to China even as political tensions increased. Political distance did not seem 
to increase markedly in the period, as positive news, predominantly economic news, 
rose. Chapter 3 showed some evidence that an increase in political distance causes trade 
55 Author's calculations from the increase in trade perfonnance due to WTO entry with parameter 
estimates from the fixed effects model (and political distance controlled for) which is model (4) in Table 
3.4 (p.70). 
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to fall, holding all else constant. To untangle the effects of political distance from WTO 
accession on the bilateral economic relationship it is important to examine how WTO 
membership has transformed the Chinese economy and what this meant for the effect of 
political distance on Japanese firms operating in China. 
Studies of China's accession usually focus on two aspects to do with accession (Farah, 
2006). One is the tariff liberalisations, market access concessions through reduction of 
NTBs and other at-border measures to integrate China into the global economic system. 
Such studies usually show significant gains for China and the international economic 
community56 as objective resistances are reduced. The other aspect is the reform of 
Chinese institutions. Banking, legal and even political institutional reform were agreed 
to in accession commitments. This includes transparency issues related to legal and 
administrative policies and the resolution of domestic commercial and trade disputes by 
foreign firms that also affect domestic firms (Yu et al., 2003; Farah, 2006). These 
institutional reforms are very important for continued economic reforms in China 
(Bhattasali et al., 2004) and reduce subjective resistances. This chapter explains how 
both aspects of accession affected China's economic interaction with the international 
economic community, including Japan. 
The next section reviews China's opening up before WTO accession and some 
empirical studies on the impact of accession. Then explanation of the commitment to 
reforms, the signal that this sent and the effect on subjective resistances are discussed. 
Finally, the constraints put on Chinese policy as well as the confidence gained by 
foreign entities in their dealing with China, as well as Chinese entities in their dealing 
with the outside world, are discussed before concluding. 
56 See, for example, studies by Rumbaugh and Blancher (2004) and Martin et al. (2009). 
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Trade and FDI liberalisation and the WTO 
Pre-WTO accession liberalisation 
China achieved a higher level of openness in trade before WTO accession than any other 
large developing country and than is often recognised (Branstetter and Lardy, 2006). 
China's trade liberalisation and market oriented reforms in the 1990s cannot be viewed 
independently of its GATT, and later WTO, accession bid. The unilateralliberalisations 
that were undertaken in the 1990s gave Chinese policy makers credibility and 
confidence in the international trading system that was reciprocated by the international 
economic community (Drysdale, 2000; Garnaut and Huang, 2000). The accession bid 
started in 1986 and rapid unilateral liberalisation took place in the late 1980s as well as 
1990s (Lardy, 2002a; Lin et al., 2003). The FDI regime was also very open for a 
developing country, despite much of the openness being concentrated in special 
economic zones earlier in the 1990s (Lin et al., 2003; Branstetter and Lardy, 2006). 
The average statutory tariff rate in 1982 was 56 per cent, which was reduced to 43 per 
cent in 1985 and then stayed constant at that level until 1992. The period following 1985 
saw the average tariff rate decline steadily to 15 per cent by the time of WTO accession 
(See Figure 5.1) (Lardy, 2002a). The 1990s was a period of rapid liberalisation at the 
border but also involved significant domestic reforms. Tariff and NTB liberalisation 
cannot occur in isolation of other domestic reforms and the 1990s saw the establishment 
of the legal basis for trade and deep reform of both import and export systems 
(Shengming, 2000). Gordon Chang has claimed that China's reform effectively stopped 
in the period 1997 to 2002 despite the alternative views of Chinese scholars57 (Yu et al., 
2003: 6). Yet to sustain the rapid economic growth and modernisation that China 
experienced and to gain entry to the WTO, border liberalisation had to be accompanied 
by deeper behind-the-border reforms (Drysdale, 2000). In this sense it was not just 
liberalisation as a result of WTO accession that mattered but the commitment made by 
China throughout the 1990s to the international trading system that was an important 
driver of China's integration into the international economic community (Drysdale and 
Song, 2000). 
57 See, for example, Hai (2000), Lin (2001) and Lin et al. (2003). 
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Japanese FDI into China saw a sharp increase in 1986 (see Chapter 4) which was the 
year that China's GATT accession negotiations started. China's GATT entry talks 
starting in 1986 had symbolic significance as it was combined with other measures of 
. h Ch' 58 openmg up t e mese economy . 
Figure 5.1 shows China's average tariff rate and total trade (exports plus imports) as a 
proportion of GDP, which is a common measure of openness. The figure shows that the 
most significant tariff reductions did in fact occur in the 1990s, but trade as a proportion 
ofGDP did not rise significantly until around the time ofWTO accession in 2001. The 
increase in China's trade since accession to the WTO occurred despite most of the 
significant liberalisations, both at the border and behind the border, having taken place 
in the lead up to WTO accession as early as 11 years prior to 2001 (Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1 China's trade dependence and average tariff rate, per cent, 1990-
2004 
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Source: Tariff data from MOFCOM website, http://china.org.cn, and trade data from UN Comtrade 
database and GDP data from World Development Indicators, http://www.worldbank.org/data. 
58 See Chapter 4 for discussion. 
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Figure 5.1 shows the importance of the WTO and its institutional effect on China's 
continual liberalisation and its deepened integration with the global economy. The 
signal that the accession sent to the international economic community and the 
confidence that it brought are discussed later in this chapter. 
Gains from trade and FDI liberalisation 
Studies that empirically estimate the effects of China's WTO accession are wide ranging 
and numerous. However, the effects ofWTO membership on a country's trade are not 
obvious. Rose (2004a) found no empirical evidence of a significant effect of WTO entry 
on a countiy' s trade. Rose extended his controversial findings in two follow-up studies, 
finding that WTO members did not have more liberal trade policies than non-members 
and that the WTO did not affect the variability in trade (Rose, 2004b; Rose, 2005). The 
results are not, however, very robust after taking into account features ofWTO 
membership and what the WTO does for its signatories and the global trading system. 
Tomz et al. (2007) show some non-members of the GA TT/WTO participate informally 
much more actively than some official members do. There are significant spill-overs to 
non-members in this sense and China falls into this category, as it was increasingly a 
major trader that benefited from the open global trading system. Other members do not 
internalise the benefits of GATT/WTO membership (Tomz et al., 2007). While the 
debate has shown that in fact membership of the GATT/WTO does increase trade for a 
member, membership status has to be clearly defined and accounted for (Tomz et al., 
2007) in the model specification, and the treatment of imports and exports has to be 
well specified (Subramanian and Wei, 2007). 
Unlike the average effect ofGATT/WTO membership for all countries, the empirical 
studies estimating effects from China's membership in 2001 are not surrounded by 
controversy. China's unilateralliberalisations at the border leading up to membership 
increased trade and China's experience confirms the importance of recognising non-
WTO members who actively participate in the global trading system, as Tomz et al. 
(2007) describe 59 Studies that estimated the effects of China's WTO accession on 
59 See Drysdale and Song (2000), Panitchpakdi and Clifford (2002) and Lardy (2002a). 
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Chinese and global trade that were conducted prior to accession show the dominant 
prediction was that accession would lend to a substantial increase in Chinese and world 
trade (Zhang, 2000; Bach et al., 2000; Lei and Huang, 2000). 
Studies which include post 200 I data confirm the gains from further tariff liberalisations 
and commitments to reform. Ianchovichina and Martin (2004 ), Anderson and Martin 
(2006) and Martin et al. (2009) all estimate significant gains from tariff reductions for 
China. Martin et al. (2009) recognise that WTO entry also constrains the future 
proliferation of agricultural protection, a policy response associated with rapid industrial 
growth in developing countries, and estimate the significant unmeasured gains from a 
counterfactual. Subramanian and Wei (2007) find that WTO membership increases 
imports and Yu (2009) shows WTO accession increases exports through the channel of 
improved institutional quality. Yu (2009) and Subramanian and Wei (2007) show that 
China's case is contrary to the findings by Rose (2004a). 
Empirical studies usually focus on the effects of WTO membership on trade but the 
impact on FDI is also important. An important condition for entry into the WTO was the 
granting of permission for foreign firms to sell directly to the Chinese domestic market 
to which unti12001 they had to sell through Chinese trade organisations (Chow, 2003). 
There is ex ante empirical evidence of FDI into China increasing from WTO entry (see, 
for example, Rumbaugh and Blancher, 2004) as reforms to economic and legal 
institutions took place. WTO entry acted to increase FDI through another channel. China 
became a more attractive destination for FDI as reforms in key sectors improved the 
domestic economic environment and encouraged the momentum in China towards a 
more competitive market economy (Whalley, 2006). The reforms and analysis of their 
effect on the growth of FDI to China are discussed later in this chapter. 
The gains to the Chinese economy and the international economic community from the 
liberalisations undertaken leading up to accession in 200 l, as well as the accession 
commitments to further tariffliberalisation and removal ofNTBs, are clear. Why then 
did China's trade (both imports and exports) increase so sharply after WTO accession 
when most of the tariff liberalisation occurred prior to 200 I (Figure 5.1 )? And more 
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importantly, for the purposes of this study, how do we understand the surge in trade 
after the WTO accession in the context of Japan-China bilateral economic and political 
relations? The rest of this chapter addresses this question in explaining the benefits of 
WTO accession for China, the international economic community and Japan-China 
relations. 
WTO and domestic reform 
China made more concessions than any other new member of the GATT/WTO ever has 
because of its size and impact on the world trading system, as well as Chinese 
leadership requiring an external force in liberalising its economy as part of the domestic 
reform agenda (Drysdale, 2000; Brand! et al., 2007). China joined as a developing 
country because of its income levels and institutional framework but had to give many 
developed country concessions precisely because of its size and the impact of its rapid 
growth (Garnaut and Huang, 2000). This included unprecedented antidumping and 
safeguard measures beyond what would be expected of an economy entering the 
GATT/WTO at China's level of development60 (Rumbaugh and Blancher, 2004; 
Whalley, 2006). Indeed, it can be said that in no other country has WTO accession 
effected such deep economic, legal and political changes as it did with China (Cross, 
2004). 
The United States and EU imposed such strict accession requirements in the bilateral 
negotiations leading up to entry in 200 I because of the impact that China was having, 
and was predicted to have, on the international system. China's rapid rise and the 
adjustments that had to be made were causing friction and stresses for China, its trading 
partners and the international economic community. More stringent rules had to be put 
in place for other WTO members to be confident China's accession would not disturb 
the global trading system adversely (Gamaut and Huang, 2000). 
60 See Messerlin (2007) for details on the process and circumstance which meant China's antidumping and 
safeguards measures were beyond that of any other previous accession protocols and beyond what was 
reasonably expected of China given its level of development. 
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Why did China make so many concessions? The reason why China accepted the 
demands by the international community, which were far beyond those placed on 
previous new signatories, was that the benefits outweighed the costs (Brand! et al., 
2007). The costs were the policy constraints and the market opening measures that 
China had to undertake, as well as the concessions on antidumping safeguards and other 
measures put in place against China. The benefits were joining the world trading system 
as an equal member and locking in and reinforcing reforms towards a market economy. 
Many constraints and concessions that accession brought China were seen as benefits by 
pro-reform policy makers and leaders, and seen as costs to non-reformers and vested 
interest groups. 
The liberalisation that China unilaterally undertook in the 1990s was mostly at the 
border. This liberalisation was easiest to undertake (Fan, 2009). Behind-the-border 
reforms are much more difficult to implement, especially with institutions that are not 
fully developed (Dee, 2009). China faced and still faces significant internal barriers to a 
well functioning market economy that allocates resources efficiently. To continue the 
momentum of reform and to move beyond the reform of the 1990s, China used the 
external constraints that WTO imposed (Drysdale and Song, 2000). Those external 
constraints that China committed to helped it break through the political, economic, and 
ideological deadlocks and continue its economic transition (Hai, 2000; Fan, 2009). 
Pro-reform elements of the Chinese leadership were able to use WTO membership as an 
instrument to overcome domestic barriers, and protection and reform fatigue, and 
maintain reform momentum (Hai, 2000; Lin et al., 2003; Paden, 2003) and has used 
international engagement as a driver of domestic reform (Chow, 2003; Brandt et al., 
2007). Whalley (2006) notes that China is a w1ique case in that it has based its 
development strategy around the WTO accession- both in the reforms and liberalisation 
leading up to, and the implementation of its commitments after, membership61 • As such, 
it is often recognised that accession was part of a larger strategy directed at fundamental 
economic reform (Ciarke, 2003). 
61 With the potential exception of Vietnam, another recent developing country member to the WTO. 
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Long Yongtu, head of the Chinese accession negotiations said 'China's economy must 
become a market economy in order to become part of the global economic system, as 
well as the economic globalization process.' (Long, 2000a). He went on to say that 'We 
must let those [WTO] rules that stand at the core of the market economy, and which 
have to be obeyed, take firm roots in our society and country, so that our own market 
economy may become one that is truly orderly, efficient, honest and clean' (Long, 
2000b). 
Brand! et al. (2007) draw a parallel between China's use offoreign influence as a lever 
on domestic reform and gaiatsu (external pressure) in Japan to break policy gridlock in 
Japan. The state-owned sector, at least in some areas, was seen as a drag on economic 
growth (Lardy, 2002a; Lin et al., 2003), including the debt crisis in the state-owned 
financial sector. WTO entry can be viewed as generating the necessary momenturu and 
impetus for reform during the most politically difficult stage of China's move to a 
market economy (Panitchpakdi and Clifford, 2002). Liberalisation of trade policy 
associated with WTO accession in effect forces the pace of reform in many areas. WTO 
accession and the commitments played a role in entrenching the reforms in the SOE 
sector, and financial and foreign exchange sectors (Drysdale, 2000). Lin et al. (2003) 
detail the effect ofWTO membership on China's agricultural sector, financial sector and 
SOE reform, and demonstrate the importance of the WTO for each sector. 
WTO accession imposes market disciplines on China as it makes certain existing 
reforms towards a market system difficult to reverse, if not irreversible (Cross, 2004). 
The accession commitments sidelined many vested interests within the government, 
bureaucracy and the state-owned sector who opposed market oriented reforms. China 
used WTO accession and membership to reinforce the pace of economic refonn against 
domestic protectionism (Drysdale, 2000; Hai, 2000; Fan, 2009). 
Accession required China to make broad and deep market access commitments across 
goods and services sectors, to bind China to Western norms of transparency, procedural 
fairness, and intellectual property protection; and singled out China for less than most-
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favoured nation treatment with respect to the 'non-market economy' treatment for 
antidurnping and safeguards (Brandt et al., 2007). WTO accession involved measures 
that are quantifiable (trade liberalisation) and those that are not, such as reforms of 
economic, legal and political institutions (Chow, 2003). 
Those reforms mattered for foreign firms and are therefore relevant to the analysis of 
bilateral economic relations between Japan and China, as described next. 
Financial, legal and economic institution reform 
Chinese reformers, led by Premier Zhu Rongji and chief WTO accession negotiator 
Long Y ongtu, understood that simply reducing import barriers, both tariffs and NTBs, 
was insufficient for China to benefit from globalisation and join international production 
networks (Branstetter and Lardy, 2006). Japanese firms, for example, wanted market 
mechanisms entrenched in China and saw the WTO as playing a large role in this 
(JMOF A official; Keidanren official)62 China saw the WTO as a mechanism for 
strengthening and deepening market oriented economic reforms (Hai, 2000). Accession 
was not simply a matter of reducing tariffs (which was done leading up to accession) 
and granting market access to foreign firms but instituting a deeper reform of Chinese 
institutions. 
Reform oflegal institutions was a significant step towards establishing a functioning 
rule of law and in line with Deng Xiaoping' s 'two hands' policy of developing the 
economy on one hand and the legal system on the other (Chen, 1999; Cross, 2004). 
Legal infrastructure reforms agreed on accession were especially important for the 
operations of foreign enterprises in China. 
Accession protocol commitments for the legal system included three major elements. 
First, publication of all trade rules and regulations and access to information are the 
usual general rules in the WTO (Yu et al., 2003; Gertler, 2004). Improvements in 
62 See Appendix A for interviewee references. 
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transparency provide confidence and reduce asymmetric information. Access to all 
regulations is specifically made in the accession protocol and new laws and regulations 
were only to be implemented after a specified period where comments had to be heard 
and enough warning given 63 The introduction of new laws and regulations without 
notice, prior to 2001, was considered a major obstacle for Japanese firms (Automobile 
informant 3; METI official 2). 
Secondly, the protocol included uniform application and administration of trade rules. 
Such reforms were among the most difficult commitments given the institutional setting 
in which China was starting (Chen, 1999; Cross, 2004). Significant reduction of 
subjective resistances comes from the GATT requirement that all trade-related laws, 
regulations and rulings be promptly published and administered in an 'impartial and 
uniform manner' 64. This is an important requirement as it provided accessibility to other 
WTO country members on trade-related laws and regulations on an equal basis to 
domestic enterprises. 
Thirdly, the introduction of independent judicial review and, ultimately, the opportunity 
to appeal meant that Japanese firms and other MNEs in China now had a dispute 
settlement mechanism. This included an appeal process where local government 
protection can be brought to the attention of the central government (Yu et al., 2003) 65 
On top of the transparency and legal reforms, China's accession protocol included 
significant banking, insurance and telecoms reform. Financial system reform and 
banking reform (still dominated by SOEs) would mean a more efficient market economy 
with financial intermediation that channelled China's high savings into more productive 
investments. Upon accession to the WTO China agreed to remove geographic and 
business restrictions on financial institutions within five years and to allow the entry of 
foreign banks, both commitments that have been undertaken to a certain degree. These 
reforms were important for trade and foreign enterprises operating in the Chinese 
63 From the Accession Protocol, Paragraph 2, C. 2 and paragraph 2, C, 3. 
64 GATT, October, 1947, Article X, 61, Stat. A-ll 
65 Protocol note World Trade Organization, Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 
(Nov. I 0, 2001), http://www.uschina.org. 
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market. The services liberalisations agreed to as commitments to accession by China are 
the most radical and far reaching ever negotiated in the WTO (Mattoo, 2004). Accession 
has helped modernise accounting, telecommunications and transport systems while 
reducing corruption and local protectionism (Yu et al., 2003). 
Commitment implementation 
Although the 15 years negotiating required many commitments and reforms by China, 
some like Clarke (2003) have argued that they pale in comparison to implementing 
commitments agreed upon after accession. Lardy (2002b) points to the difficulties that 
China faced in achieving its commitments and notes China may still have some trouble 
meeting the commitments on time (Lardy, 2002b ). 
There are mechanisms in place to monitor the implementation of commitments, the 
most important of which is the Trade Policy Review Board (TPRB) ofthe WTO. In its 
second Trade Policy Review of China in 2008 it noted that much progress had been 
made but concerns were raised about specific areas in regulatory barriers in trade and 
investment as well as noting that services liberalisation has been slower than other 
areas66 . Such checks on the implementation commitments give an avenue for other 
member countries to voice concerns and review progress in a transparent manner. 
Some commitments have been contested and some not met on strict deadlines but the 
mechanisms are in place and the agreements China made with the United States and the 
EU, in particular, leading up to the accession, mean that there are constraints that keep 
reform moving in the right direction (Rumbaugh and Blancher, 2004). The reality is that 
the Chinese government signed up to constrain its behaviour and set in train reforms that 
secure movement towards a more open functioning market economy. The constraints 
were the cost that had to be paid for accession but the constraints were also what pro-
reform elements required to overcome domestic barriers and protection against reform. 
66 Concluding remarks by the Chairperson, Trade Policy Review: China, 21 and 23 May, 2008: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/countries e/china e.htm 
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Despite some delays and lapses in implementing some aspects of WTO accession 
commitments, the assertions of systematic non-compliance by China are not supported 
by the evidence (Lardy, 2002a; Rumbaugh and Blancher, 2004). No WTO member has 
thus far voiced major issues with China's early implementation of its commitments 
under the accession agreements (Rumbaugh and Bl<incher, 2004) except in intellectual 
property rights (Brandt et al., 2007). There will be other technical difficulties with 
financial and agricultural sector reforms but the general momentum of reforms and the 
constraints put on Chinese leadership from WTO accession have meant major trading 
partners have confidence in China's compliance. This is discussed in the next section. 
Constraints and confidence 
While the direct benefits from market access concessions and continued reforms are 
significant and important, the symbolic significance of China joining the WTO cannot 
be overstated. It meant the world community recognised China as an equal patiner and 
signalled the continued progress of economic globalisation (Chow, 2003). More 
importantly, it signalled China's commitment to a rules-based global trading system, 
illustrated by its willingness to place constraints on Chinese policy makers (Garnaut and 
Huang, 2000). 
China's membership in the WTO also affected the behaviour of China's major trading 
patiners towards China, including Japan. It changed Chinese policy behaviour and the 
environment in which foreign and domestic firms operate, and the behaviour of foreign 
and domestic firms operating in China (Drysdale, 2000). It managed to do this because 
of the commitments that were made and the credibility which China had earned in the 
process leading up to accession. The commitment to the global trading system prior to 
WTO accession should not be overlooked. This commitment, which catne in the form of 
unilateral trade liberalisation (as discussed above), demonstrated that China was serious 
in its long term goal of moving towards a market economy. As was reported in Chapter 
1, an executive in a Japanese MNE said that '[with] WTO accession [China] becatne 
recognised as a real player globally and a real market' (Electronics informant 2). 
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The accession commitments were a blueprint for China's institutional changes for at 
least a decade from 2001, even if the timetable has not been strictly met (Chow, 2003). 
The process of WTO accession provided the international community and China with a 
rare opportunity to set out principles governing trade relations between China and the 
rest of the world (Garnaut and Huang, 2000). WTO accession and the policy credibility 
and predictability that arose from accession protocol commitments (even if not all are 
eventually met on the ambitious timetable) limited the likelihood of distortionary 
interventions in trade and FDI sectors in China (Drysdale, 2000). It does the same to 
China's trading partners as they are also bound by the rules that govern the world 
trading system when dealing with China. 
The process provided China with increased confidence in further opening up its 
economy and participating in the international economic system and put constraints on 
China's behaviour (Garnaut and Huang, 2000) as the accession and the commitments 
made also underwrote the credibility of the continuity and reliability of policy in China 
(Itoh, 1996: 8). 
The commitments made to reforms and the timetables agreed upon had the effect of 
changing the corporate strategic environment for both foreign and domestic firms and 
reduced the opportunities for reversal in reform momentum with the external constraints 
(Drysdale, 2000). For example, rather than destroying industrial policy for the auto 
industry, WTO accession constrained and disciplined it (Noble et al., 2005). The auto 
industry became more competitive and dynamic after WTO accession and has grown 
rapidly since (Noble et al., 2005). Chapter 6 discusses the growth in the auto and 
electronics industries and the effects of political distance on the trade and FDI in those 
industries between Japan and China. 
The effects of political distance on trade and FDI changed once China became a member 
of the WTO because of the confidence of all players in China moving towards a market 
economy and constraints on Chinese policy makers. Sudden reversals in regulations and 
policies became much more difficult in some sectors, behaviour of policy makers that 
affects foreign enterprises became more predictable and there was increased 
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transparency in China. The deepening of reforms towards industrialisation and an 
efficient market economy also means that even if political distance widens, there is less 
state involvement in the economy. Japanese enterprises could still engage in operations 
in China when political distance widened. 
Roessler (2000) has described the WTO as an institution that provides a means to 
'resolve conflicts of interest within, not between, nations'. In this sense WTO accession 
gave Japanese MNEs and policy makers, for example, confidence to engage China 
despite the political distance. The electronics executive mentioned above stated that 
since WTO entry, business risk, although still high in China, had been falling 
(Electronics informant 2). Former business executives at the Japan-China Investment 
Promotion Organisation stated that 'China's WTO membership brought assurance to 
Japanese firms and it changed the way Japanese people think about China' (JCIPO 
representative). 
There are a number of aspects to the confidence gained for firms and governments, both 
foreign and Chinese. First, the established rules-based framework that the WTO 
provides for addressing disputes and differences gives confidence in dealing with China 
but also with China dealing in the international economic community (Gamaut and 
Huang, 2000). Also, commitment to reform and liberalisation associated with entry not 
only boosted efficiency, but also foreign investor confidence in the Chinese economy at 
a time when it desperately needed it (Drysdale, 2000). Related to the commitments that 
were made, the constraints put on Chinese and foreign country policy reduced 
unpredictability and information asymmetry in trade and investment policies. 
Japanese firms recognised China as a real player in the global system and as a real 
market after WTO accession in a country where country risk was historically high 
(Electronics informant 2). 
Conclusion 
China and the international economic community have gained from the continued 
opening up of the Chinese economy to international trade and increased market access 
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China has given to foreign enterprises. The reduction of trade barriers undertaken and 
the commitment to continue to reduce these barriers has been significant for all foreign 
enterprises trading and investing in China, including Japanese foreign enterprises. While 
this aspect of the WTO accession cannot be overlooked, the reforms that China 
committed to are equally important. 
Chinese domestic reforms that accompanied border liberalisations in the lead up to 
China's WTO accession were significant but pale in comparison to the reform 
commitments made in the accession protocols. China recognised that those reforms are 
necessary to maintain the rapid growth and modernisation of the Chinese economy. The 
WTO provided the external constraints that were required for China in order to achieve 
these difficult reforms to its financial, banking, legal and economic institutions. There is 
enough evidence that the reforms are entrenched and China has and will continue to 
implement the reforms agreed to, despite some difficult deadlines not met on time. The 
mechanisms in place, by design, such as the TPRB, monitor and review such measures 
on a regular basis. These are the basis for the increased confidence in dealing with 
China after China's WTO accession. 
The domestic reforms that China has agreed to, and those that have already been 
implemented, continue the process to transform China into a more modem efficient 
market economy with stronger legal, financial and economic institutions. The reductions 
in subjective resistances to international trade and foreign enterprise are significant. 
Japanese firms have been able to engage, and operate, in the Chinese market with less 
uncertainty. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of WTO accession was the signal it sent to the rest of 
the world and the confidence gained by all parties from the constraints that the WTO has 
placed on China and the international economic community. China committed itself to a 
series of reforms and rules which continue its earlier unilateral reforms towards a well 
functioning market economy. The entrenchment of reforms and reform momentum, 
combined with dispute settlement mechanisms and wider reaching market access, have 
meant foreign enterprises can engage in China with less state involvement. 
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The increase in confidence from foreign investors and traders and others interacting 
with the Chinese market comes from not only China's commitment to a rules based 
system, but the constraints put on Chinese policy makers (Garnaut and Huang, 2000). 
The WTO's main objective is 'to help trade flow smoothly, freely, fairly and 
predictably'67 The liberalisations and continued opening up of China contribute to the 
freeing up of trade flows while the institutional reform commitments help trade become 
smoother. The constraints put on China as well as those trading with, and investing in, 
China make trade fairer, given the rules based system committed to. The constraints also 
lead to increased predictability in trade flows but more importantly in policy responses 
which give confidence to the Japanese (and other major trading partners of China) and 
Chinese in further deepening their engagement. 
67 The WTO's mandate: http://www.wto.org 
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6 Electronics and autos: driving the Japan-China relationship 
Japanese firms view China as the most promising foreign destination for expanding 
their operations overseas (JBICI, 2007). The huge market potential, the geographic 
advantage and other positive factors in China, have swamped the country risk that at 
times receives a high degree of publicity. Bilateral trade flows were not found to be 
affected significantly by political distance in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 showed that aggregate 
bilateral FDI is more sensitive to political distance and that a widening of political 
distance helps explain a relative fall in FDI to China. This chapter takes a closer look at 
the two most dynamic sectors in the Japan-China trade and investment relationship, 
electronics and automobiles, and at how trade and FDI in those sectors may be affected 
by political relations. 
Trade and FDI in electronics and automobiles have been, and continue to be, important 
in the Japan-China economic relationship. The two industries are the largest elements in 
the relationship and are at the core of the whole nature of trade and industrial 
specialisation in East Asia. 
The industries, thought they differ in important ways, are the focus here because both 
lead the economic relationship between Japan and China and focus on both illustrates 
the different ways politics affects trade and investment but also how that affect might be 
mitigated. Despite the dominance in public discussion and the media of the political 
tensions between Japan and China, there has been a huge growth in interdependence 
between the two countries, reflected in increasing trade and investment shares led 
primarily by the electronics and automobile industries. 
Every major Japanese MNE in the automobile and electronics sector is involved in 
operations in China68 The key difference between the two industries is that electronic 
goods are produced in China to export to Japan and other markets, as well as sell to the 
domestic market in China, whereas the automobile MNEs are producing automobiles in 
China for Chinese domestic market consumption. Another significant difference is in 
68 See Tables 6.3 (p. J 3 J) and 6.4 (p. l 34). 
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the procurement of parts and components in both industries. In general, with minor 
exceptions, the geographic distance that parts and components have to be transported 
and the quality do not matter as much for production in electronics as they do for 
automobile production, which has larger, more sophisticated parts that require higher 
quality standards than most electronics parts and components. Geographic distance 
matters more for parts and components procured between offshore and local sources 
than those traded domestically but distance still matters as much of the trade depends on 
FDI, which is sensitive to economic distance (Chapter 4). 
Japanese MNEs in both industries procure parts and components from other economies 
in East Asia, as well as Japan, and the FDI in both industries is commonly associated 
with an expansion of trade. Increasingly, parts and components are procured 
domestically in China from foreign and domestic firms. This trade in parts and 
components, and the investment link, is an important feature of the economic 
relationship and is addressed in more detail later in the chapter. 
This chapter reviews the recent growth in the operations of Japanese automobile and 
electronics firms in China and survey data are presented on where Japanese MNEs rank 
China as a potential destination for overseas operations. The chapter examines how the 
political relationship between the two countries affects business in these two sectors. 
Some measures that limit the effects of the political distance are discussed before the 
chapter describes the relationship between trade and investment and the new 
interdependence that drives the economic relationship. 
Production of automobiles in China is aimed at the Chinese domestic market and export 
of cars from China has not yet started in any significant way. With the growth in scale of 
production in China, the agglomeration of these industries and the technological 
capacity and human capital that is being developed on the ground by Chinese 
manufacturers, China is likely to be a significant exporter of automobiles in future. 
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Table 6.1 Japanese direct investment in China by sector, per cent 
1995-99 2000-03 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Manufacturing total 77.0 83.0 87.1 77.6 79.1 67.4 
Food 5.3 2.8 2.3 3.4 3.0 2.8 
Textile 7.6 3.1 2.4 4.5 1.5 1.0 
Lumber & pulp 1.1 0.8 1.2 0.5 0.6 7.6 
Chemical 7.2 8.2 6.2 9.5 7.7 5.1 
Metal 7.0 6.2 8.7 5.7 4.3 8.2 
Machinery 9.0 9.4 9.4 7.0 8.3 9.1 
Electrical 15.9 24.9 10.3 13.1 20.7 12.9 
Transport 9.7 25.3 36.6 15.7 18.5 12.2 
other 12.0 9.9 5.7 18.2 14.4 8.5 
Non-manufacturing total 23.0 17.0 12.9 22.4 20.9 32.6 
TOTAL (lOOm yen) 2364 2160 4909 7262 7172 7304 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Balance of Payments Statistics, Tokyo, Japan 
Table 6.1 shows the rapid increase in, and importance of, the share of non-
manufacturing investment which is a significant development in the bilateral 
relationship. The service sector in China started to open up, especially after accession to 
the WTO, and financial services and other services to support the manufacturing 
industry have made the economic relationship deeper and more important. 
Trade in electronic parts, components and finished goods accounted for over a third of 
total trade both ways, at roughly US$79.6 billion in 200669. One-third of Chinese 
imports from Japan were in parts and components in 2005, up from 13 per cent in 1992 
and 1993, where electronics and autos feature prominently70• Trade in parts and 
components from China to Japan increased from two per cent in 1992 to 16.3 per cent in 
2005. Both sectors were also important in Japanese FDI to China. Table 6.1 shows that 
FDI in electronics accounted for 13 per cent of total FDI from Japan to China and FDI in 
69 Source: United Nations Comtrade database. 
70 Source: United Nations Comtrade database. Parts and components commodity composition from 
Athukorala (2005) 
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auto parts was 12 per cent oftota1 FDI in 200771 . In tenns of the share of Japan's 
investment in China, these industries ranked first and second. In 2006, the year after the 
anti-Japanese riots in China, FDI in electronics and auto industries together accounted 
for 39 per cent of total FDI, or 282 billion yen in terms of the investment stock. 
Although FDI is lumpy and jumps around, the share of electronics and automobile FDI 
in Japanese FDI into China over the period 2005 to 2007 was lower than it was on 
average from 2000 to 2003. Table 6.1 reveals the falling share of manufacturing FDI 
and a shift towards non-manufacturing FDI. The FDI relationship has not been 
weakened but there has been a shift in the structure of FDI towards more sophisticated 
economic activity. 
The growth in Japanese FDI into China has been staggering. Over the period 1989 to 
2007, total FDI from Japan to China grew at an annual rate of22 per cent72. Japanese 
FDI flows to China in the electronics and electrical parts industries grew at an annual 
rate of 26 per cent and 57 per cent annually for the automobile sector. Japan continues to 
rely heavily on its external sector for growth and China is a large part of that. Total 
estimated Japanese FDI stock worldwide in 2007 was US$54 7 billion, of which China 
had US$37 billion or 7 per cent73 . 
Many major Japanese electronics and automobile companies have histories in China that 
go back to before the Second World War. However, investment and production in China 
only really started to take off after China's commitment to opening up in the late 1970s. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, a wave of Japanese direct investment in China began in the 
mid 1980s. This was due to the opening up of China to foreign enterprise and the 
beginning of China's accession bid to the then GATT, later the WTO. The rapid inflow 
of Japanese FDI to China necessitated a framework to manage the potential frictions on 
both sides, for Japanese MNEs and in China domestically, that result from a sudden 
expansion in FDI. In 1988 the two countries signed the BIT to serve that purpose. FDI 
71 FDI data source is from Balance of Payments Statistics, Ministry of Finance, Japan, unless otherwise 
stated. 
72 See Chapters 1 and 4. 
73 Source: Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO). 
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since then has taken place without any major bilateral political initiative comparable in 
impact to that of the BIT. 
The share of Japanese FDI in total Chinese inward FDI in 1992 was 6.4 per cent and 
Japan was the third largest source ofFDI behind Hong Kong (68.2 per cent) and Taiwan 
(9.5 percent), larger than the United States' share of 4.6 per cent. In Chapter 4 Japan was 
shown to be much closer to its potential FDI than the United States and European 
countries, given the determinants of FDI for both the source countries and China. 
The period of rapid investment expansion after 200 I coincided with bilateral political 
relations taking a turn for the worse. Visits by leaders were suspended for six years and 
rivalry and disputes flared, culminating in anti-Japanese protests and boycotts of 
Japanese products in China in 2005. How did the political distance between China and 
Japan, which had been narrowing but widened after 2001, affect firms in these sectors 
and what factors have helped limit the impact of the adverse political climate on the 
operations of Japanese firms in the Chinese market? Chapter 5 provided a broad answer 
to this question through analysis of the interaction between political developments and 
the economic relationship overall but examples and supporting evidence at the firm 
level is provided in this chapter. Evidence is drawn from interviews with Japanese 
MNEs and SMEs with significant operations in China, Japanese policy makers and 
Chinese policy makers. For more details on the interviewees referred to throughout this 
Chapter and the rest of the study, see Appendix A. 
Hot economics 
Chinese market potential 
Since its accession to the WTO China has increasingly been seen in Japan as a potential 
market, not only a platform from which to export using cheap labour (Automobile 
informant I; Cabinet Office official). 
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The Survey Report on Overseas Business Operations by Japanese Manufacturing 
Companies undertaken every year (since 1989) by the JBICI is a comprehensive survey 
with an average of around 600 Japanese MNEs surveyed a year over the last five years, 
involving over I 0,000 overseas affiliates. Figure 6.1 reports the destinations which 
Japanese investors see as most promising countries or regions for Japanese overseas 
business operations. China has been ranked number I every year since 1995. 
Figure 6.1 Promising countries/regions for overseas business operations over 
the medium term, selected years, per cent of firms looking to expand 
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Source: JBICI, various years. 
In 2003, over 75 per cent of Japanese MNEs surveyed listed 'inexpensive source of 
labour' as one of the five reasons for operations in China. In the 2007 survey that 
number dropped to 50 per cent and the most frequent reason given for operations in 
China was the 'future growth potential oflocal market' (JBICI, 2007). 
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There are many reasons for Japanese and other MNEs to invest and produce in China 
and then export, as well as sell to the domestic market, from a Chinese production base. 
The Japan-China Investment Promotion Organisation cites WTO accession, which 
reduced business risk74, and a stable government which reduces country risk, as 
significant factors that encourage Japanese MNEs to invest in China (JMOFA official). 
A stable government, unlike that in Indonesia hitherto or Thailand now, has made China 
a more attractive FDI destination. Cheap labour has also been an important reason but 
often not the most significant, especially in the medium and long term, as evidenced by 
already rising wage costs. Rising wage costs combined with the expected continuing 
appreciation of the RMB means electronics firms have already shifted strategy from 
using China predominantly as an export platform to a focus on selling to the domestic 
market (Electronics informant I). This is a change that coincides with the growing 
market in China as per capita incomes and consumption rise. Continued reforms and 
policy changes committed to through WTO accession and the huge potential growth of 
the market in China are also a large reason for moving production to China. 
Table 6.2 shows the growth in Japanese MNE foreign affiliates over the period 1990 to 
2004. The Yangzi River Delta alone now has more Japanese foreign affiliates than any 
other single country in East Asia (Fujita and Hamaguchi, 2006). The explosion in 
foreign affiliates of Japanese firms is evidence of the rapid expansion of the production 
networks and the shift in production to China. 
The Japan-China Investment Promotion Organisation also cited Chinese infrastructure 
and labour quality as major reasons for China being the top destination for Japanese FDI 
(JCIPO representative). Chinese industrial clusters, export-oriented government policies 
that allowed FDI and aid for infrastructure, have meant that China has been more 
attractive than other countries like India with less infrastructure- there is a lack of 
highways and transportation infrastructure in India compared to China, where there are 
extensive and efficient highway networks (JMOF A official). 
74 See Chapter 5 for full discussion of the effect of the WTO. 
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The geographic advantage of China is also significant for Japan. India, Indonesia and 
other Southeast Asian economies are at a disadvantage relative to China in this respect. 
Chapters 3 and 4 confirmed the importance of proximity for trade and FDI, a result that 
is found in most models of trade and FDI. The formation of industrial clusters, to reap 
gains from economies of scale, has been a force in geographical concentration of 
production, while comparative advantage is a force for geographic dispersion in 
production (Yusuf, 2003; Dee, 2007). Both forces are shaping the trade patterns in East 
Asia and reaffirming the importance of geography in trade and investment location. 
Table 6.2 Number of Japanese firms' foreign affiliates in East Asia 
Location 1990 1994 2000 2004 
China 315 1061 2432 4041 
Bohai Bay 141 404 815 1039 
Yanzi River Delta 77 384 1060 2187 
Pearl River Delta 47 !52 310 525 
Others 50 121 247 290 
Hong Kong 793 1022 1112 1121 
Taiwan 727 812 891 909 
Korea 399 404 496 640 
Singapore 743 961 1129 1067 
Malaysia 509 709 881 805 
Thailand 766 983 1342 1512 
Indonesia 292 439 676 698 
Philippines 171 234 426 453 
Vietnam I 21 174 220 
India 71 81 168 193 
Source: Fujita and Hamaguchi (2006) from Toyo Keizai Inc., Overseas Japanese Companies Data. 
In 1994 the Chinese government released a policy paper outlining China's first real 
industrial policy for the automobile industry (Gallagher, 2003). It made explicit the 
Chinese push for a major automobile industry, and specified policies to protect the all-
domestic industry from foreign competition. The protection came in the form of trade 
and FDI barriers, the most significant being the restriction on foreign ownership to a 
maximum of 50 per cent in joint ventures. Such resistances to FDI are difficult to 
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include in models ofFDI and, in Chapter 4, are represented in the distance to the FDI 
frontier. A reasonable expectation from such policies would have been a fall in foreign 
investment in automobiles but Gallagher (2003) explains that the result was a race to 
establish joint ventures with Chinese firms. The auto industry continued a steady 
increase in passenger car production throughout the 1990s (Gallagher, 2003). Japanese 
MNE affiliates numbered 19 before 1995 but that number increased by 277 up to the 
end of 2004 (Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3 Number of Japanese MNE affiliates in China by year of 
establishment and region: automobile industry 
South Yangtzi East Bohai North South West 
Costal Delta Interior Rim 
1985-89 I I Isuzu 
1990-94 3 7 I Suzuki 5 I 
1995-99 !0 Honda 23 7 Nissan, 35 3 12 Suzuki 
MMC 
2000-04 61 Honda, 71 7 Honda, 32 Hino, 4 2 Toyota 
Toyota, Nissan Toyota 
Jsuzu 
Total 74 11 15 73 8 14 
number 2 
Note: Numbers of suppliers include parts producers classified as 'automobile industry' plus producers of 
materials (such as plastic, metal, rubber, and fabrics) which are explicitly prescribed for use in automobile 
manufacturing. 
Source: Fujita and Hamaguchi (2006) from Toyo Keizai Inc., Overseas Japanese Companies Data. 
Figure 6.2 shows that, in 2007, Japanese firms in the automobile industry still planned 
to strengthen and expand their operations in China more than anywhere else. Thailand is 
the next most favoured location for strengthening and expanding operations for 
automobiles, with 61 companies planning positive FDI. India had the largest gain from 
the previous year's survey results, with an 10 additional companies planning to 
strengthen or expand operations and this trend is echoed in the JBICI (2007) survey, 
where India was for the first time voted ahead of China as the most promising country in 
the long term (the next 10 or so years). 
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Figure 6.2 Number of companies to strengthen/expand operations, 
automobiles, 2007 
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China is an even more promising destination for Japanese FDI for the electronics sector 
(Figure 6.3). Thailand and North America are favourable designations for FDI but both 
are dwarfed by the 292 companies looking to expand or strengthen operations in China. 
Table 6.4 shows the growth in the number of Japanese electronics MNEs in China. As 
with the automobile industry, the growth in number of affiliates increased significantly 
in the period 2000-2004 after China joined the WTO. Table 6.4 also shows the large 
number of MNEs operating in China and their geographical distribution. 
Investment in the automobile and electronics sectors has seen rapid expansion, 
especially since the year 2000, and the most recent surveys show this is likely to 
continue. This is to be expected given the complementarities of the two economies, the 
scale of the Japanese economy, the growth and potential of the Chinese market and their 
proximity. 
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Figure 6.3 Number of companies to strengthen/expand operations, electrical 
equipment and electronics, 2007 
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Trade between Japan and China have faced relatively fewer resistances than average 
Japanese and world trade (Chapter 3). The evidence presented here confinns that 
Japanese MNEs still see China as the destination with largest potential for expansion. 
Actual Japanese FDI to China has been close to its potential since 1986 (Chapter 4) and, 
as with trade, has faced low resistances. The proximity, complementarities and scales 
are the core drivers of Japanese FDI to China and trade both ways. The results from 
Chapters 3 and 4 show Japan and China are not only close geographically but also have 
close economic distance. However, there is some evidence of political distance affecting 
trade in Chapter 3 and strong evidence of it affecting FDI in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 
showed that while adverse political relations affect FDI, FDI performance has been 
robust to political distance. Alongside the other determinants of FDI, political distance 
has had a marginal effect on FDI. The effects on trade and FDI may be marginal but still 
appears important. The following section presents some examples and evidence of how 
political distance can affect trade and FDI in these sectors. 
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Table 6.4 Number of Japanese MNE affiliates in China by year of 
establishment and region: electric and electronic equipment industry 
South Costal Yangzi Delta East Interior Bohai Rim North South 
West 
1980 I Sanyo 4 0 6 Matsushita I 0 
1990- 30 Matsushita 48 Sharp Sony I NEC 39 NEC 2 0 
94 JVC Matsushita Konica~ Matsushita 
Toshiba Minolta JVC 
Pioneer JVC 
Hitachi 
Fujitsu 
1995- 46 Casio Sony 79 Kenwood 4 34 Sony 3 NEC 3 NEC 
99 Pioneer Sharp Sony Sanyo 
Sanyo Pioneer Oki Matsushita 
Matsushita Mitsubishi Toshiba 
Fuji~Xerox Sanyo 
Matsushita 
Fujitsu 
2000- 46 Sony Pioneer 140 Onkyo 4 Hitachi 27 Sotech 2 2 
04 Matsushita Cannon Matsushita 
Hitachi Pioneer 
Matsushita 
Toshiba 
Note: Numbers represent producers of intermediate products classified as "electric and electronics 
equipment' sector. South coastal region includes Guandong and Fujiang provinces. 
Source: Fujita and Harnaguchi (2006) trorn Toyo Keizai Inc., Overseas Japanese Companies Data. 
Cold politics 
Effects of political distance 
The rapidly expanding economic and business relationships between Japan and China 
have occurred despite a background of widening political distance between the two 
countries in the first half decade of the 21" century. How have the unresolved issues of 
history, mistrust between the two countries and occasional flare-ups of tensions affected 
trade and investment in the automobile and electronics sectors? 
There is recognition on both sides of the importance of good political relations for the 
economic relationship. A representative of the important Japanese business association, 
the Keidanren, saw some businesses suffer at the margins during the worst times of the 
relationship (Keidanren official). 
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A similar view was expressed by a representative from China's Ministry of Commerce 
who is a specialist on the Japan-China economic relationship: 
Trust is the most important aspect in business and relations between countries 
affect this. 
-Ministry of Commerce, China (MOFCOM official). 
The MOFCOM official also said trade and investment growth slowed as a direct result 
of the political difficulties between Japan and China. 
The most obvious effects of the political tensions between Japan and China on the 
economic relationship were the 2005 anti-Japanese riots and boycotts in China. Other 
adverse effects that heightened tensions after 2001 include failed Japanese business-to-
Chinese government dealings such as the high stakes bid for the high speed rail link 
contract between Beijing and Shanghai that went to a French (Alsthom Ltd) and German 
(Siemens) consortium despite what many in Japan felt was a more competitive bid from 
Japan (Annstrong, 2007a; Electronics informant 3). Indeed, a Chinese interviewee was 
of the opinion that when the highly publicised rail contract decision was being made, the 
political tensions meant that the Chinese government could not justify choosing the 
Japanese bid, despite what many thought was a better value bid. One explanation was 
that a Chinese individual with strong enough anti-Japanese sentiment could easily 
vandalise the long track somewhere between Beijing and Shanghai (CMOFA official). 
These are isolated incidents that do not accurately portray the costs of ongoing and 
widening political distance. An attempt is made later to answer this empirical question 
in Chapter 7. Here a qualitative analysis is offered of the effects of bad relations 
politically, of widening political distance, on the otherwise rapidly expanding economic 
relationship. 
There are areas where the costs of political distance may be tangible. One automobile 
MNE (Automobile informant 2) with significant business in China reported that the 
political distance between China and Japan adversely affects their operations, sometimes 
significantly. The most obvious evidence was that the Japanese auto company 
executives would not be met by Chinese government officials, in Beijing at the national 
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level, or at a local government level, while American and European companies would be 
able to discuss problems and meet with Chinese policy makers on request. This 
Japanese company has felt it had to build trust by supplying many public goods, 
conducting more R & D in China than it otherwise would and invest more in 
environmental protection and road safety awareness campaigns well above and beyond 
what is required according to their calculations (Automobile informant 2). It was part of 
company strategy to overcome what it felt was the natural bias against Japanese 
products and companies resulting from the mistrust of Japan that has given American 
and European companies an advantage. 
Of all companies interviewed, no company stated that improvements in the Japan-China 
political relationship would disadvantage their business. Five of the eight companies 
stated an improvement in the political landscape would help their business and the 
others said there would be a small impact if any. 
Investment delays and diversion 
Perceived increases in country risk resulting from increased political tensions have in 
the past led to delays in large-scale investment decisions and, in the extreme, has led to 
a hedging strategy by Japanese MNEs, which is often called a 'China plus one' strategy 
(JMOFA official). This strategy means that a Japanese company will diversify its FDI 
between conntries above and beyond what it would have to due to purely economic 
factors. An example of such a strategy would be, instead of expanding current 
operations in China, to build a new factory in Vietnam. 
FDI is often on a large scale and at times when negative events accumulate or 
significantly large negative shocks occur in the relationship, such as protests or a 
Yasuknni Shrine visit, Japanese companies have delayed new investments until 
sentiments improve (Automobile informant 2; Electronics informant 3). In the highly 
competitive environment in which these companies do business, delays in FDI decisions 
might significantly affect business. Japanese MNEs have had to be extraordinarily 
careful about the timing of large-scale and highly visible investments. 
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Although difficult to prove, it is believed by many Japanese businesses and Japanese 
government officials that investment approvals are delayed by the Chinese authorities 
when relations have been particularly bad. This was thought to be the case during the six 
or so years where no bilateral leadership visits took place: 
The last five years there was a big problem of delays by the Chinese government 
in approving Japanese investments, which had a big impact. 
-Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Japan (JMOFA official). 
This discrimination, relative to American and European FDI, was also thought to be 
present, albeit to a lesser extent, outside this period of 2001-2006 because of the 
unresolved historical issues and underlying mistrust in the relationship. 
Interviewees also identified the period around a Yasukuni Shrine visit by Japanese 
Prime Minister Koizumi as particularly sensitive to the relationship, and when Japanese 
companies went on 'high alert'. 
One result of the additional perceived country risk from some Japanese firms in China 
as a result of the political distance between the two countries, was the 'China plus one 
strategy' (Fujita and Hamaguchi, 2006). Additional investment, 'as a strategy to hedge 
or reduce risk' (JCEA official), takes place in a third country to what would normally 
result from a strategic decision to invest for reasons of comparative advantage and 
integrating into the international supply. A similar view was expressed by a government 
official in Japan: 
Anti -Japanese protests increased country risk and a China plus one strategy 
is increasingly taken up by Japanese firms. 
-Cabinet and MOFA official, Japan. 
Fujita and Hamaguchi (2006) detail some of the latest developments in Japanese MNE 
behaviour and explain the factors which lead the enterprises to pursue a 'China plus one 
strategy'. Their interviews and analysis lead to the conclusion that lack of market 
institutions and other business risks are part of the reason but that incidents such as the 
2005 anti-Japan protests in China are also a factor. 
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One of the most significant adverse effects of increased political distance is increased 
uncertainty in the investment environment75 • Despite other determinants of trade and 
FDI dominating the political distance factors, increased uncertainty is unfavourable. 
The results from Chapter 4 support the anecdotal evidence here of political distance 
affecting FDI but Japanese FDI to China performed as well as Japanese FDI elsewhere 
and comparably to what could be expected given all the determinants of FDI. Some of 
the reasons for this are discussed later in this chapter. 
Inability to update bilateral treaties 
The long term trade agreement (LTTA) signed in 1979 is still the only (before WTO 
accession) bilateral trade agreement between Japan and China. It had been the 
framework for the atmual trade in both directions which reached US$! 00 billion, of 
which 28 per cent was in electronics and automobiles 76 FDI flows were governed under 
the 1988 BIT. FDI in the year before WTO accession was 182 billion yen, of which half 
was in electronics and automobiles77• The stock ofFDI up to 2001 was 2.26 trillion yen. 
Significant trade and investment had been taking place under two out -of-date and now 
irrelevant economic agreements. The LTTA is now irrelevant, because it was signed at a 
time when securing the exchange of Chinese natural resources for Japanese capital 
goods was the primary objective. The structure of trade has changed rapidly since 1979. 
Both the L TT A and BIT have been superseded by the WTO multilateral framework. 
An improved investment climate, through a bilateral or multilateral agreement, was 
frequently mentioned by interviewees for this study as a highly desirable outcome by 
Japanese electronics and automobile firms. The increased access in China made 
available to foreign firms from China's policy aimed at further opening up in 1986 (see 
75 l 979-8 l saw unilateral cancellation of a series of contracts from the Chinese side due to domestic 
economic restructuring. This was the cause of bilateral tensions and an increase in uncertainty for 
Japanese investors and traders. Actions such as these do not happen on any significant scale any longer as 
they erode the business confidence in China, which is not in the interest of Chinese business or policy 
makers. There is also a very different regulatory framework and investment regime in place now, as the 
WTO has constrained policy behaviour (Chapter 5). 
76 Source: United Nations Comtrade database. 
77 Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan, FDJ database. 
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Chapter 4) led to a surge in Japanese FDI. Similarly, China's WTO accession in 2001 
led to a surge in Japanese and other FDI. However, a bilateral framework or agreement 
for securing investment is seen as beneficial by policy makers in both countries as well 
as firms operating in both countries. The large flows and existing stock of Japanese FDI 
in China could benefit from an updated framework for mitigating disputes and 
resistances to FDI and managing the FDI relationship. 
There are concerns among Japanese companies investing in China, arising from earlier 
episodes of cancelled or nullified contracts and other smaller difficulties, suggesting 
there is a need to extend or update the BIT or even move to an economic partnership 
agreement (Automobile informant I; Automobile informant 2; MET! official 1; 
Japanese SME 2). 
The political difficulties between Japan and China have meant that they have not been 
able to sign a more relevant and modern bilateral trade or investment agreement that 
would increase confidence in SME traders and investors, as well as MNEs. Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry officials in Japan saw the need to revise the bilateral 
investment treaty but stated that they could not talk to Chinese counterparts during the 
term of the Koizumi government when relations were particularly bad: 
There is a primitive legal framework from the 1988 investment framework ... we 
want [an updated] agreement broader [than a free trade agreement] including 
investment, such as in an economic partnership agreement, but because the 
bilateral relationship is relatively bad, we have to take the long way around: 
include South Korea as an intermediary; and multilateral... the [relationship with 
the] United States is a priority for South Korea, not Sino-Japan relations. 
-North East Asia Division, MET! (MET! official, Japan) 
China also wanted to increase and secure imports of technology-intensive goods which 
were slowed by the lack of legal infrastructure and broader framework (MOFCOM 
official). 
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Measures which limit the influence of politics 
Despite the investment diversion which is thought by some policy makers to have been 
taking place (MOFCOM official, METI official, Cabinet Office and MOFA official) 
many of those interviewed saw the impact of a widened political distance as marginal 
and limited (JCIPO representative; Automobile informant I; Automobile informant 2; 
Electronics informant I; METI official 2; Cabinet Office official; Keidanren official). A 
typical view expressed was: 
In the worst times of the relationship orders fell and companies suffered a little 
but the impact on business was limited. 
-Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (JMOFA official). 
Japanese consumer electronics makers have portrayed themselves as global brands, and 
not to be identified solely as Japanese brands, especially at times of heightened political 
tensions. For this reason, some electronics makers (Electronics informant 2; Electronics 
informant 3) see their business-to-consumer dealings unaffected even during times of 
boycotts and heightened anti-Japanese sentiment. There were, however, also times when 
Sony billboards were targeted during the anti-Japan protests in 2005 as a symbol of 
Japan. Japanese MNEs reported that consumers prefer high quality and low cost 
products and that these product characteristics dominate any Japanese ownership factor, 
so that the political distance has little or no impact on firm dealings (Automobile 
informant I). 
In a similar vein, Japanese auto manufacturers have been able to present themselves as 
national brands because they have faced restrictive Chinese regulation which has limited 
the Japanese branding and this at times has been a plus (Automobile informant I; 
Automobile informant 3). 
Joint ventures and automobile regulation 
The automobile industry in China is unique for a number of reasons. It has unique 
regulations that were a compromise product of the WTO accession negotiations. Other 
regulations over many aspects of production, distribution and even consumption are a 
product of the history of the industry in China and make it unlike any other auto industry 
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in the world. However, the industry has been able to attract large amounts of investment 
from abroad as it has huge potential in terms of growth in the size and diversity of the 
market. 
The policy regime in the Chinese automobile industry is set up to extract know-how, 
technology, managerial skills and capital from foreign MNEs. It is highly regulated, 
with the aim of capturing as much technology transfer from FDI as possible in order to 
develop a sophisticated home grown industry (Gallagher, 2003). No single rule has as 
much effect in reaching this goal as the requirement for 50 per cent ownership joint 
ventures. No foreign firm is allowed to produce and sell automobiles in China without at 
least 50 per cent ownership by a domestic firm 78 
Tariffs for importing automobiles fell from 50 per cent before accession to the WTO to 
25 per cent in 2006 as part of China's WTO commitments. Some estimate that a further 
scheduled fall to 15 per cent or 10 per cent would mean it would be more beneficial to 
ship and trade autos instead of manufacturing them in China (Automobile informant 3). 
As Chinese technology and know-how continues to improve and domestic parts and 
components suppliers improve quality and are able to supply more of the parts and 
components needed domestically, the tariff barrier becomes less important. The most 
significant entry barrier would appear to be the requirement of joint ownership at 50 per 
cent. 
The 50/50 joint venture regulation has in the past caused problems previously not faced, 
sueh as that reported by Honda Motor company. Koushuu Honda, which makes the 
Accord model, and the Toufu Honda, which makes the CRV model, were treated as two 
separate brands and therefore could not be sold in the same dealerships or use the same 
distribution networks. This was a problem faced by all foreign manufacturers until 2003 
when lobbying successfully changed Chinese policy (JCIPO representative). 
78 This is an ongoing issue of contention in the WTO. See for example, the Committee on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures, Communication from the European Communities, WTO, October 14, 2008. 
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Foreign automobile manufacturers face barriers to operating in China which would seem 
highly deleterious to their investments there but the manufacturers have, nevertheless, 
invested large amounts of capital in China because of the potential of the market. Figure 
6.4 (p. 147) reveals Japanese companies' intentions to expand and strengthen operations 
in China. The single most decisive factor was not a cheap or high quality labour force 
but the competition for market share in an industry which it is estimated will consume 
10 million units by the year 2010. 
Joint ventures have not been, and are not, limited to those in the automobile industry. 
For many Japanese firms to start up operations in China or elsewhere it is sometimes 
beneficial to partner with a local firm (Electronics informant 4; Keidanren official). 
Immediate knowledge of the domestic market, previously established service links and 
distribution links, as well as favourable treatment by policy makers are all factors which 
provide incentive to foreign companies to form joint ventures. 
Joint ventures, whether by choice or by regulation, were said to lessen the adverse 
effects during times of boycotts and riots (Automobile informant 2; Electronics 
informant 1 ). Partnering with another firm can give protection from, and have 
advantages in dealing with, local regulators. 
Production networks 
Beyond the factors which directly limit the effects of adverse political distance already 
discussed, the nature of trade and FDI in East Asia, and especially between Japan and 
China, is of a complementary nature which has forged a new form of interdependence 
between the two countries and within the region. The highly complementary economic 
structures of Japan and China lie behind this. Japanese MNEs have been able to further 
split their production value chain vertically into finer lines of specialisation. Chinese 
firms have joined in the production networks and global supply chains. For many 
products China is often the final the assembly point of parts and components imported 
from all over East Asia as well as domestically. Japanese MNEs design products, supply 
high technology components and coordinate the production networks. Machinery 
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products, electronics and electron parts, and automobile parts and components have 
been the industries leading this phenomenon (Yusuf et al., 2004). 
Trade in East Asia is no longer accurately characterised by trade in final goods between 
countries but rather by trade in parts and components, known as production networks or 
'fragmentation trade'. Japan has played an important role in the proliferation of 
production networks in East Asia, driven by its MNEs. China has increasingly become 
an integral part of production networks for manufactured goods in East Asia. China has 
predominantly been an assembly point for the production networks but is increasingly 
shifting to inputs with higher value added. Multilateral resistances were included in the 
empirical analyses of Chapters 3 and 4 to account for production network behaviour of 
MNEs. 
Production networks, involving trade in parts and components for final assembly, are 
based on comparative advantage and driven largely by FDI. Many studies focus on the 
increased competition, finer specialisation and division of labour that production 
networks are based on (Yusuf et al., 2004). In fact, Japanese MNEs have been largely 
responsible for this as 'Japanese multinational companies are building a regional 
division oflabour that emphasises technology-intensive prototype production in Japan 
and mass production of standardised products in Asia' (Hatch 2003: 31). Dee (2007) 
also finds that FDI in the Asia Pacific is driven by economic geography and comparative 
advantage (mitigated by transport costs and economies of scale). Li et al. (2008) show 
that it is the market size, economic growth, FDI and infrastructure in China that is 
driving the parts and components trade. They demonstrate that the continued 
liberalisation of the services sector, as agreed to in WTO accession, is an important 
factor in driving the continued expansion of the parts and components trade as well as 
the deepening of economic ties with countries like Japan. 
A stylised pattern of a production network for the electronics or machinery industry 
would be highly technology-intensive parts and components produced in Japan, Korea 
or Taiwan, low technology-intensive parts and components produced in South East Asia 
and China, and all parts and components exported to China, where low skilled, labour-
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intensive assembly is conducted. The finished goods then are exported to Japan, the 
United States and Europe (Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006). 
In general, in electronics production, quality is not the most important aspect of 
competitiveness hut instead, itmovation is the main element in competition79. Apart 
from innovation, which is again done in Japan, where highly skilled workers design, 
market and coordinate the supply chains of the production, the next most important 
aspect is cost cutting in competition. Parts and components are procured from Chinese, 
Taiwanese and Korean components suppliers. An example is the production ofPentax 
cameras in Vietnam. High quality components are sourced from plants in China which 
are Japanese owned or operated and have Japanese engineers. Increasingly, Chinese and 
Vietnamese owned and operated suppliers are able to supply these parts. 
The case of automobiles is different. Not so high a percentage of the parts and 
components is traded, and they are mainly procured domestically due to the cost 
advantage of domestic procurement. The last step of trade in exporting final goods to 
developed countries is also not a characteristic of the automobile industry (although it is 
beginning to happen on a small scale) and the final products are sold to the domestic 
market in China. 
The first large wave of Japanese FDI in East Asia started with the appreciation of the 
yen, after the Plaza Accord in 1985, but as discussed in Chapter 4, was due to the 
beginning of China's GATT accession and opening up. Japanese MNEs relocated 
production to Southeast Asia and to a lesser extent at that stage, to China. The export of 
Japanese capital and technology helped integrate the economies of Asia (Hatch, 2003). 
This pattern of production is mutually beneficial to economies involved in the supply 
chain. It allows domestic firms to join the networks at all stages and supply to MNEs. 
The MNEs often bring competition between domestic and foreign parts suppliers (Yusuf, 
79 However, quality has been a key factor for Japanese electronics market share in the past (Kelly et al., 
1995). 
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2004). The regional interdependence which makes production fragmentation possible 
necessitates Japan-China interdependence, as Japan and China are important for the 
production networks, but also reinforces the importance of the bilateral interdependence 
for the regional economy. 
Investment and trade as complements 
Kojima's (1978) important study showed that FDI in a sector where the host nation has 
a comparative advantage will complement the host nation's exports in that sector. This 
pattern ofFDI is very apparent to China and Japan as they are at different stages of 
development and have complementary resource structures. This pattern of FDI 
increasing trade between Japan to China is contrary to earlier results such as those of 
Hors! (1972), who showed exports to be substitutes for FDI when investment is aimed at 
avoiding trade barriers. A generalisation would be that Japanese MNE investment in the 
newly industrialised economies (NIEs), Southeast Asia and later China, has been of a 
vertical nature, where trade and FDI are complements. There is, of course, an element of 
FDI that substitutes for trade, especially in the automobile sector where Japanese auto 
exports to China would be larger if FDI were not allowed. This may not be so 
significant, as Japanese automobile MNEs invest in China despite the restrictive 
investment environment in that sector. Also, the high trade protection in the automobile 
sector in China means trade would be low without FDI anyway. Many American and 
European MNEs have pursued horizontal FDI, in which the trade and FDI relationship 
is often ambiguous (Brenton et al., 1999; Kawai and Urata, 2004). 
The expansion of production networks in East Asia has two related characteristics. The 
first is a finer degree of specialisation in one part of the production process where there 
is comparative advantage. The other is FDI, which is vertical in the production process 
so that parts and components made in one location are traded to a producer or assembler 
further downstream in the production process. Hence, trade in electronics and 
automobiles, as well as manufacturing trade in general in East Asia, cannot be analysed 
without attention to the FDI which is a driver of it. 
145 
An automobile producer or electronics firm investing in China and setting up a factory 
is not an isolated event with marginal impact. In most cases an FDI project by an MNE 
involves Japanese SME parts and component suppliers following the larger MNE to 
China and moving production to China. Having assembly plants, within the production 
networks, move to China means that industrial clusters form in the area (Yusuf et al., 
2004). Domestic firms in China join the production processes and supply chains, not 
only in assembly but by supplying labour-intensive parts and components initially and 
increasingly parts and components with higher technology content. Although many parts 
and components are imported into China, there is a degree of domestic procurement, the 
extent of which depends on the product and the final market, as well as the cost 
advantage of domestic procurement. The forces of geography, of the pull from 
geographic agglomeration and push from comparative advantage, mean that depending 
on the type of good and its transportation costs, some parts are sourced domestically and 
others through international trade. 
Japanese automobile MNEs have a lower degree of localisation than American 
automobile manufacturers (Fukao et al., 2006) and Japanese MNEs in different 
industries. They require more 'Japanese built' components than in the electronics 
industry, whether they are imported from Japan or produced by a Japanese SME in 
China, at this stage of China's development, because of quality standards (Marukawa, 
2004). Data received from a range of sources in interviews suggested that the 
proportion of parts and components procured by Japanese automobile MNEs in 2007 
was on average, 30 per cent imported, 70 per cent procured locally in China, of which 
I 0 per cent were from fully Chinese owned companies (Figure 6.4) (Automobile 
informant 2; Keidamen official; JCIPO official). This I 0 per cent oflocal Chinese 
procurement is still a significant source of employment, profit and technology spill-over, 
which has been growing, and will continue to grow, as Chinese firms and engineers 
catch up to the technology frontier through technology transfer, technology spill-overs 
and general human capital development in China. 
Japanese MNEs share most trade knowledge with their joint partners since this is 
necessary to operate and produce in China, especially for automobile production. 
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Production processes, managerial expertise and technology are mostly all transferred. 
The technology for the highest value added parts and components, which are perhaps the 
most heterogeneous and play a significant role in differentiating a brand or product from 
the competition, are, however, not passed on to Chinese counterparts and continue to be 
produced in Japan. An example of this is Toyota wanting to keep certain technologies in 
its hybrid car production secret. 
Figure 6.4 Japanese automobile MNE parts suppliers in China, 2007 
Chinese 
Source: Author's interviews (Automobile informant 2; Keidanren official; JCIPO representative). 
The electronic goods producers procure more through trade and domestic firms and less 
from Japanese SMEs. The nature of the product cycle in the electronics industry-
driven by discrete innovation events- means that surges in production come in waves, 
at irregular intervals, depending on innovation. This requires more flexibility in 
procurement sources, both domestically and from abroad. The automobile industry has 
more steady production rates, with demand and supply both more stable than electronics. 
As many automobile parts are large in size, transportation costs matter more than in 
other manufacturing. This has meant automobile MNEs procure more parts and 
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components domestically (Marukawa, 2004). The nature of Japanese automobile 
production80 is different from American or European automobile manufacturers in that 
they transplant existing relationships with their suppliers from Japan to China (Fukao et 
al., 2006). American and European producers generally make use of existing parts 
suppliers in China (Marukawa, 2004). 
The example of a piston maker which supplies to Toyota highlights another feature of 
the industry. The supplier moved from Nagoya to Tianjin to follow Toyota's operations 
but still ships parts and components from Yokohama in Japan. Automobile production 
has high safety and quality standards and requirements. Toyoseat Auto Parts, which 
manufactures seats for Toyota cars, searched for suppliers in a 200 km radius of their 
production base in Shenzhen, Guangdong but were not able to find a supplier that could 
produce to the quality standard required. The end result was that a Japanese supplier 
moved from Japan to be close to production. 
Whilst MNE parts and components procurement data is difficult to obtain, the RIETI 
FDI Database supplies detailed data for Japanese affiliates operating outside Japan. The 
database adjusts and consolidates Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry FDI data 
but is only available up to 2003. The RIETI FDI database shows that, for China in 2003, 
the ratio of imported parts and components to domestically sourced parts and 
components was 47.8 per cent for electrical machinery, 64 per cent for higher-end 
information and communication electronics equipment, which has higher technology 
content, and 64.5 per cent for the automobile sector. The high ratio of imports for input 
into production at Japanese affiliate firms has steadily fallen from close to I 00 per cent 
of parts and components imported in 1989. While automobile MNEs averaged 70 per 
cent local procurement as of2007, this figure does not reveal the origins or ownership 
of the SMEs that the RIETI data does. So while domestic procurement of parts and 
components in Japanese automobile MNEs in China has risen to over 70 per cent, many 
of the SMEs are in fact Japanese SMEs that followed the parent company to China. 
They source parts and components from Japan or elsewhere in East Asia, the piston 
maker in the example above being one such SME. In 2003, of the 64.5 per cent 
80 With the exception of Suzuki Motors (Marukawa, 2004). 
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imported inputs, 53.4 per cent were from Japan (Figure 6.5). This number was up 
slightly from 49 per cent in 200 I and 2002 and increased further from the four year 
average of just under 40 per cent before WTO entry (RIETI). This meant that 11.1 per 
cent of inputs into Japanese affiliate companies in the automobile industry in China 
were imported from a country other than Japan. 
Figure 6.5 Automobile affiliates' (SMEs) procurement, 2003 
Source: RIETI FDI Database (http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/database/d08.html) 
Local content in automobiles manufactured in China is increasing and it is an aim of the 
Japanese MNEs (Automobile informant 2; Automobile informant 3; Cabinet Office 
officical) since it creates a lot of competition for parts suppliers in China (Yusuf, 2004). 
The RIETI data shows a high of38.6 per cent in 1999 of parts supplied domestically 
that were non-Japanese affiliated suppliers, after steady increases from 1989, but the 
percentage of non-Japanese parts suppliers is believed to have grown since (Automobile 
informant 1; Electronics informant I). 
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Institutions 
Country risk has been high historically in China from the perspective of Japanese 
investors and membership in the WTO significantly reduced China's country risk 
(Nguyen and Nguyen, 2007; Automobile informant 3; Electronics informant 1). The 
JBICI survey cited that the most common answer given for Japanese MNEs expanding 
operations in China was the Chinese market potential, which is underpinned by its WTO 
membership and the commitments that involves. 
As Chapter 5 described, WTO membership has greatly increased foreign investor 
confidence in investing in, and trading with, China. Increased confidence comes not 
only from commitments to market oriented reforms but from constraints put on the 
Chinese government in dealings with trading partners and foreign businesses (Drysdale 
and Song, 2000; Garnaut and Huang, 2000). The rules agreed to upon joining the WTO 
restrict the Chinese government from anti-market behaviour as the costs associated with 
enforcement backlash from the international trading community are high. Athukorala 
and Yamashita (2008) describe China's WTO accession as the turning point in giving 
foreign companies confidence to expand their global production networks, especially the 
assembly operations, to China. 
On the bilateral front, some institutions have been created, or have evolved, with the 
purpose of promoting cooperation, understanding and strengthening of economic 
relations between Japan and China. Examples are the Japan-China Economic 
Association set up in 1972 to promote business exchanges, the Japan-China Investment 
Promotion Organisation established in 1990 and the Chinese counterpart, the China-
Japan Investment Promotion Committee, officially launched in the same year. 
There are other institutions outside of the official arena which have played an important 
role. The Techno Centre and the Beijing-Tokyo Forum are two examples of very 
different and unique institutions which have helped to build trust and business 
confidence. The Beijing-Tokyo Forum was established jointly by Japanese and Chinese 
academics, and public commentators, with the support and the blessing of some 
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politicians on both sides after the 2005 anti-Japanese riots in China. The Forum meets 
annually, alternating between Tokyo and Beijing, to have 'frank and open discussions' 
on climate change, the economy, security, media and the future of Asia more broadly. 
This sort of institution involves a cross section of influential thinkers and holds highly 
public question and answer sessions. The first three annual Forums have been seen to 
help build trust between participants. 
The Techno Centre 
Of direct and immediate relevance to Japanese electronics and auto firms is the Techno 
Centre in Guandong. The Centre was set up independently of government in 1989 and 
helps to narrow the cultural, linguistic and institutional barriers for Japanese firms in 
expanding operations to China. 
The Techno Centre was set up with the purpose of helping Japanese SMEs establish 
operations in China and to take advantage of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in 
Guangdong. The headquarters are in Hong Kong, where all companies are registered in 
order to take advantage of the SEZ export processing zone laws so that parts and 
components can be imported from Japan tariff free. Revenues from the Japanese SMEs 
are tax free as long as the products are exported, often to Hong Kong, and in most cases 
imported straight back to mainland China. An institution such as the Techno Centre is a 
product of a unique set of circumstances at a unique time in a country's development. 
Japanese SMEs can learn the differences of operating in China with Chinese workers 
before they 'graduate' and set up a company on their own in China, often near a 
Japanese downstream producer. Some SMEs stay in the Techno Centre for months, 
others for years. Up to the end of2006, 50 SMEs had 'graduated' from the Techno 
Centre. 
SMEs often experiment with different production line systems, different incentive 
schemes for workers and in training labour. In 2007 there were I 0,000 guest workers 
from all over rural China working for Japanese SMEs in the Techno Centre itself. There 
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is language training both ways, exchanges between Japan and China for workers and 
researchers, and often after an SME leaves the Techno Centre, Chinese workers follow 
the company. 
In recent years Japanese SMEs at the Techno Centre have often moved operations to 
China not to seek cheap labour but quality labour. Know-how in training workers and 
access to data on production research are additional benefits. The agglomeration of these 
SMEs also means they can share transportation costs and other economies of scale. 
Employment of Chinese workers 
The employment of Chinese workers has had a positive effect on the perception of 
Japanese FDI and brands in China (Automobile infonnant 3). Japanese companies in 
these two sectors employed over half a million Chinese workers in 2003, out of a total 
one million employed in all sectors in which there was Japanese investment (RIETI 
database). The latest available data from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
of Japan, does not provide the sectoral composition of Japanese affiliate employment in 
China but the 2005 the total number of Chinese employed was 1.4 million, a 40 per cent 
increase in overall employment by Japanese affiliates in two years. The rapid growth in 
the number of affiliate companies shown in Table 6.2 (p. 130) confirms this story of 
rapid expansion. 
The importance of employment is not limited to the absolute number employed. 
American and European MNEs are widely believed to bring in managers of Chinese 
background with Chinese language ability whereas Japanese MNEs have been 
dominated by Japanese speaking managers with Chinese language training (Electronics 
informant 3). The large Japanese companies interviewed in China have signalled that 
this is not ideal and that a change is underway. Top management in Sony-affiliated 
companies is mainly Japanese but this is slowly changing. Sony recognises many 
benefits of having Chinese management, one of the reasons being the incentive that 
upward mobility creates within a firm. 
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Conclusion 
The automobile and electronics industries are leading economic interdependence 
between Japan and China. However, the political distance which at times has become 
quite significant has increased uncertainty in the investment environment in both these 
sectors. 
Japanese firms have viewed China as the most promising destination for operations 
during the times when political tensions were at the worst since normalisation of 
relations in 1972. The reason is that the operations of automobile and electronics 
industries are based on China's market potential, the current growth of the Chinese 
economy, the proximity of the two economies, their complementary economic structures 
and other positive factors. 
There is evidence of adverse effects of the sometimes widening political distance on the 
investment in the electronics and automobile sectors but the effects are not enough to 
crowd out Chinese market potential and the complementary economic relationship. 
Some of the reasons that the political distance has not dominated are the joint ventures, 
increased employment of Chinese workers and bilateral institutions that have been set 
up. The most important factor that has allowed economic fundamentals to drive trade 
and investment has been China's commitment to the global trading system and the 
GATT/WTO. China demonstrated its commitment with trade and foreign ownership 
liberalisation throughout the 1990s and voluntarily subjected itself to the international 
rules of trade and commerce. The constraints put on Chinese policy making and the 
Chinese market from accession to the WTO allowed foreign firms to engage in 
operations in China with confidence. 
The expansion of production networks in East Asia has been important for Japanese, 
and other MNEs and important for giving the Chinese firms the opportunities to join the 
international supply chains. The roles of Japan and China have been different but both 
have been important in changing the nature of trade in East Asia. While some see third 
country influences as reducing Japan-China economic linkages, as Japanese firms are 
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sometimes thought to invest outside of China to hedge against country risk ('China plus 
one strategy'), the evidence of production network proliferation shows that third country 
influences are mostly positive. The splitting of production vertically into finer 
specialisation has meant an increase in economic interdependence. 
Japanese MNEs and SMEs shifting production to China are supplying to Chinese and 
other producers in the supply chain and procuring domestic Chinese parts and 
components suppliers. Chinese firms have benefited greatly from the capital, technology 
and managerial know-how that Japanese FDI has brought. Japanese firms have been 
able to expand their operations and remain competitive and profitable globally while the 
Japanese economy has stagnated. The Japanese economy's reliance on the external 
sector is significant and China is the largest part. 
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7 Interaction between trade and political distance 
The bilateral relationship between Japan and China is often characterised as one of 'cold 
politics' and 'hot economics'; the economic relationship continues to boom while 
historical issues and political tensions continue to strain the relationship. 
After six years of suspended visits between leaders from 200 I to 2006, the period since 
late 2006 has seen an effort by both sides to mend relations, perhaps in recognition of 
the growing importance of their economic relationship. Since normalisation of 
diplomatic relations in 1972 and the period of the economic relationship since 1979, 
political tensions have at times deteriorated while the economic relationship continued 
to prosper. 
Do political events have any effect on the trade relationship? Chapter 3 found some 
evidence of politics affecting trade. Chapter 4 showed that FDI is more sensitive to 
political distance and that a worsening of political relations causes FDI to fall. Does 
increased trade and trade dependence cause countries to get along better? Or do the 
increased interactions through trade, or asymmetry in trade such as that seen in the 
United States-China case, cause political distance to widen and conflict to rise? 
The view that increased trade and economic interdependence will result in a narrowing 
political distance is shared by many scholars and policy makers81 . There is also a view 
that increased imbalance in trade and economic interdependence will cause political 
tensions to rise. 
This chapter investigates the relationship between trade and political distance between 
China and Japan. The literature that studies the relationship between interstate relations 
(geopolitical relations) and economics (predominantly trade) use the terms 'conflict' and 
81 See Mansfield and Pollins (2003) for a review of the literature. 
155 
'cooperation' to describe political distance82 . A political conflict is a widening of 
political distance and a cooperative event is a narrowing of political distance. 
The chapter looks at Japan's and China's relationships with their other major trading 
partner, the United States, as points of comparison. The expectation is that the economic 
relationship is interdependent with how well countries are getting along. The Japan-
China relationship is expected to be different from both the United States-China and the 
United States-Japan relationships, the latter of which is a lot more stable politically. 
Although the probability of war, or high intensity conflict, between Japan and China is 
low, there are occasional flash points in the relationship such as Taiwan, territorial 
claims and history that have the potential to escalate. Extreme conflict (economic and 
trade sanctions, or even war) and high level cooperation (such as customs union or 
security alliance) are at the opposite ends of the spectrum in a scale of conflict or 
cooperation events. These extremes do not occur in the China-Japan relationship over 
the period analysed in this study but the relationship is one of low intensity conflict and 
cooperation. 
China's relationship with its other major trading partner, the United States, is also 
complicated but does not perhaps share the historical complexity of the Japan-China 
relationship. The asymmetry in trade flows, stemming from the growing US bilateral 
trade deficit with China, has strained relations from time to time. On the other hand, the 
mutual recognition of the importance of the relationship, and the increased trade and 
interdependence, is causing the two to negotiate their way through the imbalance 
carefully and there are substantial efforts to keep relations stable. 
A political distance variable is created in this study (consistent with other studies) by 
subtracting a scale of conflict from cooperation. Although not all events or news in the 
82 Here the use of'conflict' and 'cooperation' is in terms of political conflict and political cooperation. 
Trade tensions (such as trade disputes) are part of political conflict and act to widen political distance. 
Conflict and cooperation widen and narrow economic distance by widening and narrowing political 
distance, as described in Chapter 2. 
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data are created by the actions of authorities on either side, and many are instead events 
that are a product of independent actors, they all have some positive or negative political 
impact. Thus, the index of net cooperation derived from the record of these events can 
serve as a measure of the political distance between the two countries in the study. 
An alternative political distance variable, net conflict, which is a measure of conflict 
minus cooperation, is commonly used in the literature (Schneider et al., 2003). This 
differencing of the two variables imposes some limitations and assumptions on the 
event data and can potentially alter results, and is discussed later. A distinction is made 
between trade and economic interdependence in this study and, unlike in previous 
studies, both are tested for their correlation with the variables of net cooperation. 
The study uses monthly data up to 2004, whereas previous studies (such as Reuveny, 
and Kang, 1998) for other countries have used quarterly data, analysed much earlier 
periods and not examined the relationship between Japan and China. Sub-periods of the 
data are analysed for the Japan-China relationship to capture any changing dynamics in 
the trade-cooperation relationship. In addition, nonlinear causality is tested to find 
further evidence of the interdependence of conflict/cooperation and trade. Non-linearity 
is potentially important in testing whether the scale of net cooperation is a monotonic 
function or holds any other nonlinear relationship to trade and interdependence. 
The next section sets out the main arguments in the trade-political distance debate and 
then reviews some of the growing empirical evidence supporting various arguments. 
The section after that provides a description and explanation of the political distance and 
trade data. Then the following section explains the Granger causality model, presents 
the estimation results and discusses other tests that were carried out for finding a robust 
relationship between the variables. Finally, the implications of the analysis are discussed 
before concluding. 
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Trade, conflict and cooperation 
There has been a rich debate for centuries about the link between political distance and 
economic interdependence (Mansfield and Pollins, 2003). In the last few decades, the 
debate has seen the growth of a vast amount of systematic empirical analysis which has 
added to the understanding of the issue but there remain many unanswered questions 
(Mansfield and Pollins, 2001). The broad line of thinking associated with the 'liberal' 
school is that as trade and interdependence between nations grow, there is a greater 
opportunity cost to conflict and so the chances of conflict are reduced. Another view 
point, associated with the realist school, argues that countries also go to war to acquire 
resources as an alternative to international trade. In addition, it is argued that 
asymmetries in trade relationships can cause tensions to rise. These views, and the 
supporting empirical evidence, are briefly reviewed below, as are other factors affecting 
the link between political distance and economic interdependence such as the proximity 
of countries and the level of their political liberalisation. 
Economic interdependence can mean vulnerability towards another nation (for example, 
through exposure to a dominant resource or strategic goods supplier) and/or sensitivity 
to dependence (for example, through the effect of economic shocks such as inflation or 
exchange rate volatility in one country on another) and quite often trade flows are the 
best quantitative measure of these independencies that are available83 • There is, of 
course, a high correlation between trade and interdependence, as a large component of 
interdependence is due to trade; but interdependence will generally include other forms 
of trade, such as in services, as well as the flow of people and investment. 
As early as 1748 Montesquieu, the French social commentator and political thinker, 
famously said: 
Peace is the natural effect of trade. Two nations who traffic with each other 
become reciprocally dependent; for if one has an interest in buying, the other has 
an interest in selling: and thus their union is founded on their mutual necessities. 
-de Secondat (1748 [1989): 316). 
83 For a discussion of this see Mansfield and Poll ins (2001). 
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This is an insight that is often quoted in studies of interdependence and political 
distance. The basic idea is that mutual dependence leads to increased cooperation and a 
decrease in hostilities. or conflict. A narrowing of political distance has a positive 
relationship with interdependence or trade. This is an oft-cited and good characterisation 
of the liberal school of thought. 
Trade flows are influenced significantly by broad political relations of amity and enmity 
between nations (Pollins, 1989b ). The argument for a positive relationship between 
trade and cooperation runs both ways: trade fosters peace and peace fosters trade. As 
trade increases between two countries, the opportunity cost of conflict rises. Trade is 
seen as being driven by those fundamentals such as differences in factor endowments, 
but also significantly influenced by politics and the political distance between nations 
(see discussion in Chapter 2). It is easy to see that allies may trade more and sign trade 
agreements (for example, the North American Free Trade Agreement) whereas in 
general, countries reduce or stop trade with their enemies (for example, the United 
States and Cuba). 
Countries, and the actors within those countries that engage in trade, do so because they 
gain from it and it is in their interest to do so. Disputes and a widening of political 
distance may lead to a loss in trade and therefore a loss in welfare. Highly 
interdependent states rarely engage in full blown war because the costs of doing so are 
too high. 
Hirschman describes the politics of foreign trade and notes that there is 'the possibility 
of using trade as a means of political pressure ... in the pursuit of power' (1945: xvi). The 
gains from trade between nations can have unequal distribution within countries as well 
as between countries (Hirschman, 1945). This unequal distribution of gains from trade 
can lead to a change in the structure of power within a country and between countries. 
Therefore, asymmetry in the gains from trade, which occurs quite naturally and regularly, 
especially if it causes a shift in power relations, can lead to a widening of political 
distance between countries and to high intensity conflict in extreme cases (Gilpin, 1981; 
Levy, 1989; Mearsheimer, 1990). Such views are representative of the realist school of 
!59 
thought. Liberal and realist views are not mutually exclusive, however, as a good 
example of the comfortable co-existence of the liberal and realist schools is Richard 
Nixon's opening up to China. Nixon was known as a realist but his opening up of 
relations with China was a liberal prescription. 
An example of conflict (mainly low intensity conflict) arising from asymmetric trade is 
the case of the United States and the trade disputes it has with some of its largest trade 
partners- Japan in the 1980s and the recent United States-China tensions over a rapidly 
growing bilateral trade imbalance. 
There have been other characteristics identified that influence political distance. 
Countries with elected democracies, it is argued, do not go to war with each other84 
(Kant, 1795; Wright, 1942); and there are ambiguous effects of enduring rivalries on the 
trade-political distance relationship. 
Distance is very important in analysing the link between political distance and economic 
interdependence (O'Loughlin, 1993; Robst et al., 2006). On one hand, distance is an 
important determinant of trade and has been used extensively in gravity models of trade 
since Tinbergen (1962) to explain trade dependence. On the other hand, closer countries 
interact more with each other and neighbours tend to have more disputes (Vasquez, 
1995). Further, neighbours may be more likely to have enduring rivalries (Stinnett and 
Diehl, 2001). The origin of such neighbourhood rivalries can include territorial disputes, 
disputes from increased trade (the closer countries are, the higher trade is, on average, as 
the gravity model attests) and the ability of countries to wage war on a neighbour as 
opposed to a distant country. 
Of course, countries that trade often have many interactions and it is easy to see how 
even the closest of allies have disputes and low intensity conflict from time to time. If 
the relationship of two countries is secure economically, incentives to create low 
intensity conflict for domestic political reasons can arise. In fact, trade, or the threat of 
84 For a discussion of the literature, including empirical studies, see Polachek and Seiglie (2006). 
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restrictions on trade, can be used as a signal to resolve disputes and avoid more serious 
conflict (Gartzke et al., 2001); so it is possible that trade can reduce military conflicts 
but increase non-military conflict, 'particularly if one country is more hesitant to fight' 
(Robst et al., 2006: 4 ). From this perspective, interdependence may foster a high degree 
of low-intensity conflict that is less likely to escalate (Gartzke, 1998). 
To complicate matters, history is littered with counter-examples of adversaries trading 
during war time and countries changing the way they interact with the rest of the world. 
At first it is counter-intuitive to think of a widening of political distance or a negative 
action towards another country causing trade, but there are examples in history, such as 
when Commodore Perry forced a then closed Japan to open its ports to international 
trade. Such examples are not common but are not anomalies. 
Many studies do not recognise that the nature of the complex interactions between trade 
(or interdependence more broadly) and political distance change over time, both in 
intensity and direction, and that the relationship may depend on both domestic and 
international factors (Mansfield and Pollins, 2001 ). This dynamic is revealed in the 
nonlinear relationships between these variables and is touched upon later in this study to 
shed light on such aspects in the Japan-China-United States trade relationships. 
Empirical evidence 
Polachek (1978) was the first to analyse the relationship between trade and political 
distance with a cross section study of the effect of trade on conflict. He found that 
increased trade reduces political distance, thus finding evidence of the liberal view. 
Polachek (1980) constructed a model from microeconomic foundations in an important 
paper showing the negative relationship between conflict and trade. His work generated 
a proliferation of empirical papers testing both realist and liberal theories. 
While Polachek ( 1978) accounted for causality running from trade to political distance, 
Pollins ( 1989a, 1989b) is often recognised as the first to show the effect of political 
distance on trade in a single equation cross section study. The importance of causality 
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both ways between trade (or interdependence) and political distance has been recognised 
since Polachek (1980), and two-staged least squares regression models are used to 
estimate these relationships. Reuveny and Kang (2003) and Polachek (1997) have since 
derived simultaneous equations models. 
Barbieri and Schneider (1999) contains a summary table of the main findings of the 
most significant empirical work in the field. It is clear from their review in the table that 
the results are mixed, methodologies are wide ranging, the countries covered differ, and 
in general, the time periods analysed are wide ranging. As Mansfield and Pollins (200 I) 
make clear, conclusions often do not have sensible boundaries and are, more often than 
not, imprecisely stated as generalisations. 
The most common political distance data sets used are events data such as the 
Cooperation and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), World Events Interaction Survey 
(WEIS), and war data sets such as Militarised Interstate Disputes (MID) data, the latter 
of which are compiled by the Correlates of War Project. There is a stream in the 
literature testing the compatibility of many of these measures, the biases in the coding 
(King and Lowe, 2003) and whether these measures accurately reflect reality 
(Pevehouse, 2003). One such example shows the high level of compatibility between the 
COP DAB and WEIS data sets (Reuveny and Kang, 1996). 
Barbieri ( 1996) finds strong evidence of economic interdependence increasing the 
likelihood of militarised interstate disputes. She finds this applies to symmetric as well 
as asymmetric interdependence between nations. In her study, the only form of 
interdependence that seems to mitigate conflict is low to moderate interdependence. Her 
data for conflicts is from 1870 to 1938 and she may have captured the different nature of 
interactions between countries in a different time from now. That was a time of imperial 
and colonial expansion and a less globalised world. 
Robst et al. (2006) estimate the effects of geographical distance on political distance 
separately and find that trade reduces conflict to a greater extent when two countries are 
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geographically close, but trade has a greater effect on cooperation when countries are 
distant. Closer countries have more interactions and there is more chance of territorial 
disputes and regional rivalries- both of which are relevant in analysing Japan and China. 
Robst et al. (2006) also find that proximity increases the number and severity of both 
conflict and cooperation events more among non-trading countries than countries with 
large trade. Their second finding does not relate to the study here, as Japan and China 
are close but trade is large. Robst et al. do find that although 'proximity provides 
incentives for conflict, trade mitigates these incentives' (2006: 5). 
The literature suggests that the causality is bilateral-relationship dependent and the 
existence of causality often reciprocal -if political distance affects trade from country X 
toY, then often political distance will affect trade from country Y to X (Reuveny and 
Kang, 1998). If no causality is found in one direction of a bilateral relationship, then it is 
likely that no causality exists in the other direction. 
Results in the literature also point to causality running in different directions in different 
bilateral trade relationships, and the interactions depend on the type of traded good (for 
example, strategic goods versus non-strategic goods) (Reuveny and Kang, 1998). 
Gasiorowski and Polachek (1982) and Reuveny and Kang (1996) test for Granger 
causality between conflict and trade using time series data. Gasiorowski and Polachek 
(1982) analyse Warsaw pact countries' trade with the United States and find relatively 
little evidence ofGranger causality. Reuveny and Kang (1996) look at some of the most 
important and politically and economically significant relationships from the 1960s to 
early 1990s, concluding that the Granger causality is dependent on the relationships 
analysed and tends to be reciprocal. Similar methodology is used here for the Granger 
causality tests but with monthly data instead of quarterly data, with fewer relationships 
covered but in more detail. 
To better understand how politics can affect trade, we take a look at an extreme case. A 
widening of political distance leading to a trade embargo or war will obviously affect 
163 
trade adversely. The other extreme is that a customs union or high level economic 
cooperation will increase trade. How does low level political distance affect trade 
relations? A one-off territorial dispute may have little direct effect on trade but it adds to 
perceived trade risk and increases overall country risk. The cumulative effects of 
continued low intensity conflict will add to negative perceptions of, and attitudes 
towards, that country and over time political distance may widen. At the margin it is to 
be expected that this can make a significant difference in the decision to undertake trade 
and other economic transactions. 
Increased trade can foster cooperation and peace. Increased imbalances in trade or a shift 
in power relations sometimes due to trade can cause political distance to widen. Hence 
there is a feedback relationship from trade to political distance and vice versa. The 
implications of imbalanced and balanced trade will be important for the different cases 
of US-China, where trade is largely imbalanced and US-Japan, where trade is relatively 
balanced. 
The literature reveals the interaction of political distance and economic relations is a 
complex one that depends on the countries, the symmetry in the economic relationship 
(level of trade) and the type of goods and FDI that flow between them. Chapter 3 did not 
find an immediate robust relationship as the analysis there was limited to aggregate 
annual trade. This chapter will examine the data for causality relationships but the next 
section first introduces the data properly, which is important in understanding the 
analysis. 
Data 
Political distance events data 
The political distance variable used throughout this study is comprised of 
conflict/cooperation data from King's (2003) dataset oflntegrated Data for Events 
Analysis (IDEA), which is an extension and refinement of the WEIS data set85 • The data 
85 Available at http://gking.harvard.edu/events/ 
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were used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 but are explained in more detail here, as the close 
examination of the link between political distance and the dynamics of any relationship 
that might exist requires comprehensive explanation of the data. There are more 
categories of conflict and cooperation in IDEA than in WEIS or COPDAB. Monthly 
bilateral conflict and cooperation variables for Japan-China, Japan-US and US-China 
were extracted for the period 1990-2004. A net cooperation variable is constructed by 
differencing conflict from cooperation, which is common in the literature, and called 
'political distance'. 
Cooperation is represented by positive events or positive political event in a relationship, 
generally from one country towards another. A report of' Japan increasing overseas 
development aid (ODA) to China' would be a cooperative event from Japan towards 
China. Conflict is represented by a negative political or non-political event such as 
'nation-wide protests in China against Japanese interests' or 'Japanese Prime Minister's 
visit to Yasnkuni Shrine angers China'. For the net cooperation variable, a value of zero 
means no event or the weighted positive event (cooperation) has cancelled out the 
equally weighted negative event (conflict). 
The events are machine coded from Reuters Business Briefs using Virtual Research 
Associates (VRA) software and the results are shown to be more accurate and consistent 
than high skill human coders (King and Lowe, 2003). The events covered report most 
actions from one country towards another, including such events categorised as 
comment, consult, approve, promise, grant, reward, agree, request, propose, reject, 
accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten and demonstrate. All events are given 
weights consistent with Goldstein (1992) to capture severity and extended from WEIS. 
The assumption here is that a positive event will to some extent cancel out, or have the 
opposite effect on, a negative effect. The variables are analysed separately to confirm 
the importance of a net measure. Net conflict (conflict minus cooperation as opposed to 
the other way around) is used in other studies (Polachek, 1980; Pollins 1989a). 
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Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show the net cooperation indexes between Japan and China, and 
China and the United States for the sub-period 2002-2004 to illustrate what the data 
picks up and what the data looks like. The fifteen years from 1990 to 2004 cover many 
events and the sub-period is used here purely for illustration. Cooperation is positive and 
conflict is negative on the vertical axes in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. A move in the positive 
direction is a narrowing of political distance as countries become closer politically. A 
move in the negative direction from a conflict event is a widening of political distance. 
Some of the peaks and troughs that can be noted from Figure 7.1 include: 
Cooperation 
• April 2002: Chinese leader Li Peng meets Prime Minister Koizumi in Japan. 
• August 2003: China and Japan participate and work together in six-party talks to 
solve the North Korean nuclear problem. Also there is news of FDI hitting 
record highs. 
Conflict 
• May 2002: diplomatic rift over North Korean asylum seekers 
• July 2002: sunken North Korean ship in East China Sea creates tension between 
Japan and China 
• December 2003: 400 Japanese businessmen organise an orgy in South China 
with 500 prostitutes. This is significant and shows up as such a large event 
because of ongoing discomfort over the war-time sex slavery. 
• March 2004: Japan cuts aid to China by 20 per cent. There are also disputes over 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. These events lead to a cancellation of bilateral talks on 
a maritime treaty. 
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Figure 7.1 Political distance (net cooperation) between Japan and China, 
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Source: King (2003). 
Figure 7.1 shows that the net cooperation index does not appear to pick up one of the 
most important and significant events between the two countries: the Yasukuni Shrine 
visits by Koizumi. The annual visits to the shrine between 2001 and 2006 created a great 
deal of tension as the shrine is supposed to house the spirits of 14 Class A war criminals 
and Koizumi 's visits were very public and were seen by the Chinese public as honouring 
these war criminals. The visits during this sub-period took place on 21 April 2002, 14 
January 2003 and I January 2004 but do not show up in the net cooperation index. The 
reason the shrine visits do not register in Figure 7 .I or in the net cooperation variable 
used in this study, is that the negative reportage of the shrine visit is cancelled out by 
positive cooperation news (such as record high FDI or trade numbers being reported). 
Indeed, if the conflict variable is viewed independently, the shrine visits do show up as 
significant conflict events (see Appendix 7 A). The 2002 and 2003 visits are the most 
significant and the reasons for the 200 I and 2004 visits not showing up strongly even in 
the conflict data in those exact months are explained in Appendix 7A. Figure 4.3 (p. 99) 
in Chapter 4 shows both positive and negative variables separately for the whole period 
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of 1990-2004. It shows that the frequency of both positive and negative events between 
Japan and China increased substantially in 200 I, which is analytically untangled in 
discussing the effect of China's WTO accession in Chapter 5. 
Also common in the literature is the use of relative conflict/cooperation rather than 
absolute conflict/cooperation to control for some countries having more events reported 
than others. Data sets such as COPDAB which use the New York Times exclusively 
might bias the reporting of US events upwards, and no news source is bias free. 
Countries like the United States will naturally have more events as well, as they are 
engaged in more international activities and have more interactions with other countries. 
Converting the events into a relative measure by dividing the scale by the total number 
of events is not appropriate for this study because it will negate the fact that some 
countries interact more with other countries. 
Some of the peaks and troughs from the US-China relationship in Figure 7.2 include: 
Cooperation 
• October 2002: China and the United States agree to work together on nuclear 
disarmament ofNorth Korea. 
• April 2004: Trade talks result in satisfactory outcome for both countries. 
Conflict 
• November 2003: Trade dispute leading to US antidumping measures being put 
in place on Chinese TV s, textiles, steel and soy beans (this is shown only as 
conflict from China towards the United States). 
• July 2004: reports of avian influenza in China; China announces military 
manoeuvres in the Taiwan Straits and presses the United States to stop arms 
sales to Taiwan. 
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Figure 7.2 Political distance (net cooperation) between China and the US, 
2002-04 
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The conflict/cooperation data are not perfect and the creation of a net cooperation 
variable to reflect political distance may be inappropriate, as noted previously, as some 
important events do not show up. Also, large events only show up as spikes in the data 
whereas quite often they have lasting consequences. Relying on one news source, as the 
data set used here does, misses news from some countries and over-reports from others. 
This is a difficult problem as Chinese events perhaps have better coverage, than other 
sources, in news sources such as the China Daily, but then this data source is also far 
from bias free. Reuters is seen as an acceptable, more international, and bias free wire 
service than other news sources traditionally used such as the New York Times, which 
is the exclusive source for the COPDAB database. WEIS and Kansas Event Data 
System (KEDS) use a number of different sources and are flexible, as they allow coders 
to specify the data sources. There is also difficulty in isolating reporting bias for 
countries such as the United States as they have more international interactions and 
hence appear in the news the most. 
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Trade data 
Trade data are monthly and from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics. As is common 
practice, import data are used as there is incentive to under-report exports. The data are 
adjusted for seasonality and de-trended to make them into stationary series where 
necessary and the appropriate tests for unit roots carried out. 
Two variables are used for trade and compared: nominal, absolute US dollar value trade 
flow from one country to another and a trade index constructed by Hirschman (1945), 
which is 
where subscripts i and j on Trade indicate trade from country i to j, Xu is exports from 
country i to j, M if is imports of country i fromj and subscript w indicates world (so X,w is 
total exports of country i). This shows the importance of country j to country i. 
Here, Hirschman's (1945) index of trade is used as it captures both types of 
interdependence: vulnerability (Keohane and Nye, 1977) and dependence (Hirschman, 
1945). This measure is used in other studies (Reuveny and Kang, 1996 and Barbieri, 
1996). Although this index is useful for capturing aspects of interdependence, a flaw in 
its use is discussed below. The results from using both trade variables are compared. 
Granger causality 
Granger causality is defined as the past values of one variable being useful in explaining 
the current value of another, given an information set that includes past values of both 
variables (Granger, 1969). A variable X is said to Granger cause a variable Y if lagged 
values of X help explain values of Y. Granger causality is not deep causality but a 
method that can show there exists a relationship between variables. 
170 
The availability of rich monthly data is taken advantage of here and Granger causality is 
used to test the hypothesis that there is no Granger causality between trade and the net 
cooperation index. The direction of causality and the Jag lengths are expected to be 
different across country pairs as many other factors affect both trade and political 
relations (Gasiorowski and Polachek, 1982; Reuveny and Kang, 1996). 
The model is a vector autoregressive (V AR) model which looks like 
(7.1) T; = 'f-a,T;_, + L_p,c,_, 
i=l i=l 
(7.2) c, ='f-a', y;_, + L_p·, c,_, 
i=l i=l 
where T is trade (the index or exports) and C is net cooperation, with the subscript 
indicating time. The variables are tested for autocorrelation and first differences are 
taken where appropriate to correct for autocorrelation. 
There is Granger causality if we reject the null hypothesis of 
~;'s = 0 in Equation 7.1 [political distance will help forecast trade in future] 
or 
a';'s = 0 in Equation 7.2 [trade helps forecast political distance] 
The existence of a third variable which Granger causes both net cooperation and trade 
will give the result that net cooperation Granger causes trade or vice versa when a 
relationship does not exist (Granger 1980; Sims, 1980). Sims (1980) found causality is 
uni-directional from money to income but not vice versa in his famous 1972 paper and 
later showed the addition of the interest rate to the vector autoregression effectively 
explains away his earlier finding. Here it is difficult to think of another variable that 
could be explaining both variation in the political distance between two countries and 
variation in their trade volumes. A third country's influence or presence could affect the 
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results from time to time during shocks but this would be difficult to capture 
consistently over time and to isolate. The Japan-China relationship could be affected by 
the involvement of European countries, the United States, or even the multilateral 
landscape in general. However, it is a stretch to think of the general trend in news items 
between two countries to be driven by a third country. This study does not analyse the 
effects of external factors on the trade-political distance relationship. 
Another potential problem that Sims points out is the existence of serial correlation, 
which can cause problems in this sort of estimation when 'some elements of optimal 
control enter' the model (Sims, 1972: 542). If one variable in a bivariate system is 
chosen optimally, the values of that variable become structural elements ofthe system 
(Sims, 1972). The only sense where that could potentially be a problem in this case is 
when political distance is controlled to influence trade. This is somewhat plausible but 
the conflict and cooperation variables include actions by many actors in each country 
and events out of the control ofleaders, governments and authorities. 
Sims (1972) points out that presence of uni-directional Granger causality can be thought 
of as causality but bi-directional Granger causality shows a feedback mechanism and 
carmot be called causality. As discussed above, it is assumed that there is a bi-
directional relationship between trade and conflict and cooperation and the results below 
would seem to confirm this. Causality is used to refer to the direction of influence but as 
in the case of Granger causality analysis, it is not deep causality. The aim of this chapter 
is to find a relationship between political distance and trade or economic 
interdependence and therefore instead of strict causality, finding one variable affects the 
other is adequate. 
Why Granger causality and not cross-sectional analysis? 
It is common in the literature to find single equation cross-sectional analysis to estimate 
the effect of various measures of trade or interdependence on political distance, which is 
what was done in Chapter 3. Pollins (1989a, 1989b) is generally given credit for 
popularising the estimation of the effect of political distance on trade. The recognition 
172 
of causality running both ways between political distance and trade led to many studies 
estimating simultaneous equations. The problem with two stage least squares or three 
stage least squares estimation in analysing the relationship between political distance 
and trade simultaneously is that exogenous variables are needed to identify the equations. 
Defence expenditure has been used to identifY political distance and development 
indicators such as education levels and highway vehicles per capita have been used to 
identifY trade (Polachek, 1999). Using defence expenditure may be useful when 
analysing high intensity conflicts with data sets such as MID, but in this study it is 
problematic for the analysis of China-Japan relations. China's defence expenditure is 
unclear and Japan's defence expenditure is uniquely constrained constitutionally. Also, 
there have not been any significant military related conflicts and nothing worthy of 
showing up in the MID data set. China also trades a lot more than its level of 
development would suggest, if such indicators were used to identify trade. For these 
reasons, the most common variables used to allow a simultaneous equation to work do 
not perform adequately for the case of Japan-China. 
The results below here (and from Chapter 3) suggest that cross section analysis, often 
only possible with annual data and depending on the country pairs, may not capture the 
true dynamics of international trade and political interactions, as reflected in the 
differing Jag structures in the results. 
The advantage of time series methodology is that there is greater freedom in terms of 
finding different Jag structures among different bilateral relationships. There are some 
problems with this methodology that Kim and Rousseau (2005) summarise. First, the 
results seem to be sensitive to the number of lags included (Geweke, 1984). Secondly, 
as mentioned, the inclusion of a third variable can alter the results (Granger, 1980; Sims, 
1980). Finally, de-trending a series (in this case the trade data) may lead to different 
causality conclusions (Kang, 1985). 
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Results 
The main results of the Granger causality tests are shown in Tables 7.1 to 7.3. An 
increase in the net cooperation index (a narrowing of political distance) in the tables is 
either an increase in cooperation or a decrease in conflict relative to the other variable. 
'Japanese net cooperation' in the tables means a rise, on balance, in reports of positive 
over events that relate to country Y, where Y is the other country in the bilateral analysis. 
There is no strong evidence of increased conflict causing trade to increase (which does 
not make sense, except in the event of some countervailing action) but there is evidence 
of cooperation (or a reduction in conflict) causing trade to increase. 
Two tests are carried out. The first is for Granger causality: that the coefficients are 
jointly statistically different to zero. This is testing the joint significance of all Ws in 
Equation 7.1 or joint significance of all a's in Equation 7.2 (null: ~ 1 = ~2= ~3= ... =0). The 
statistical significance is shown with a star next to the number of lags. The second test is 
whether the sum of the coefficients is statistically different to zero (null: ~ 1 + ~2+ 
~3+ ... =0). This is a test of whether we can confidently claim the long-run multiplier 
effect of one variable on the other is positive or negative, or indeed whether there is any 
overall statistical effect at all. This statistical significance is denoted with a star next to 
the sum of coefficients. 
The results in Tables 7.1 to 7.3 show the sum of coefficients even if they are not 
statistically different to zero, as in many cases the sign is consistent over a number of 
lags where Granger causality was found, and it will show the general trend and is 
therefore useful in interpreting the results. The magnitude of the sum of coefficients is 
not of great value in interpreting the results as they are coefficients between de-trended 
and differenced trade values and an index86. In Table 7.2 they are of less importance as 
they reflect the correlations between two indices. 
86 The magnitude or importance of the shocks are also difficult to quantify as the political distance 
variable is difficult to quantity. The purpose here, therefore, is to find a relationship between the two 
variables. 
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Table 7.1 Trade and net cooperation, 1990-2004 
Japan-China Lags Sum of coefficients 
a . .T apanese exports to China 7*** 13.55 
= .fCChinese net cooperation) 8*** 8.72 
9** 6.88 
10*** 12.80 
11 ** 5.87 
12** 0.55 
b. Japanese net cooperation 12* -0.024 
= JCChinese exports to Japan) 13* -0.019 
14* -0.023 
China- US Lags Sum of coefficients 
c. US net cooperation 11* -0.036** 
=./(Chinese exports to US) 12* -0.043** 
13** -0.032* 
14** -0.028 
15** -0.035* 
16** -0.044** 
17** -0.038 
d. Chinese exports to US 6* -2.48 
= JCChinese net cooperation) 9* -3.57 
e. US net cooperation 2** -0.014** 
= f(US exports to China) 3** -0.012* 
4* 
-0.014** 
5*** -0.017*** 
6** -0.018*** 
7** 
-0.018** 
8** -0.013* 
13** -0.008 
19** -0.004 
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Japan-US Lags Sum ofcoefficients 
f. Japanese net cooperation 3* 0.005 
= j(Japanese exports to US) 4* -0.001 
10* -0.023 
11* -0.026 
12** -0.020 
13* -0.015 
g. US exports to Japan 14** 3.60* 
= .f\Japanese net cooperation) 15** 3.61 * 
16** 2.37 
17** 2.17 
18** 1.81 
h. US exports to Japan 3** 2.31 
= f(US net cooperation) 4* 2.54 
5* 2.89 
6* 3.47* 
Notes: * = 10 per cent Jevel of significance, ** = 5 per cent level of significance and *** = I per cent level 
of significance. Statistical significance on the lag number signifies joint statistical significance of all the 
lags from one lag up to that number (presence of Granger causality) and significance on the sum of 
coefficients is a test whether the sum of all the lags is significant. 
The Jag lengths differ for each country pair in the study and this is consistent with 
results in other studies (Reuveny and Kang, 1996). Trade contracts are in general longer 
term than monthly or quarterly, and the effects of large or significant events, good or 
bad, take time to affect trade and investment numbers. The cancellation of most 
contracts cannot be effected immediately and it takes time to initiate trade transactions. 
Similarly, an increase in trade is not followed immediately by cooperative actions or a 
diminution in negative actions because it takes time to report trade and FDI statistics 
and to respond to them. There is a Jag in causality and it varies for each relationship. 
The first result in Table 7.1 shows that an increase in the index of Chinese net 
cooperation towards Japan (Granger) causes Japanese exports to China to increase. This 
can be thought of in a number of ways. As the political climate in China towards Japan 
improves, China is likely to import more from Japan. Another interpretation is that as 
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the political climate in China improves towards Japan, Japanese companies are likely to 
be more confident and inclined to sign contracts to supply to the Chinese market87. 
The second Japan-China result (Table 7.lb) is that increasing Chinese exports to Japan 
help explain a fall in the index of cooperation from Japan towards China. Increased 
Japanese imports of Chinese goods after 12 months can be seen to worsen the climate in 
Japan towards China. This is consistent with what the media often refers to as the 
'China fear' in Japan of industry hollowing out and jobs being lost to China as well as 
Japan's fear oflosing its economic dominance in the region. Table 7.3 (p. 181) below 
shows stronger evidence of this result, which supports realist hypotheses of trade 
sometimes increasing political distance. 
The United States-China results show strong evidence that trade flows reduce net 
cooperation (widen political distance) in the United States towards China. The sum of 
the coefficients is mostly statistically significant and both an increase in Chinese exports 
to the United States and United States exports to China cause the United States' stance 
towards China to worsen. 
Finally for Table 7 .I, that Japanese exports to the United States help explain a reduction 
in the Japanese net cooperation index towards the United States is unexpected (Table 
7 .I f). The sum of the Jag coefficients is very small and closer inspection of the data 
shows a mix of positive and negative coefficients for different lags88• The other results 
(Table 7 .I g and h) show increases in the index of cooperation in both directions, which 
helps explain increased United States trade to Japan. 
87 Jt could be argued that the political climate in China towards Japan will be affected by the political 
climate in Japan towards China. 
88 The coefficients of each Jag are not reported here as they are in some other papers (Sims, 1972) because 
the sheer amount of data and the relationships for which they may be interesting (Japan-United States) are 
not the main aim of this chapter. 
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Table 7.2 Interdependence and net cooperation, 1990-2004 
Japan-China 
a. Japanese net cooperation 
=./(Chinese dependence on Japan) 
b. Japanese net cooperation 
=_/(Japanese dependence on China) 
c. Japanese dependence on China 
=./(Japanese net cooperation) 
Japan-US 
d. Japanese net cooperation 
=.fi:Japanese dependence on US) 
e. US net cooperation 
=./(Japanese dependence on US) 
f. US net cooperation 
=./(US dependence on Japan) 
Lags 
5** 
6** 
7** 
8*** 
9** 
10** 
11** 
12** 
13** 
12* 
13* 
14* 
15* 
2* 
Lags 
6** 
7** 
8** 
9** 
6** 
18** 
19** 
20** 
21** 
22*** 
2* 
3*** 
4*** 
5* 
6* 
Sum of coefficients 
810 
1264** 
1516** 
2244*** 
2323*** 
1983** 
2719** 
2025* 
2735* 
-752 
-180 
286 
622 
-0.00012 
Sum of coefficients 
5313*** 
6173*** 
7790*** 
8320*** 
2918 
15380*** 
14835** 
18568*** 
24198*** 
28415*** 
418** 
581*** 
602*** 
542*** 
517** 
Notes: * ~ I 0 per cent level of significance, ** ~ 5 per cent level of significance and *** ~ I per cent level 
of significance. Statistical significance on the Jag number signifies joint statistical significance of all the 
lags from one Jag up to that number (presence of Granger causality) and significance on the sum of 
coefficients is a test whether the sum of all the lags is sign(ficant. 
178 
In Table 7.lb Chinese exports to Japan were explaining falls in Japanese net cooperation 
(or increasing political distance) towards China; in Table 7.2a an increase in China's 
dependence on Japan helps explain the opposite effect, a positive movement on the net 
cooperation scale and the countries becoming politically closer. The results are not 
inconsistent, as the dependence index used here captures the increasing importance of 
Japan for China, reflected in its rising dependence and vulnerability in relation to Japan. 
This nuanced story is only picked up with the use of both the nominal export variable 
and the trade index of dependence. 
The results of increased Japanese dependence on China are mixed (Table 7.2b). 
Although one could interpret the change in sign after 13 months, from a negative to a 
positive effect on Japan's stance towards China, as the change over time of the effect of 
Japan's integration with China on the country as a whole, the sum of the coefficients is 
not statistically significant and the results cannot be interpreted as confidently as other 
results. All that can be said is that Japanese dependence on China Granger causes a 
change in political distance. 
The Granger causality estimations carried out on interdependence and cooperation, 
using the trade index, do not include the United States-China case because the highly 
unbalanced trade relationship distorts the trade index89. 
The results showing a positive relationship between net cooperation and dependence for 
Japan and the United States are strong (Table 7.2d, e and f). There is uni-directional 
causality from dependence to political distance showing that mutual interdependence 
fosters cooperation and narrows political distance- the classic liberal hypothesis. 
89 Hirschman's index of trade dependence does not perfonn well for highly unbalanced trade or rapidly 
growing imbalances in trade. The direction of trade is irrelevant in the index so it does not treat China's 
growing surplus (the United States' growing deficit) as trade increasing in one direction. As the theories 
and literature tell us, it is the asymmetry in trade, or the growing imbalance, that is the driver of conflict 
and so the index would only appear to perfonn well for trade that is relatively even. 
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As the causality, direction of causality and Jag lengths vary by country pair, it is 
reasonable to assume that even within a country pair the dynamics and interactions 
change over time. To take account of, and to test for this, two additional steps are taken. 
First, to test whether the longer term relationships in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 are consistent 
over time, or whether the pattern (or even nature) of the interactions changes over time, 
the fifteen-year period was split roughly into half. In order to keep tbe number of 
observations high, the eight and seven-year split represents the only sub-periods 
analysed. Table 7.3 shows that the results are significantly different between the two 
time sub-periods. 
The other method used is the nonlinear Granger causality, which is detailed in Appendix 
6B and discussed below. 
Table 7.3 reveals more evidence of the existence of a trade-cooperation nexus, which is 
perhaps hidden in the longer series. It is interesting to note there is a stronger link 
between trade and political distance in the period 1998-2004 while there is a stronger 
dependence-political distance link in the earlier period 1990-1997. For example, there is 
no evidence found of Granger causality between trade dependence and political distance 
in the period 1998-2004. The result from Table 7.1a, that Chinese net cooperation 
towards Japan Granger causes Japanese exports to China is present in both periods in 
Table 7.3a but with ambiguity of the sign of the effect. Analysis of the longer time 
period may better capture the long-term underlying direction of the effect, if there is one 
at all. 
The most significant result is that an increase in Japanese net cooperation towards China 
appears to lift Japanese exports to China (Table 7.3c). This is the equivalent to saying an 
increase in conflict from Japan towards China Granger causes a reduction in Japanese 
exports to China. Again, the sum of coefficients is not significantly different to zero but 
is consistently positive and well above the magnitude of the individual Jag coefficients, 
which range from 1.8 to 13 in this case. 
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Table 7.3 Japan-China trade/interdependence and net cooperation by sub 
periods, 1990-1997 and 1998-2004 
1990-1997 1998-2004 
Trade and Net Cooperation Lags .Sum coejjs Lags Sum coejfs 
a. Japanese exports to China 7** 6.30 2* -0.79 
=./\Chinese net cooperation) 8** -1.35 3* -0.54 
9** -0.73 7* 22.12 
10*** 6.48 12** 8.85 
16* -12.0 13* 7.44 
b. Japanese net cooperation 12* -0.07*** 
=./\Chinese exports to Japan) 13* -0.06** 
14** -0.08*** 
15** -0.08*** 
16* -0.07** 
c. Japanese exports to China 12*** 24.7 
=./\Japanese net cooperation) 13** 25.4 
14** 20.5 
15** 22.4 
16* 22.5 
d. Japanese net cooperation 13* -0.16* 
= .f\Japanese exports to China) 
e. Chinese net cooperation 22** 0.317 2* 0.003 
= .f\Japanese exports to China) 23* 0.220 4* -0.006 
24* 0.358 5** 0.003 
6* -0.002 
f. Chinese exports to Japan 11 * 26.7*** 
= .f\Japanese net cooperation) 
g. Chinese net cooperation 6** 0.030 6* 0.002 
=.!\Chinese exports to Japan) 7** 0.027 
8* 0.034 
12* 0.111** 
13* 0.126** 
15* 0.181*** 
h. Chinese exports to Japan 17** 5.44 
=./\Chinese net cooperation) 18* 6.37 
19* 11.18 
20* 10.59 
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1990-1997 
Dependence and Net Cooperation Lags 
i. Japanese net cooperation 2* 
= fi:Chinese dependence on Japan) 3** 
4* 
5** 
6*** 
7** 
8** 
9** 
10* 
11* 
12* 
j. Chinese dependence on Japan 3** 
= fi:Chinese net cooperation) 
k. Chinese net cooperation 20** 
= fi:Chinese dependence on Japan) 21** 
22*** 
23*** 
24** 
I. Chinese net cooperation 8* 
= fi:Japanese dependence on China) 20** 
21* 
22* 
23* 
Sum coejJs 
-374 
-866 
-466 
54 
985 
1069 
1719 
1696 
1733 
2279 
1672 
-0.0002 
3942* 
4140 
5678* 
6397* 
6198 
1991* 
4851* 
3985 
4201 
3738 
1998-2004 
Lags Sum coeffs 
Notes:*~ 10 per cent level of significance,**= 5 per cent level of significance and***~ I per cent level 
of significance. Statistical significance on the Jag number signifies joint statistical significance of all the 
lags from one Jag up to that number (presence ofGranger causality) and significance on the sum of 
coefficients is a test whether the sum of all the lags is significant. 
The other result from Table 7.1 b, that Chinese exports to Japan are causing the measure 
of conflict from Japan to China to rise, is confirmed in Table 7.3b but with evidence 
only found in the latter period. It is reasonable to expect that the 'China fear' that is a 
product of China's rise is more pronounced in the second period analysed as China 
becan1e a much bigger player internationally and in trade with Japan, and the direct 
threat to Japan's regional dominance became more apparent. 
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The main Japan-China result from Table 7.2a, that growing Chinese dependence on 
Japan is causing Japanese net cooperation towards China to rise, is also found in Table 
7.3i but is only apparent in the earlier period. 
The nuanced story from Table 7.1 can be extended to: Japanese net cooperation towards 
China is positively affected in the earlier period by Japan's growing importance to 
China and negatively affected in the latter period by the growing exports of China to 
Japan, as China's dominance grows and becomes more visible. 
Net cooperation as the appropriate measure of political distance 
The net cooperation variable used in this study follows the seminal papers of Polachek 
(1980) and Pollins (1989a). Other studies use only conflict and it could be argued a ratio 
of cooperation to conflict could pick up different dynamics between conflict and 
cooperation and not restrict it to one functional form. It is reasonable to assume that it is 
not conflict (negative news) alone, or cooperation (positive news) that drives trade, but 
the net effect of both. To subtract conflict from cooperation imposes the assumption that 
they are additive and that the reporting of certain events cancels out the reporting of 
others. One approach might be to test the robustness of the results with the ratio of 
cooperation to conflict. This, however, is difficult as there are frequent zero values in 
the news events, where no positive or negative news item was reported in that month for 
the bilateral relationship. Also, despite the fact that this would test another shape of the 
relationship between cooperation and conflict, and its relationship with trade, it seems 
more appropriate to think of cooperation and conflict as additive, as positive and 
negative utility towards another country. 
The Granger causality tests from Tables 7.1 and 7.2 were repeated but with conflict and 
cooperation separately. While some results confirm the results in Tables 7.1 and 7.2, 
and even some in Table 7.3, a majority of results were not consistent and did not make 
sense with what is observed in reality. These inconclusive results suggest that in 
analysing the relationship between political distance and trade, it does not make sense to 
183 
look at only the positives or only the negatives of political distance, in isolation from 
each other. 
Nonlinear analysis 
Since the nature and structure of interactions, and the time taken for actors in economies 
to respond to interactions change over time, and some events cause quicker responses 
than others, a non-parametric analysis is also carried out for the study of trade and 
political distance. 
Traditional Granger causality methods find correlations between conditional means of 
two variables. Nonlinear Granger causality finds relationships between conditional 
distributions of two variables (Baek and Brock, 1992). The linear V AR causality tests 
strip out the linear causality and the non-parametric methods test whether the remaining 
V AR residuals have any remaining structural relationship; so, although useful in finding 
a relationship between two variables, the exact nature of the relationship is difficult to 
determine. It is unclear whether it is the variance (volatility) of one series, or any other 
aspect of that series, affecting the mean, variance or other characteristics of the other 
variable. In that sense the methodology is a 'black box'. Perhaps the biggest weakness 
of the nonlinear tests is that the presence of a relationship between two variables does 
not say anything about the effect of the relationship. That is, if it appears trade causes a 
movement in the political distance variable, it cannot be determined whether it is a 
positive or negative movement. 
Nevertheless, the results show there is further evidence, in addition to the linear results, 
of trade affecting political distance and vice versa. The methodology and results are 
presented in Appendix 6B. 
Although the signs of the relationships are unclear in the nonlinear method, the 
existence of causality is a significant result and means that: 
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1. Japan's stance towards China has implications for its trade relationship (trade in 
both directions) with China90. 
2. Japan's trade flows to China cause potentially mixed reactions from both sides. 
The first of these conclusions would appear more important as it shows the political 
relationship is constrained by the economic relationship. This result confirms the 
findings from Table 7.3 (results c and f). For example, Japanese leaders have to be 
aware of the ramifications of this constraint when taking actions that could raise 
political tensions, despite some believing that hot economics and cold politics can 
coexist. 
The US-China and US-Japan nonlinear test results also show evidence of a nonlinear 
relationship between trade and political distance and causality in more directions, 
compared to just the linear results. 
Implications 
The three relationships covered here include neighbours (Japan and China), rivals (the 
United States and China; China and Japan), allies (the United States and Japan), 
democracies and a one-party state. No generalisations are made about the characteristics 
of the countries and their effect on the trade- political distance relationship as is done 
elsewhere- there is often a lack of sensible bounds on conclusions and results are 
generalised across time and countries (Mansfield and Pollins, 2001 ). 
The results in this study are not completely consistent with Reuveny and Kang (1996). 
Reuveny and Kang find that causality tends to be reciprocal, whereas in this study 
causality seems to be uni-directional when only applying the linear results that they use. 
The conclusion Reuveny and Kang draw that the pattern of the interaction between 
90 This may at first seem an obvious finding but quite often policy makers and other actors in a country 
claim that their actions that adversely affect political distance do not affect trade or the economic 
relationship. During the Yasukuni Shrine visits of2001 to 2006, many pointed to the growing trade and 
FDI between Japan and China as evidence of their independence: hence the term hot economics and cold 
politics. 
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politics and economics differs for each country relationship is, however, supported by 
this study. 
There is evidence in the present study that supports both the liberal and realist schools. 
The findings are consistent with the theories described previously of low intensity 
conflict in a relationship underpinned by strong economics, of enduring rivalries and 
neighbourly disputes that are mitigated by trade (Robs! et al., 2006). The structure of 
Japan-China relations at this point makes them relatively low intensity in the generation 
of conflict. 
The Japan-China relationship 
This analysis leads to a number of important conclusions. The economic relationship 
underpins the relationship between China and Japan, and the results here show that the 
economic relationship constrains the political relationship. This result is in direct 
contrast to a study by Hughes and He (2006), which concluded that the pacifying effects 
of trade (as posited by liberal theories) are dominated by nationalism in the case of 
Japan-China relations. 
Yasukuni Shrine is the most talked about issue and is most symbolic of the difficulties 
between Japan and its largest neighbours, China and South Korea. In a sign of the 
recognition of the importance of the relationship, Prime Minster Abe did not visit the 
shrine while he was leader and in the contest for leadership after Abe, Fukuda, who 
eventually won the contest, gave a clear message that in order to mend relations with 
Asian neighbours, a Yasukuni Shrine visit would not take place91 • Recognition of the 
implications of shrine visits is now clear and even if future leaders do seek to increase 
political tensions for domestic political reasons, it would appear these actions would be 
taken in a manner so as to minimise the damage to Japan-China relations92. As the 
results here suggest, politics or variations in political distance do appear to have an 
91 There has been increasing talk of either removing the souls of the 14 Class A war criminals from 
Yasukuni, or failing that technically, creating another memorial for Japan's war dead that does not include 
the war criminals. 
92 This could also be the case with other economically important yet politically sensitive relations such as 
between Japan and South Korea. 
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effect on the bilateral trade relationship and trade affects political distance (See Table 
7.la and 7.1b; Table 7.3a, band c). 
There is some evidence of increased low intensity conflict from Japan towards China as 
Chinese trade to Japan increases, but this can be explained by the underlying economic 
relationship's being strong enough that the Japanese leaders and some actors in the 
economy can cause low intensity conflict for domestic political reasons. This is 
consistent with the media reports of 'China fear' and with the findings of Robst et al. 
(2006) and Gartzke (1998). Tensions may rise significantly if trade started to become 
unbalanced as in the US-China case. The Japan-China trade relationship is currently 
relatively balanced and a growing Japanese deficit with China would have to be 
managed carefully to dampen tensions and rising nationalism between the two countries. 
Thus, these low intensity conflicts between Japan and China would seem unlikely to 
escalate as the countries become more integrated economically, unless trade becomes 
largely lopsided. Increased trade, and also investment, have meant that both forms of 
interdependence, vulnerability and dependence, have grown. The increased vulnerability 
of one country towards the other and the unresolved historical issues complicate and 
fuel domestic sentiments in some segments of both countries and from time to time it 
would appear that both governrnents play these up for domestic political gain. 
Hughes and He (2006) state that the economic interdependence between Japan and 
China is a weaker factor than nationalism and that although increased economic 
interdependence has increased the cost of conflict, the risk of escalation has increased. 
Chapter 5 has shown that China's WTO entry may have greatly changed the dynamic of 
the relationship and that now the institutional effect of the WTO has meant that 
economic interdependence is more dominant than nationalism. China becoming a 
member of the WTO meant that Japanese firms could engage in operations in China 
more confidently despite the political distance (Chapter 5). 
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The results of this study suggest that Japanese exports to China are increasingly affected 
by Japanese political distance from China (Tables 7.la, 7.3a and 7.3c). A rise in 
negative Chinese sentiments towards Japan and increasingly a rise in Japan's negative 
sentiments93 towards China adversely affect Japanese exports. Japan's politicians are 
increasingly constrained in actions that might affect China and Chinese sentiments. 
The economic relationship is now being driven by market forces and not significantly 
directed by policy intervention (Drysdale, 2007) as the highly complementary industrial 
structures and proximity of both countries drive the growth in trade. And the politics 
affect the economic relationship in some areas more than others, as some Japanese 
companies feel they are global brands that can de-link themselves from their country of 
origin (Armstrong, 2007a; Electronics informant 1). However, the Chinese economy, 
especially after WTO accession, is much more of a level playing field for companies 
from Japan, the United States and Europe and Japan's advantage of being in China early 
(see Chapter 4) is diminishing rapidly. The evidence of Japanese net cooperation 
affecting Japanese exports to China after 1998 shows that it is important for Japanese 
actors in the Chinese economy not to have to carry Japanese political baggage in 
competing with others in that market (Armstrong, 2007a). The interaction between 
politics and trade would appear to be more pronounced in the later period analysed. 
Since this period saw rapid economic growth it can be concluded that it caused an 
improvement in political distance. 
As the bilateral economic relationship between the two countries becomes even more 
important than it already is, its effect on the politics between the two countries is likely 
to grow. The period since late 2006 has seen political tensions ease with visits by both 
leaders to the other country and efforts from both governments to resolve some 
important issues. Significant examples include the joint experts commission set up to 
agree on disputed interpretations of history and an agreement to pursue jointly, and 
eventually commit to, a bilateral trade agreement (free trade agreement or a broader 
economic partnership agreement). 
93 Here and at other times the measured events which cover all news items are used as a proxy for 
sentiment. 
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It is possible that when significant negative events are reported and political distance is 
seen to be widening, there are some actors in each country that would try and cancel 
these out with positive events. For example, the Chinese and Japanese governments 
have created second track dialogue forums (the Beijing Tokyo Forum, for example) and 
increased grass roots exchanges. The period of rising tensions from 2001 (see Figure 4.3 
on p. 99, in Chapter 4) also saw positive cooperation events increase from China's 
WTO entry). The net effect was that the news and closer economic ties from China's 
WTO entry cancelled out the negative political news. 
Further work 
Economic relationships between countries involve a lot more than just trade in goods. 
An obvious next step would be to undertake a similar systematic study that included 
services trade. Chapter 4 has already shown that a narrowing of political distance 
increased FDI from Japan to China but the analysis was limited to annual data and uni-
directional. 
Another extension of the analysis would be to take account of multilateral, or third party, 
effects of political distance and trade. It is not difficult to see why the influence of the 
United States could have an effect on Japan-China trade, or to see that as the political 
distance between Japan and China increases, trade through Hong Kong or other 
countries will increase. 
The results show evidence of nonlinear Granger causality and an obvious extension is to 
find the shape and nature of this non-linearity. The methodology of Baek and Brock 
(1992) is limited to finding evidence of nonlinear causality only, not whether the 
causality has a positive or negative effect and where these turning points may be. 
Quadratic and other shaped functional forms could be tested in future to see whether 
trade interacts differently to low intensity conflict and higher intensity conflict. The 
effects of volatility in the political relationship on the trade relationship are also of 
interest. The structure of the nonlinear relationships is potentially important in 
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understanding the dynamics of the relationships between trade and politics and politics 
and trade. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to test whether there is any relationship between trade 
and political distance, and the direction of its causality in the Japan-China relationship. 
The interactions of both countries with the United States were analysed by way of 
comparison. The study uses the latest events data available (up to 2004), and monthly 
data and extends the analysis from testing the null hypothesis that there is no linear 
Granger causality by testing the null hypothesis of no nonlinear Granger causality. 
The main results are that a narrowing of political distance helps explain an increase in 
Japanese exports to China; in the 1990-1997 period; growth in Japan's importance to 
China increases Japanese cooperation towards China; and in the 1998-2004 period an 
increase in Japanese cooperation towards China helps explain an increase in Japanese 
exports to China. Chinese imports of Japanese products do not appear to be independent 
of how well the countries are getting along. 
Growing Chinese exports to Japan and the United States are causing a rise in the 
measure of negative sentiment towards China, but the growth of Japanese trade to China 
dampens this effect. The large imbalance in the trade relationship between China and 
the United States is causing tensions to rise in the United States from increased trade in 
both directions. 
The stable and rapidly growing economic relationship, of which trade flows are a big 
part, constrain political behaviour between China and Japan. The rising interdependence 
between the nations and concomitant opportunity cost of serious conflict has led to an 
easing of political tensions and even some narrowing of political distance. The structure 
of the political relationship appears likely, from this analysis, to be increasingly affected 
by the economic relationship. 
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8 Conclusion 
This study set out to answer the question of how international institutions and the 
political relationship between Japan and China have affected the trade between the two 
countries and FDI from Japan to China. To address this question, a framework was 
developed for measuring the impacts of all factors on trade and investment, with 
particular focus on factors such as changes in the political relationship, on trade and FDI. 
The methods developed allow assessment of all bilateral relations to benchmark trade 
between Japan and China, and FDI from Japan to China. 
In bringing together the conclusions of the study, this chapter summarises the 
contributions made to the analysis of trade and FDI; the contribution to understanding 
the China-Japan economic relationship; and the significance of the findings for 
international economic relations more generally. It then concludes with discussion of the 
potential areas for further research before concluding by answering the questions posed 
in Chapter 1. 
Contributions to the analysis of trade and foreign direct investment 
In Chapter 2, a framework that extended existing trade and FDI models was developed. 
The framework allowed separation of the core determinants of trade from re si stances to 
trade. The same framework was then applied to modelling FDI in Chapter 4. The 
separation of resistances from the core determinants, and the measurement of those 
resistances were conducted by applying stochastic frontier analysis to a gravity model of 
trade as well as an FDI model. FDI and trade are closely linked and have the same core 
determinants so Chapter 2 introduced consistency in variable choice for estimating 
frontiers in stochastic frontier analysis for both the FDI and trade models in order to 
measure unobservable resistances. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, a measure of both potential trade and FDI was made possible. This 
measure was based on the characteristics of the most liberal and free flowing trade and 
investment relationships worldwide. In these chapters, the world trade and world FDI 
frontiers were constructed using models of trade and FDI. These had consistent 
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theoretical underpinnings, derived from firm behaviour. Potential bilateral trade and FDI 
values were calculated from the frontiers given the characteristics of countries. 
The determinants used in estimatingtrade and FDI frontiers are scale, geographic 
distance, multilateral resistance and relative factor endowments. All resistances other 
than geographic resistances are measured by the difference between an actual trade or 
FDI flow and its predicted value. The frontier estimation therefore involved two stages: 
one to estimate trade and FDI performance and one to explain it. 
The results of the frontier analyses produced the expected results and showed small 
open economies, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, face the least resistances to trade 
and inward FDI. They also showed the changes over time to trade and FDI performance 
to be consistent with a priori expectations. 
Explaining, after estimating, the performance of trade and FDI confirmed some 
established findings in the trade and FDI literature. The results showed that language 
similarity, APEC membership and RTA membership helped reduce bilateral resistances 
and achieve higher trade and FDI in relation to potential. R T As, unlike APEC, show 
signs of trade diversion as might be expected, because of their preferential nature. Also, 
tariffs were confim1ed to be a significant resistance to trade but not FDI, as they are 
trade barriers that affect different kinds of FDI in different ways. 
Similarly, China's WTO membership appeared to have a large and significant effect on 
trade but not on FDI. One possible reason could be the lack of FDI source countries in 
the sample, as discussed in Chapter 4. An index of economic freedom, which is included 
not only to reflect economic freedom but also because it is a measure of country risk 
(negatively correlated), shows that those countries with higher domestic economic 
freedom face fewer resistances to imports, exports and FDI inflows. 
Another contribution to the analysis and explanation of FDI was the inclusion of a 
political distance variable. It was found that an improvement in political relations 
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increases FDI, with a time Jag of a year, or potentially even in that same year. This result 
was robust to a standard FDI model without a frontier. However, the inclusion of the 
variable in the trade frontier model did not produce such strong results. That required 
further detailed examination in a later chapter. 
In this study, the application of stochastic frontier analysis to modelling FDI was an 
innovation that helped bring together two related strands of FDI literature. The 
application of a trade frontier, while not new, was completed to a greater depth than has 
been attempted previously. This was done by the careful choice of variables for 
estimating and then explaining trade performance, and was thus made consistent with 
the standard theoretically derived gravity model. The consistency with which the 
separation of core determinates and resistances was made, as well as the application of 
the stochastic frontier to both the models, adds value to the analysis of trade and FDI. 
On the contribution to understanding the China-Japan relationship 
The study produced a number of findings that contribute to a greater understanding of 
the China-Japan relationship. Trade performance results from the empirical analysis 
showed that Japanese trade with China generally performed above the world average 
between 1980 and 1990 and consistently above world average trade performance from 
1990 to 2006. In 2006, Japanese trade to China was achieving 42 per cent of its potential 
while trade from China to Japan was achieving 44 per cent of its potential. This 
compares to the world average of 28 per cent at this time. 
Since 1986, on average, Japan-China trade both ways has faced less resistance than 
Japanese imports from elsewhere, and less than Japanese exports elsewhere, on average, 
since the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98. Similarly, since 1989, on average, the 
bilateral trade also faced less resistance than Chinese imports. These results were found 
taking into account the proximity of the countries, their economic scale, their relative 
economic structures (through factor endowments) and multilateral resistances. 
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The reason trade between Japan and China grew so rapidly was because of their 
proximity, the rapid growth of China's economy and their complementary economic 
structures. The addition of a frontier to the gravity model allowed the conclusion that the 
rapid growth in trade was also due to the fall in resistances to trade within and between 
the two countries over time. This is a result of the continuous liberalisation and opening 
up of the Chinese economy as well as improvements in 'trade technologies' (reduced 
information costs, transport costs, better trade facilitation and lower behind the border 
barriers to trade) for both countries above and beyond what other economies achieved. 
Risk averse Japanese MNEs did not really start to enter China (by way of direct 
investment) until China began negotiations to join the GATT in 1986. That year saw a 
policy shift which opened many doors for foreign firms to enter and operate in China. 
While regulations were still relatively stringent and the degrees of freedom of foreign 
firms still low, 1986 brought a large increase of FDI from Japan. Confidence in doing 
business with the Chinese economy grew, with both uncertainty and fears of a 
boomerang effect falling. The risks seen in investing in China by Japanese firms and 
having Chinese partners appropriate their technology and compete in production in their 
home and other markets (the boomerang effect) became dominated by the positive 
market potential and economic fundamentals. American and German MNEs, by 
comparison, did not achieve the level of FDI that Japan was achieving until the mid 
1990s. 
Japanese FDI in China was high from !986 until the Asian financial crisis in !997/98, 
which included Chinese domestic political turbulence in 1989. Over this period, 
Japanese FDI faced less resistance in China than that from any other major investing 
source and, despite a downturn at the end of the century, since WTO entry has bounced 
back from the post Asian financial crisis slump to the level predicted by the average 
perfonnance worldwide after accounting for the determinants ofFDI. 
Multilateral resistances are accounted for implicitly in the trade frontier model, as is 
commonly the case in the literature for practical reasons. Multilateral resistances are 
explicitly included in the FDI frontier model and were shown to be important in 
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explaining FDL The inclusion of multilateral resistances nested the analysis of the 
Japan~China bilateral economic relationship in a multi-country, multi-factor world. This 
is because bilateral trade and FDI from Japan to China cannot be accurately explained in 
isolation from the impacts of the rest of the world. The production networks and 
economic interdependence within and beyond the East Asian region mean that not only 
are trade and FDI linked but they are linked in complex networks among many countries. 
Japan and China both play a large and significant role in these production networks and 
their bilateral relationship drives, and at the same time, is greatly supported by, the 
regional interdependence. 
After normalisation of relations between Japan and China in 1972, their economic 
relationship took off properly in 1979 with the signing of the L TT A. Since then, among 
the significant economic developments were the signing of a BIT and China's accession 
to the WTO. Alongside these major developments there was also variation in political 
distance. Generally, there has been no significant period in which the two countries have 
enjoyed a close political relationship. These trends and circumstances affect economic 
distance. 
On the question of the effect of political relations on the trade and FDI relationships, the 
study has reached a number of conclusions that contribute to understanding the complex 
interaction between economic and political relations. A measure of political distance did 
not have a strong or obvious effect on trade when analysed using an annual panel data 
set for world trade flows (Chapter 3). More detailed analysis, and a close look at the 
literature on the interaction between politics and trade in Chapter 6, revealed that the 
effect was not picked up in the earlier simple analysis because of the unclear direction of 
causality (even with lagged variables) and the varying lagged effects of politics affecting 
trade and trade affecting politics. 
Using the Granger causality method it was found that for the cases of Japan-China, 
China-United States and Japan-United States, there was a complex relationship between 
political distance and trade. For the case of Japan and China, with some caveats, an 
increase in trade caused political relations to improve. 
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The complexities in these relationships can be highlighted through a number of 
examples. The effects of political difficulties between Japan and China during the 
period 2001 to 2006 were swamped by the positives from (including the positive news 
ot) China's membership to the WTO in 200 I. Similarly, while the increasing Chinese 
imports caused negative sentiment in Japan towards China to rise, this was alleviated by 
China's growing economic dependence on Japan. 
Evidence of politics affecting investment flows was found in a cross country analysis of 
world FDI in Chapter 4 for both a lagged political distance effect and political distance 
in the same year. The relationship was a robust one, and showed improving political 
relations increased FDI. A worsening of political relations quite clearly led to an 
increase in perceived country risk, which reduced FDI across the entire sample. This 
result suggests the evidence and the effect of political distance appear to be stronger on 
FD I than they are on trade. This result is to be expected as FDI requires presence in the 
partner country with a commitment that brings with it capital and labour from both 
countries. It is apparent that FDI is more sensitive to bilateral political relations than 
arms-length trade is. 
While there is clear evidence of political distance affecting trade (Chapters 3 and 7) and 
FDI (Chapter 4), measured alongside other determinants and resistances, the effect of 
political distance was marginal. Political distance, however it is measured, did not affect 
performance of trade or FDI by any significant amount. This is made clear in the 
analysis, with the estimated resistances being low during times of political turbulence. 
The stable and rapidly growing economic relationship, of which trade and FDI are a big 
part, constrains political behaviour between China and Japan. The rising 
interdependence between the two nations and the concomitant opportunity cost of 
serious conflict has led to an easing of political tensions and even some narrowing of 
political distance. The structure of the political relationship appears likely, from this 
analysis, to be increasingly affected by the economic relationship. 
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Bilateral political tensions have not derailed the economic relationship between Japan 
and China since normalisation of relations in 1972, but instead the economic 
relationship has at times helped shape the political relationship and to prevent political 
tensions from intensifying. Tensions did not derail relations because ofthe commitment 
China made to opening up its economy and to entering the global trading system, which 
underpinned the economic relationship and gave both sides confidence in engaging 
commercially with the other. 
China's commitment to the global trading system through rapid trade liberalisations in 
the 1990s was aimed at accession to the GATT, and later the WTO. That commitment 
placed constraints on Chinese policy makers and was a deliberate step by the leaders of 
Chinese reform to deepen pro-market reforms and the opening up of the Chinese 
economy. These constraints, and rapid opening up of the economy, meant state 
influence on domestic and foreign companies waned and the effect of political distance 
on trade and FDI fell substantially. In this context, Japanese FDI has performed well 
since 1986 and trade has performed well since 1980. Chapter 5 detailed the significance 
of China's WTO accession and what that commitment meant for increasing confidence 
in Japanese (and other) firms engaging China as well as for Chinese access to Japanese 
and other markets. 
This commitment by China has allowed more confident Japanese and Chinese economic 
engagement based on the proximity of the two countries and their complementary 
economic structures in a way that that has insulated against the vagaries of political 
distance. 
Chapter 6 detailed the growing economic interdependence of the East Asian region, with 
the development of complex production networks in which Japan and China are 
important participants. The electronics and automobile sectors are drivers of these 
regional interdependencies, which have nested the Japan-China bilateral economic 
relationship in a broader regional setting. The experience of Japanese auto and 
electronics firms in China gives insights into the effect of political distance on firms and 
how they have overcome it. Their operations show that market forces and economic 
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fundamentals have dominated political distance in their business activities in China. The 
analysis of these sectors confirmed results from Chapters 3 and 4, which showed that 
while political distance mattered alongside other factors, it did not dominate. 
The significance of the findings for other bilateral relations 
A number of the conclusions in the study are specific to the bilateral relationship of 
Japan and China, and specific to that period of time since normalisation. There are, 
however, conclusions and implications that potentially contribute to the thinking about 
other economic relationships, both bilateral and otherwise, beyond the empirical tools 
developed here. 
The commitment to the global trading system, given momentum and a base from the 
accession process to the GATT/WTO, was not only a story of China's agreeing to put 
constraints on itself in the march towards market oriented reform and for the 
international economic community to gain market access to China. It provided the basis 
upon which economic engagement could occur with confidence, despite other negative 
tensions. The Japan-China trade relationship is a good example in relation to political 
distance and economic relations. Other bilateral relationships that involve political 
tensions because of unresolved historical issues, territorial disputes and other such 
political problems, will be less constrained by the politics ifthere is common 
commitment to global institutional arrangements, as there is in the case of Japan and 
China. 
The study has also produced a rich set of results relating to the trade and FDI 
performances of other countries. The results reveal the importance of economic distance 
in analysis of trade and FDI that is very different from geographic distance. Gravity 
models and FDI models often use geographic distance and only some resistance 
measures to account for economic distance. The results in this study show that there is a 
significant difference between these two measures. That difference means that all the 
unaccounted resistances are reflected in the usual residual term which, if measured 
properly as in this study, do not average out to be zero. The consensus in the literature 
198 
that most resistances cannot be observed is confirmed in this study and reflected in the 
low proportion of total resistances that is explained by readily measurable resistances (a 
low r-squared value). 
Limitations of the study and further research 
The r-squared values in the second stage analyses of explaining trade and FDI 
performance were low, meaning the resistance variables included in the empirical 
explanation only explained a small proportion of the variation. Although this result was 
expected, as most resistances to trade and FDI are unobservable or difficult to measure 
and quantifY, there is scope for further analysis of the composition of resistances and 
other policy measures in examining trade performance. 
The existence of potential multicollinearity in resistance variables limited the number of 
variables used. Non-parametric methods such as principal component analysis could 
potentially explain more of the variation in trade and FDI performance with the ability 
to differentiate uncorrelated variables (as principal components) from a set of correlated 
variables. Variables such as economic freedom could be included with risk measures 
that would otherwise be negatively correlated to a high degree. 
Trade and FDI were analysed separately in this study, as is done widely, even though 
they are closely related. Although trade is implicit in the FDI model, the simultaneous 
analysis of trade and FDI, and the impact of institutions and political distance on both, is 
a natural and potentially fruitful extension of this study. Some forms of FDI increase 
trade while others act as a substitute and reduce trade. Models exist that examine trade 
and FDI together and the inclusion of political distance and institutional measures into 
these may add to some of the findings of this study. 
The limitations for the analysis of the complex interaction between political distance 
and trade were set out in Chapter 6. The conclusions from that analysis have limited 
implications for other bilateral relationships, as the literature and the results show they 
are bilateral relationship specific. Regarding the complex link between political distance 
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and the broader economic relationship, the empirical analyses conducted for the 
interaction of political distance and FDI were limited to finding the effect of political 
distance on FDI and not causality the other way. The examination of such an important 
link is of interest not only to how Japanese FDI affects the political relationship between 
Japan and China but also other bilateral investment relationships. The foreign presence 
in a country that FDI requires sometimes has a significant effect on that country's 
politics, policies and perceptions. Some inferences were made in Chapter 6 based on 
anecdotal evidence but further study of this would be of interest. This subject was 
precluded from the present study. 
Summary of findings 
The study has shown that the bilateral relationship between Japan and China is 
underpinned by the large and significant economic relationship. The scale and 
significance of the economic relationship is due to the proximity of the two countries, 
their scales, complementarity in economic structures and integration of both into the 
East Asia region. 
One of the main aims of the study was to examine the interaction of political 
sensitivities and the development of the economic relationship, and how institutions 
influenced this relationship. While the vagaries of political distance have an effect on 
trade and FDI at the margins, the other factors of geographic distance, complementarity, 
scale and multilateral factors are dominant in the explanation of trade and FDI. 
The political distance did not significantly affect the economic relationship because of 
China's commitment to the global trading system. This was done through unilateral 
trade liberalisation and reforms aimed at opening up its market throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, culminating in WTO entry in 200 I. Such underlying commitment to GATT, 
and later WTO entry, not only helped to insulate against the political tensions, but 
allowed the economic relationship to constrain and shape the political relationship. 
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Appendix 1 
Interviews 
The extensive interviews conducted for this study were all undertaken under the 
condition of anonymity and the identities of those interviewed are, therefore, protected 
here. Interview subjects are described here in as much detail as necessary and include 3 
Japanese automobile MNEs and 4 electronics MNEs with extensive operations in China. 
Interview subjects are referred to as 'Automobile informant', for example, as anonymity 
is important, and by institution, such as 'JMOFA representative', when it can be 
identified, as described below. Interviewees include goverrunent officials in both Japan 
and China (from numerous ministries), academics, MNE managers and elements of the 
Japanese business lobby. The interviewees are referred to throughout the study using 
only the italicised names listed. (JCIPO representative), for example, refers to the 
representative from the Japan-China Investment Promotion Organisation. 
The list of 19 interviewees in this study is in random order as follows: 
JMOFA official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, official 
JCEA official, Japan-China Economic Association, official 
JCIPO representative, Japan-China Investment Promotion Organisation, Tokyo 
Automobile informant 1 
Automobile informant 2 
Automobile iriformant 3 
Electronics informant 1 
Electronics informant 2 
Electronics iriformant 3 
Electronics informant 4 
Keidanren official, Japanese Business Group, Japan 
MOFCOM official, Ministry of Commerce, China 
MET! official1, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan 
MET1 official 2, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan 
Cabinet Office official, Cabinet Office, Japan 
Cabinet and MOFA official, Cabinet Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 
official 
Japanese SME 1, small and medium size enterprise business manager 
Japanese SME 2 
CMOFA official, Chinese Ministry ofF oreign Affairs, official 
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Appendix 3 
A. Alternate specifications 
Table 3A.l Alternative specifications for frontier gravity model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Frontier Frontier 
OLS Frontier absolute t-varying base model dist country pair 
w absolute dist 
Constant -33.3T" -18.49"' -13.35"' -7.96"' 
(0.2303) (0.1423) (0.1573) (0.356) 
lnGDP,, 0.99"' 0.70"' 0.73"' 0.57"' 
(0.0066) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.00997) 
lnGDP;, 1.00"' 0.78"' 0.71"' 0.6T" 
(0.0061) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.00969) 
rDistii -3.59''' -2.28"' -0.58'" -0.586"' 
(0.0486) (0.0278) (0.0092) (0.0205) 
Comp;;, 2.48"' 2.1 0'" 2.16'" 1.52"' 
(0.0265) (0.0210) (0.0200) (0.0305) 
Border;; 0.92'" 0.98'" 0.53'" 0.63'" 
(0.0669) (0.0403) (0.0414) (0.0997) 
s1gma- 53.11"' 38.74'" 
squared 11.04 52.04"' 
(0.298) (0.2709) (0.941) 
Gamma 0.976"' 0.98'" 0.85'" 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0039) 
Mu -14.26 -14.41 -11.48 
(0.0997) (0.0995) (0.239) 
Eta 0.025 
(0.0004) 
log likelihood 
function -244612 -212727 -212670 -220481 
observations 93382 93382 93382 93382 
Standard errors in parentheses.' p < 0.05, •• p < 0.01, ... p < 0.001 
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Likelihood ratio tests, to determine the specification of the model, were performed to 
determine the appropriateness of the methodology for the data and the statistical 
distribution of the non-negative residual. 
The first test for y = 0 (the alternative is is y > 0) was used to test whether a one-sided 
error is appropriate for the data. Gamma is the proportion of total variation that is 
explained by variation in the non-negative disturbance and is given by 
where ,i vis the variance ofvij and a2u is the variance ofuij. The results in Table 3.2 (p. 
63) confirm y is significantly different from zero and suggest between 87 per cent and 
89 per cent of the total variation is coming from the non-negative term that captures the 
influence of unobservable and manmade constraints on trade. The Uij term measures the 
distance of individual countries/regions from the frontier. For more details, see 
Kalirajan and Singh (2008). 
The second null hypothesis, 1-1 = 0 (alternative is 1-1 i 0 ), tests whether the restricted 
folded normal distribution is preferred to unrestricted truncated normal distribution. 
This null is also rejected indicating a truncated normal distribution fits the non-negative 
error term better than a half normal distribution. This does not impact on the relative 
sizes of the trade efficiencies greatly but changes the absolute values. It is not the 
absolute distance of trade performance to the frontier that is important but the distance 
relative to other trade f1ows from the frontier. 
The likelihood ratio test statistics are given by 
LR = -2[lnL(restricted)-InL(unrestricted)] 
with a mixed x2 distribution, reported in Table 1 ofKodde and Palm (1986). Table 3A.2 
shows the results of the statistical tests for the last period only as all periods reach the 
san1e conclusion. 
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Table 3A.2 Specification tests 
Null 2002-04 Critical mixed- Decision Conclusion 
Hypothesis l statistic x2 value at 0.0 I 
y=O 63,770 8.273 Reject null The composite error 
specification is 
appropriate. 
f.l=O 24,590 6.635 Reject null The truncated normal 
distribution fits the 
data better than the 
special half normal 
distribution. 
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B. Export and import trade performance results, average over 1980-2006 
Table 3B Export and import trade performance results, average over 1980-
2006 
Country Exports Iml'orts Country Exl'orts Iml'orts 
Argentina 0.31 0.23 Malta 0.21 0.33 
Australia 0.34 0.33 Mauritius 0.19 0.32 
Austria 0.26 0.29 Mexico 0.25 0.26 
Bangladesh 0.16 0.22 Netherlands 0.38 0.41 
Belgium-Lux 0.36 0.42 New Zealand 0.35 0.33 
Brazil 0.34 0.26 Nicaragua 0.24 0.23 
Bulgaria 0.25 0.29 Nigeria 0.33 0.27 
Canada 0.30 0.34 Norway 0.33 0.27 
Chile 0.36 0.31 Pakistan 0.19 0.26 
China 0.35 0.29 Panama 0.44 0.26 
Colombia 0.28 0.25 Paraguay 0.20 0.26 
Costa Rica 0.30 0.29 Peru 0.27 0.27 
Cyprus 0.21 0.31 Philippines 0.28 0.31 
Denmark 0.31 0.29 Poland 0.27 0.27 
Ecuador 0.35 0.25 Portugal 0.23 0.32 
Egypt 0.22 0.28 Russia 0.32 0.18 
Finland 0.30 0.29 Singapore 0.46 0.49 
France 0.32 0.31 Slovakia 0.24 0.37 
Germany 0.38 0.36 South Africa 0.27 0.28 
Ghana 0.26 0.29 South Korea 0.38 0.37 
Greece 0.16 0.24 Spain 0.28 0.33 
Honduras 0.26 0.24 Sri Lanka 0.24 0.32 
Hong Kong 0.42 0.39 Sweden 0.35 0.31 
Hungary 0.27 0.29 Switzerland 0.35 0.29 
India 0.23 0.23 Taiwan 0.47 0.43 
Indonesia 0.37 0.28 Thailand 0.35 0.38 
Ireland 0.34 0.31 Turkey 0.19 0.27 
Israel 0.29 0.30 United Kingdom 0.38 0.37 
Italy 0.33 0.32 United States 0.36 0.36 
Jamaica 0.20 0.31 Uruguay 0.29 0.27 
Japan 0.37 0.26 Venezuela 0.29 0.24 
Jordan 0.19 0.33 Vietnam 0.30 0.24 
Malaysia 0.43 0.39 Average 0.30 0.30 
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C. Testing for changes in world trade technologies over time 
Table 3C World trade frontier results for 1980-1993 and 1994-2006 
(I) (2) (3) (4) 
Two stage Two stage 
1980-93 1994-06 Simultaneous separate 
Constant -17.10'" -20.1 6'" -14.90"' -20.39'" 
(0.2537) (0. 1482) (0.1329) (0.1 552) 
lnGDP;1 0.66"' 0.76"' 0.65'" 0.74'" 
(0.0075) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0049) 
lnGDPjt 0.78"' 0.77'" 0.68"' 0.80'" 
(0.0064) (0.0043) (0.0035) (0.0039) 
rDistij -2.25"' -2.25 ... -2.27'" -2.28"' 
(0.0499) (0.0281) (0.0269) (0.0444) 
Compijt 2.16"' 2.08'" 2.01'" 2.06"' 
(0.0362) (0.01 93) (0.021) (0.0331) 
Borderij 0.93"' 1.05 ... I. 1 0"' 0.98"' 
(0.0729) (0.04 1 6) (0.0358) (0.0373) 
sigma-squared 69.42'" 42.69"' 103.88"' 49.0!'" 
(0.6809) (0.3999) (0.8568) (0.3795) 
Gamma 0.97'" 0.99"' 0.989 0.98'" 
(0.0005) (0.0003) 
Mu -16.42 -12.98 -13.85 
log likelihood 
function -98251 -110954 -184491 -211240 
Number of 
observations 40411 52971 85172 93382 
Standard errors in parentheses. 'p < 0.05, "p < 0.01, "' p < 0.001 
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Appendix 4 
A. Data annex 
Capital stock 
Following Leamer (1984) and common practice (see Dee, 2007 and Baltagi et al. 2007) 
the capital stock is calculated using the perpetual inventory method. This is calculated 
using gross fixed capital formation, K, at time t with the formula K, = 2L:t+2,.2 I, , where I 
is investment with t sufficiently less than 1982, the period under study. 
FDI destination (or host) economies 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Belize, Benin, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macau, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
UAE, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA. 
Political distance data 
The measure of political distance is from conflict! cooperation data from King's (2003) 
dataset of Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) which is an extension and 
refinement of the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) data set. There are more 
categories of conflict and cooperation in IDEA than in WEIS or the Conflict and Peace 
Data Bank (COPDAB). Monthly bilateral conflict and cooperation variables for Japan-
China, Japan-United States and United States-China were extracted for the period 1990-
2004. A net cooperation variable constructed by differencing conflict from cooperation 
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and results below show that this practice, which is common in the literature, places too 
much of a restriction on the data, when compared to results of analysing conflict and 
cooperation separately. 
Cooperation is represented by positive political or non-political events in a relationship, 
generally from one country towards another. A report of' Japan increasing overseas 
development aid (ODA) to China' would be a cooperative event from Japan towards 
China. Conflict is represented by a negative political or non-political event, such as 
'nation-wide protests in China against Japanese interests' or 'Japanese Prime Minister's 
visit to Yasukuni Shrine angers China'. For the net cooperation variable, a value of zero 
means no event or the weighted positive event (cooperation) has cancelled out the 
equally weighted negative event (conflict). 
The events are machine coded from Reuters Business Briefs using Virtual Research 
Associates (VRA) software and the results are shown to be more accurate and consistent 
than high skill human coders (King and Lowe, 2003). The events covered report most 
actions from one country towards another, including such events categorised as 
comment, consult, approve, promise, grant, reward, agree, request, propose, reject, 
accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten and demonstrate. All events are given 
weights consistent with Goldstein (1992) to capture severity and extended from WEIS. 
Net cooperation is used in this study. The assumption here is that a positive event will to 
some extent cancel out, or have the opposite effect on, a negative effect. The variables 
are analysed separately to confirm the importance of a net measure. Net conflict 
(conflict minus cooperation as opposed to the other way around) is used in other studies 
(Polachek, 1980; Pollins 1989a). 
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B. Model specification tests 
Likelihood ratio tests, to determine the specification of the model, were performed to 
determine the appropriateness of the methodology for the data and the statistical 
distribution of the non-negative residual. 
The first test for y = 0 (the alternative is is y > 0) is to test whether a one-sided error is 
appropriate for the data. Gamma is the proportion of total variation that is explained by 
variation in the non-negative disturbance and is given by 
where c/ v is the variance of vu and cr2 u is the variance of Uij. The results in Table 4B.l 
confirm y is significantly different from zero and Table 4.2 (p. 86) suggest 90 per cent of 
the total variation is coming from the non-negative term that captures the influence of 
unobservable and manmade constraints on trade. The Uij term measures the distance of 
individual countries/regions from the frontier. For more details, see Kalirajan and Singh 
(2008). 
The second null hypothesis, ~l = 0 (alternative is J.l f. 0 ), tests whether the restricted 
folded normal distribution is preferred to unrestricted truncated normal distribution. 
This null is also rejected indicating a truncated normal distribution fits the non-negative 
error term better than a half normal distribution. This does not impact on the relative 
sizes of the trade efficiencies greatly but changes the absolute values. It is not the 
absolute distance of trade performance to the frontier that is important but the distance 
relative to other trade flows from the frontier. 
The likelihood ratio test statistics are given by 
LR = -2 [1nL( restri cted)-lnL( unrestricted)] 
with a mixed l distribution reported in Table I ofKodde and Palm (1986). Table 4B.l 
shows the results of the statistical tests for the last period only as all periods reach the 
same conclusion. 
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Table 4B.l Specification tests 
Null 
Hypothesis 
y=O 
f.l=O 
l statistic Critical mixed- Decision 
l value at 0.0 I 
202 5.412 Reject null 
35 5.412 Reject null 
Conclusion 
The composite error 
specification is 
appropriate. 
The truncated normal 
distribution fits the data 
better than the special 
half normal distribution. 
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C. Specification sensitivity tests 
Table 4C.l Outward FDI stock with fixed and random effects 
Country specific effects Country pair effects 
(I) FE (2) RE (3) FE with Yd (4) RE with 3rd (5) FE (6) RE (7) FE with 3rd (8) RE with 3rd 
Log of distance -0.906'" -0.946''' -0.845"' -0.937"' -0.659'"' -0.624"'' 
(0.0496) (0.0492) (0.0509) (0.0497) (0.0958) (0.0983) 
Bilateral GDPs 2 361~*· 2.312"' 2.273h~ 2.394"" 2.133'" 1.764'" 3.063"'' 2.492"" 
(0.114) (0.0547) (0.116) (0. I 07) (0.223) (0.111) (0.245) (0.174) 
GDP similarity 4.428'" 4.132"' 3.989"' 3.972"' 5.024"' 5.485"" 4.635" 5.166"' 
(0.30 I) (0.280) (0.313) (0.300) (0.688) (0.558) (0.70 I) (0.575) 
Rei. capital ratio 3.329'" 2.364''' 3.669"' 2.185"" -2.319"' -0.550 -4.381'" -1.632'' 
(0.448) (0.377) (0.450) (0.425) (0.666) (0.559) (0.694) (0.573) 
Rei. human K ratio 0.183'" 0.129·"* 0.226'" 0.217"' 0.172"' -0.0887" 0.300m 0.0523 
(0.0312) (0.0300) (0.0319) (0.0317) (0.0355) (0.0299) (0.0384) (0.0337) 
Rei. labour ratio 0.0796 0.152*** 0.0290 0.0723 1.889"' 0.108 1.841*** 0.0695 
(0.0435) (0.0430) (0.0436) (0.0439) (0.134) (0.0612) (0.134) (0.0633) 
gamma -0.134"' -0.102"' -0.146~** -0.0959'" 0.0757" 0.0115 0.149'" 0.0489' 
(0.0155) (0.0131) (0.0 156) (0.0147) (0 0230) (0.0 193) (0.0241) (0.0 198) 
phi 0.204"' 025Q"u 0.187'" 0.223 ~** 0.0419 0.00122 0.0347 -0.000852 
(0.0358) (0.0356) (0.0355) (0.0356) (0.0346) (0.0337) (0.0341) (0.0334) 
heedom 0.598"' 0.58 j'" o.58o'" 0.581"" 0.320"' 0.429"' 0.304 ... 0.4JJuo 
(0.0286) (0.0282) (0.0286) (0.0288) (0 0257) (0.0250) (0.0253) (0.0247) 
fla 0.433'" 0.437"' 0.370'" 0.425"' 0.378"' 0.428"' 0.342*"* 0.40 j"' 
(0.0826) (0.0826) (0.0853) (0.0836) (0.0751) (0,0752) (0.0738) (0.0743) 
(continued on next page) 
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wg 0.160 0.0787 -0.0246 -0.0472 
(0.0939) (0.0753) (0.0471) (0.0403) 
WS -58.0(" -1.515 27.75" 23.42H* 
(14.37) (6.090) (9.307) (4.695) 
wk 1.324' -0.333 -0.130 0.0889 
(0.555) (0.482) (0.280) (0.267) 
wh -0.714 .. ~1.426U* -0.648*** -0.735'" 
(0.268) (0.182) (0.136) (0.124) 
wl 0.686"' 0.787*** 0.549"' 0.446'" 
(0.189) (0.132) (0.0902) (0.0801) 
wgamma -0.0180 0.0180 0.00831 0.00614 
(0.0228) (0.0190) (0.0114) (0.0107) 
wphi -0.164 -0.187 0.0437 0.0734 
(0.157) (0.109) (0.0765) (0.0708) 
\;.,·freedom 0.0701 -0.734' -0.165 -0.384' 
(0.381) (0.294) (0.184) (0.176) 
wfta 1.431 2.371 -0.390 -0.605 
(2.039) ( 1.304) (0.981) (0.828) 
constant -s9.zo*** -57.53'" -56.85'" -58.06"' -61.34'" -42.97"' -89.31"' -63.95'" 
(3.345) (1.619) (3.836) (3.578) (6.285) (3.200) (7.099) (5.221) 
N 4307 4307 4307 4307 4307 4307 4307 4307 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 5 percent level, I percent and 0.1 percent levels, respectively. RE~ random effects, FE~ fixed effects 
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Table 4C.2 Frontier model with truncated time periods 
(3) 
1982-94 1995-06 1982-2006 
lnDist -0.63*** -0.84*** -0.83*** 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.05) 
G 3.03*** I*** 2.35*** 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) 
s 4.31*** 5.01 *** 4.11*** 
(0.48) (0.37) (0.29) 
k 2.92*** 2.85*** 1.91 *** 
(0.81) (0.52) (0.35) 
h 0.22*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
0.42*** 0.26*** 0.42*** 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04) 
gamma -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.09*** 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
phi 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.2*** 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03) 
FTA 
-0.31 *** 0.04 0.48*** 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) 
wG 48.16*** -9.44*** 0.07* 
( 1.66) (1.39) (0.04) 
wS 1.16*** -6.74*** -2.52 
(0.36) (0.72) ( 1.6) 
wk -1.08*** -0.92*** 0.83*** 
(0.18) (0.2) (0.28) 
wh 1.73*** 0.58*** -1.21*** 
(0.28) (0.15) (0.12) 
wl -0.03*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.09) 
wgamma 0.2 -0.45*** -0.02** 
(0.17) (0.08) (0.0 I) 
wphi 0.72*** 03*** -0.12*** 
(0.17) (0.09) (0.05) 
wFTA -6.02*** 1.01 *** 1.41 *** 
(0.64) (0.59) (0.41) 
constant -76.22*** -14.4*** -54.3*** 
(1.01) (1.01) ( 1.25) 
sigma-squared 12.86*** 10.86*" 13.26 
(2.43) (1.33) (1.93) 
gamma 0.9*** 0.88*** 0.9 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
mu -6.81 -6.18 -6.92 
(2.16) ( 1.28) ( 1.58) 
Log likelihood fn -2822 -5313 -8295 
N 1510 2887 4307 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**and *** indicate significance at the 5 percent level, 1 percent and 
0.1 percent levels, respectively 
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D. Alternative specifications 
Another sensitivity test that was conducted is for the strict functional form assumption, 
taking the log of the sum of both GDPs. In the theoretical derivations ofMarkusen 
(2002), Carr et al. (2001) and Baltagi et al. (2007), there is a consensus that the sum of 
source and destination GDPs are a determinant of FDI but a log-linear form is taken in 
most models for ease of estimation. Table Al in Appendix A shows the result of 
sensitivity tests where GDP d and GDP; are included separately, and governance and 
corruption are substituted for economic freedom. The results show that relaxing the 
functional form of the GDP measures does not change the results significantly. This 
means that the ability to estimate the effects of host and source country GDPs (and, 
indeed, third country GDPs) separately could give more flexibility in estimating and 
explaining the determinants of FDI. 
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Table 4D.1 Sensitivity tests of different risk variables 
(I) (2) (3) 
w governance w corruption separate GDPs 
distance 
g 2.307'" 2.541"' 
(0.540) (0.240) 
s 1.382 3.003'" 0.138 
(1.490) (0.693) (0.801) 
k -7.493"' -4.177"' -3.507"' 
(1.739) (0.722) (0.702) 
h 0.115' 0.299*-* 0.334'" 
(0.0563) (0.0430) (0.0396) 
1.534'" 2.679"' 2.014*** 
(0.198) (0.150) (0.136) 
gamma 0.254"' 0.143"' 0.119'** 
(0.0615) (0.0250) (0.0243) 
phi -0.0434 0.0372 0.0439 
(0.0425) (0.0341) (0.0341) 
govern 0.603'" 
(0.120) 
wg 0.381 -0.0106 
(0.343) (0.0501) 
ws -15.34 27.48" 26.71'" 
(15.59) (9.198) (8.079) 
wk 3.193" -0.510 0.407 
(1.203) (0.287) (0.327) 
wh 0.437 -0.505"' -0.456" 
(0.243) (0.145) (0.145) 
wl 0.524 0.449*** 0.602"' 
(0.338) (0.0970) (0.0944) 
wgamma -0.107' 0.0159 -0.0106 
(0.0457) (0.0119) (0.0120) 
wphi -0.848*** 0.129 -0.0120 
(0.209) (0.0819) (0.0811) 
wgovem 5.094"' 
( 1.356) 
!la -0.0456 0.228" 0.315"' 
(0.0939) (0.0762) (0.0740) 
wfta -2.210 -0.235 -2.173 
( 1.285) (0.927) (1.213) 
corrupt -0.0867"' 
(0.0165) 
wcorrupt -0.255 
(0.184) 
GDP source 2.205"' 
(0.624) 
GDP destination 1.298*** 
(0.116) 
freedom 0.311"' 
(0.0253) 
whost -2.27e-12' 
(9.22e-13) 
wfreedom 0.117 
(0.213) 
cons -68.83 ... -72.87'" M98.83"* 
(19.67) (6.969) ( 17.90) 
N 2697 4025 4307 
Standard errors are in parentheses.*,** and*** indicate significance at the 5 per cent, 1 per cent and 0.1 
per cent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4D.2 Sensitivity test of directional political distance on FDI for 
country specific fixed effects 
FDJ tlows FDI stocks 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 6) 
Source Destination Both Source Destination Both 
distance -0.533*** -0.536*** -0.536*** -0.794*** -0.798*** -0. 797*** 
(0.0819) (0.0815) (0.0816) (0.0723) (0.0721) (0.0722) 
g 1.690*** 1.570*** 1.612*** 1.447*** 1.363*** 1.397*** 
(0.185) (0.187) (0.186) (0.156) (0.158) (0.157) 
s 4.186*** 4.1 07*** 4.135*** 5.100*** 5.039*** 5.063*** 
(0.486) (0.484) (0.485) (0.410) (0.409) (0.409) 
k 3.000*** 2.781*** 2. 779*** 3.333*** 3.1 1 4*** 3.145*** 
(0.720) (0.716) (0.720) (0.575) (0.576) (0.577) 
h 0.188*** 0.195*** 0.193*** 0.294*** 0.297*** 0.297*** 
(0.0471) (0.0469) (0.0470) (0.0388) (0.0387) (0.0387) 
-0.0405 -0.0595 -0.0491 -0.0461 -0.0584 -0.0517 
(0.0617) (0.0615) (0.0615) (0.0547) (0.0546) (0.0546) 
gamma -0.113*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.135*** -0.127*** -0.129*** 
(0.0248) (0.0246) (0.0248) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0200) 
phi 0.0563 0.0625 0.0599 0.201 *** 0.205*** 0.203*** 
(0.0538) (0.0536) (0.0537) (0.0462) (0.0461) (0.0462) 
freedom 0.595*** 0.595*** 0.598*** 0.759*** 0.762*** 0.763*** 
(0.0455) (0.0451) (0.0453) (0.0400) (0.0397) (0.0398) 
wg 0.418 0.234 0.359 0.0868 -0.0186 0.0434 
(0.683) (0.687) (0.682) (0.639) (0.650) (0.642) 
ws -115.7*** -116.0*** -116.2*** -122.6*** -121.3*** -121.8*** 
(24.74) (24.69) (24.68) (22.87) (22.84) (22.82) 
wk 0.767 -0.129 0.102 4.427 4.399 4.155 
(3.182) (3.147) (3.224) (2.494) (2.551) (2.559) 
wh 1.101 1.011 1.075 -1.198** -1.223*' -1.194** 
(0. 700) (0.698) (0.699) (0.427) (0.426) (0.426) 
wl 0.504 0.427 0.466 0.209 0.132 0.176 
(0.429) (0.423) (0.426) (0.294) (0.289) (0.291) 
wgamma -0.0948 -0.0577 -0.0690 -0.234* -0.230' -0.223' 
(0.123) (0.124) (0.125) (0.0972) (0.101) (0.1 00) 
wphi -0.660 -0.705 -0.669 0.225 0.!91 0.206 
(0.516) (0.514) (0.515) (0.235) (0.238) (0.236) 
wfreedom 2.403 2.569 2.492 -1.60 I -1.403 -1.490 
( 1.678) ( 1.644) ( 1.662) ( 1.302) ( 1.290) ( 1.296) 
fta 0.458*** 0.484*** 0.470*** 0.312** 0.329'* 0.319" 
(0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) 
wfla 1.858 3.142 2.658 6.573 7.252 6.976 
(4.999) (4.992) (4.992) (3.885) (3.877) (3.879) 
politics 0.00531 **' 0 .. 00736*** 0.00333*** 0.00445*** 0.00642**' 0.00283*** 
(0.000798) (0.000942) (0.000447) (0.000724) (0.000890) (0.000412) . 
wpolitics 0.00907 0.0174 0.00653 0.0108 0.0!26 0.00653 
(0.0115) (0.0163) (0.00714) (0.00895) (0.0133) (0.00568) 
cons -48.90** -43.14* -46.07** -11.95 -8.273 -10.24 
-
( 17.25) ( 17.57) (17.24) ( 14.66) (14.79) ( 14.70) 
N 2026 2026 2026 2602 2602 2602 
Standard errors are in parentheses.*,** and*** indicate significance at the 5 per cent, 1 per cent and 0.1 
per cent levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 7 
A. Conflict data for Japan-China 
Table 7 A.l Conflict data from China towards Japan 
Month-> 
YearJ. Jan Feb Mar June Jul Oct Nov Dec 
1990 0 5 0 10.4 2.2 5.1 0 0 9.9 0 0 32.6 
1991 4 0.1 0 0 0 9.8 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 14 
1992 0 0 9.2 5 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0 14.4 
1993 0 11.1 9.3 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 20.5 
1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20.5 7.1 0 0 .27.6 
1995 8.8 0 17.7 4.9 0 2.2 0 4.9 8.7 0 9.3 0 56.5 
1996 4.9 0 0 6 0 2.2 12 12.3 36.2 7.4 0 6.7 87.7 
1997 0 4 0 2.3 9.1 12 0.1 9.3 8.5 0 0 0 45.3 
1998 0 0 0 0.1 5.2 17.2 0 5 2.3 8 10.3 0 48.1 
1999 0 0 0 0.1 2.3 0 3 0 0.1 0 4.9 0 10.4 
2000 5 3 4 6.2 2.2 0 0 2.2 0 0 6.4 29 
2001 0 9 3 21.2 7.6 9.4 4.9 0 4 8.2 80.5 
4.9 0 12.4 0 0 4.9 4 0 7 0 63 
0 0 4.9 0 0 0 14.2 8.8 4.9 0 0.1 44.1 
0 14.2 2.2 0 4.4 
Notes: 
• Shaded months indicate a Yasukuni Shrine visit by Prime Minister Koizumi. The first visit, in 2001, was proceeded by an announcement in 
May that year which got all the press. The visit itself was not reported so highly and did not cause as much negative news as in May, perhaps 
because Koizumi gave in to Chinese pressure in August and did not visit the shrine on the highly significant anniversary of the end of the war, 
15 August, but instead on l3 August. The visit in 2004 happened on New Year's day, when it is traditional for Japanese to visit shrines and 
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temples and this could be the reason it was not reported as a negative event. Indeed, there is much less news coverage of this visit than the 
others. 
• The largest conflict month is September 1996 with a score of36.2. This is when Japan, China and Taiwan all claimed ownership of uninhibited 
islands in the East China Sea, thought to have oil. From the International Herald Tribune: 'Japan's persistent moves to assert sovereignty over 
the islands, known as the Senkakus in Japanese and the Diaoyus in Chinese, have whipped up a storm of nationalist fervor by angering Chinese 
in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau- despite their political differences; but analysts say that the main reason Japan and China will 
continue to press their claims, even at the risk of confrontation, is that both countries want access to energy resources close to their shores.' 
I 
94 (September 17, 1996) . 
Table 7 A.2 Conflict data from Japan towards China 
Month-• 
Year.l. Jan Feb Mar April May 
1990 0.1 0 3 0 0.1 
1991 0.2 0 0 0 2.4 
1992 9.8 2.4 0 4.4 4.4 
1993 12.2 0 0 0 0 
1994 0 0 0.1 0 4.9 
1995 0 0 0 4 4.6 
1996 0 5.9 18.8 0 2.3 
1997 0 8.9 0 0 0 
1998 0 0 0 0 7.6 
1999 0.2 5 0 0 0 
2000 0 0 0.1 0 0 
2001 0 0 12.8 10.4 0 
2002 9 0 8.1 I 4 27.6 
2003 4.9 0 4 0 10.3 
2004 0 0 26.8 5 0 
June July AuQ Sept Oct 
0.1 8.8 0 0 14 
4.9 0 0 0 0 
2.4 4.4 14.4 0 0 
4.9 0 0 0 0 
0.1 2.2 4.9 4.1 15.5 
2.3 4.2 22.4 0.1 0 
6.3 4.6 0.1 8.3 1 
4.4 4.9 4 0 0 
9.3 0 0 0 0 
4.9 0.1 2.4 4 0 
0.1 0 9.3 0 14.8 
4.3 0 0 0 4.9 
0 16.3 0 2.3 0 
4.4 0 0 0 0 
0 2.2 0.3 0 0 
Total conflict from China towards Japan was 623 units and total conflict from Japan towards China was 530 units over the period. 
94 http://www.iht.com/articles/1996/09/17/isles.t_ 4.php 
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Noy Dec Total 
0 0 26.1 
0 0 7.5 
0 0 42.2 
0.1 0 17.2 
0 0 31.8 
0 6.6 44.2 
0 4.4 51.7 
4.9 9.2 36.3 
0 0 16.9 
0.1 0 16.7 
0 0 24.3 
8 12.5 52.9 
0 0 .67.3 
0 18.1 41.7 
4.8 14 53.1 
B. Nonlinear Granger causality 
There is recognition that linear Granger causality tests may only capture some of the 
causality relationship between two variables, depending on the nature of interactions 
between the two variables (Baek and Brock, 1992; Hiemstra and Jones, 1994; Hiemstra 
and Jones, 1994; Diks and Panchenko, 2006). The linear VAR causality tests strip out 
the linear causality and the non-parametric methods test whether the remaining V AR 
residuals have any remaining structural relationship. The methodology is predominantly 
used in finance literature, where futures prices, trading volumes and other time series 
show nonlinear causal relationships due to complex feedback and feed-forward loops, as 
well as the fact that they are mostly self regulating systems generally characterised by 
nonlinear processes (Fujihara and Mougoue, 1997). The appropriateness of the 
methodology for finding causal relationships in the complex nexus between cooperation 
and trade is discussed in Chapter 7. 
The test as first developed by Baek and Brock in 1992 was modified by Hiemstra and 
Jones in 1994, and the Hiemstra and Jones version of the test appears to be the most 
widely used since. Diks and Panchenko (2006) made some improvements on the test 
statistic after showing that the Hiemstra and Jones test statistic over-rejects the null 
hypothesis of 'no nonlinear Granger causality' with larger numbers of observations. The 
over-rejection is particularly important in most uses of the methodology, such as in daily 
financial data, where sample sizes are large, but would not appear to be a problem in 
monthly data over a period of 15 years as is the case here95• 
The following nonparametric methodology is based mainly on Hiemstra and Jones 
(1994). 
Using the two stationary time series of exports (Xi) and net cooperation (C,) where t = 1, 
2, ... n, let the m-length lead vector of X1 be designated x,m and denote the Lx-length 
and Le-length lag vectors ofXi and C, by X,1\x and C/"\c. 
95 Diks and Panchenko (2006) show the over-rejection becomes an issue when the number of observations 
is 1,000 and serious when the number starts to reach 10,000. This study has less than 200 observations. 
The relatively small sample size here means the Hiemstra and Jones test is appropriate. 
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For given values of m, Lx, Le 2: 1 and fore> 0, C does not strictly Granger cause X if: 
(7.3) 
Pr~lx,"'-x;'ll < eillx,~~x- X,ix~x 11 < e,IIC/:<1c - C,~1"' 11 <e) 
= Pr~IX,"'-x;ll < eillx::'1x- x;:'~xll <e) 
where Pr(.) denotes probability and 11-fl denotes maximum norm. 
Hiemstra and Jones (1994) explain the Baek and Brock (1992) formula: 
The first line in Equation 7.3 is the conditional probability that two arbitrary m-
length lead vectors of {Xi} are within a distance e of each other, given that the 
corresponding Lx-length Jag vectors of {Xi} and Le-length lag vectors of { C,} are 
within e of each other. In other words, it is the probability measure of 
rrx:" -x:"ll <e (the difference between the two vectors is less than a certain 
bandwidth, e), given the pair of Lx-histories of X differ by less than e and the 
pair of Le-histories of C also differ by less than e (Baek and Brock, 1992). 
The second line is the conditional probability that two arbitrary m-length lead vectors of 
{X1} are within e of each other given that their corresponding Lx-length lag vectors are 
within e of each other. 
From Baek and Brock ( 1992) the above equation can be explained: given an arbitrary 
bandwidth, e, Le lags of C does not incrementally help predict the next period's value of 
X given Lx lags of X. If Xi= G(Xi.fx, C1.Lc) for some deterministic continuous function G, 
then it is easy to see why the event 'C1•1c close to C,.1c' would help nonlinearly 
incrementally predict "Xi close to Xs''. How 'close' one vector is to another is defined by 
e. 
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To test Equation 7.3 we can rewrite the conditional probabilities in Equation 3 as 
corresponding ratios of joint probabilities using the law of total probability: 
(7.4) 
Pr~IX ;" - x;" 11 < e, IIX :~~' - x;:'Lx 11 < e, lie,~', , - c;"_,,.ll < e) 
Pr 1x:~~~- x::'lxll < e,llc::~,- c;~~~~~ < e 
Prfllx"' -X"'II<e,llx's -X':' ll<e) ~ 1 .1 tl.x .\Lr 
which then simplifies to 
(7.5) 
Equation 7.5 can be rewritten as 
C1(m+Lx,Lc,e) _ C3(m+Lx,e) 
(7.6) C2(Lx,Lc,e) C4(Lx,e) 
where C1, C2, C3 and C4 are the correlation-integral estimators of the joint probabilities 
which are discussed in detail in Hiemstra and Jones (I 994). The basic idea of the test is 
that if Equation 7.6 holds, that is, the left hand side is equal to the right hand side, one 
residual series has predictive power over the other. 
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The test statistic and test is: for given values m, Lx, Le:?: I and fore > 0 under the 
assumption that {X1} and {C1} are strictly stationary and weakly dependent, if {C1} does 
not strictly Granger cause {X,} then, 
(7.7) r[CJm+Lx,Le,e,n) C3 (m+Lx,e,n)] N{O '( L L )) 
-v n ( ) ( ) -+ \ , u m, x, c, e C, Lx,Lc,e,n C4 Lx,e,n 
where u'(m,Lx,Le,e) is an estimator discussed in detail in Hiemstra and Jones (1994) 
and -7 means has an asymptotically normal distribution. 
The point of the test is that after removing the linear predictive power with a linear V AR 
model (as was done in Chapter 7), any remaining incremental predictive power of one 
residual series over another can be considered nonlinear predictive power (Baek and 
Brock, 1992; Hiemstra and Jones, 1994). One problem is that the direction of causality 
is undeterminable. 
Consistent with other instances of using the nonlinear Granger causality test of Baek and 
Brock, only the case where m = I (m is the lead Jag length) and Lx =Le (Jag lengths of 
{X,} and {C1} are equal) is considered. The tests are carried out for different values of e 
as the choice tends to be arbitrary. 
Results 
The results for Japan and China are presented in Table 7B.l. The results for the United 
States and China, as well as for Japan and the United States are presented in Table 7B.2 
and 7B.3, respectively. 
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Table 7B.l Nonlinear causality between net cooperation and trade for China 
and Japan 
a. Net cooperation from China to 
Japan causes trade from China to 
Japan 
e ~ 1.46 
Lx~Lc CS !-value 
1 0.48 0515 
2 0.3 0.22 
3 0.95 0.506 
4 0.255 -1.98 ** 
5 0.19 0.63 
6 0.174 0.481 
7 0.19 0.497 
8 0.22 0.474 
9 0.248 0.485 
10 0.166 0.245 
11 0.168 0.225 
12 0.496 0.441 
13 0.1402 1.57 * 
14 0.1079 0.731 
15 0.2523 4.581 *** 
16 0.25 3.767 *** 
c. Net cooperation from Japan to 
China causes trade from China to 
Japan 
e ~ 1.25 
Lx ~Ly CS t-value 
1 0.134 0.961 
2 0.28 0.155 
3 0.12 0.55 
4 0.291 -1.166 
5 0.324 -1.47 * 
6 0564 -1.447 * 
7 0.897 -1.858 ** 
8 0.1015 - !.348 * 
9 0.534 0.451 
10 0.1196 0.659 
b. Trade from Japan to China causes net 
cooperation from China to Japan 
e ~ 1.25 
Lx ~Le CS t-value 
1 0.65 0.851 
2 0.24 0.168 
3 0.6 0.298 
4 0.117 0.431 
5 0.192 0.591 
6 0.401 1.18 
7 0.649 1.332 * 
8 0.868 1.485 * 
9 0.888 1.21 
10 0.543 0.52 
11 0.1361 1.582 * 
12 0.1642 4.77 *** 
13 0.1769 4.667 *** 
14 0.1759 4.143 *** 
15 0.1792 3.854 *** 
16 0.1856 3.812 *** 
17 0.1898 3.501 *** 
d. Trade from China to Japan causes 
net cooperation from Japan to China 
e ~ 0.96 
Lx ~ Ly CS t-value 
1 0.158 -1.404 * 
2 0.73 0.352 
3 0.403 -1.428 * 
4 0.633 -1.412 * 
5 0.666 0.896 
6 0.2428 -2.264 ** 
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e. Trade from Japan to China causes net f net cooperation from Japan to China 
cooperation from Japan to China causes trade from Japan to China 
e ~ 1.42 e ~ 1.25 
Lx ~Le CS !-value Lx ~Le CS !-value 
1 0.3 0.341 1 0.1 0.81 
2 0.57 0.373 2 0.335 1.661 ** 
3 0.48 0.296 3 0.306 1.382 * 
4 0.111 0.648 4 0.123 0.438 
5 0.4 0.165 5 0.371 1.84 ** 
6 0.105 0.371 6 0.657 1.584 * 
7 0.348 -1.69 ** 7 0.669 1.344 * 
8 0.389 -1.35 * 8 0.1241 2.151 ** 
9 0.479 -1 9 0.2005 3.297 *** 
10 0.1085 -1.597 * 10 0.2159 2.997 *** 
]] 0.1806 -1.831 ** ]] 0.1965 2.326 ** 
12 0.2133 -1.684 ** 12 0.1376 0.994 
13 0.1821 -1.542 * 
* indicates 10 per cent level of significance, **indicates 5 per cent level of significance and *** indicates 
1 per cent significance. 
Notes: Lx~Lc are the Jag lengths. CS is the difference between the left hand side and the right hand side in 
Equation 7 .6. The !-ratios are asymptotically standard normal. The bandwidth values, e, were chosen 
where the most causality was found. 
Panels (d) and (e) are consistent with the linear causality tests in the cases of trade from 
Japan to China and in general causing change in the net cooperation index from Japan to 
China (from the linear results it is safe to assume that the sign is mostly negative even 
though nonlinear overall, and that the trade causes cooperation to increase) and in the 
case of trade from China to Japan causing net cooperation to decrease from Japan to 
China. The other results are additional evidence of the relationship between trade and 
net cooperation. Although we cannot tell the signs of the causality relationships, the 
linear causality results are consistent with what we would expect and there is no reason 
to expect unusual results here. It is tempting to interpret the results in panel (c) as net 
cooperation causing trade but the interpretation is that the net cooperation index, 
positive or negative, has a causal relationship with the trade variable of unknown sign. It 
would make sense to interpret this as a rise in net cooperation increases trade or a fall in 
net cooperation reduces trade- the other way around does not make sense as there is no 
realist theory that states that an increase in conflict, or a reduction in cooperation, causes 
trade. 
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The cases for which there was no causality present were trade from China to Japan 
causing net cooperation to change from China to Japan, a change in net cooperation 
from China towards Japan having an effect on trade from Japan to China and net 
cooperation from Japan to China causing a change in trade from Japan to China. 
The China-United States relationship as shown in Table 7B.2 has many more Jag 
structures statistically significant and the causal relationship appears to be more robust. 
Again, the Jag lengths differ between country pairs. 
Table 7B.2 Nonlinear results for China-US 
a. Trade from China to US causes net b. Trade from China to US causes net 
conflict from China towards US conflict from US to China 
e ~ 1.46 e ~ 1.25 
Lx ~Le CS !-value Lx=Lc CS !-value 
I 0.19 0.237 I 0.26 0.276 
2 0.122 0.797 2 0.45 0.309 
3 0.322 -1.575 * 3 0.99 0.44 
4 0.249 -1.169 4 0.391 -1.653 ** 
5 0.273 -1.77 ** 5 0.655 -2.51 *** 
6 0.201 0.722 6 0.794 -2.351 *** 
7 0.214 0.706 7 0.1041 -2.82 *** 
8 0.5 0.16 8 0.399 0.599 
9 0.153 0.344 9 0.206 0.333 
10 0.2 0.6 10 0.748 0.978 
]] 0.192 0.601 11 0.1167 -1.65 ** 
12 0.617 3.16 *** 12 0.38 0.37 
13 0.634 2.98 *** 13 0.101 3.308 *** 
14 0.622 2.853 *** 14 0.978 3.219 *** 
15 0.624 2.814 *** 15 0.102 3.23 *** 
16 0.625 2.786 *** 16 0.1042 3.156 *** 
17 0.65 2.791 *** 17 0.1047 3.39 *** 
18 0.661 2.833 *** 18 0.1011 2.891 *** 
19 0.659 2.868 *** 19 0.1 3.6 *** 
20 0.654 2.858 *** 20 0.1014 2.97 *** 
* indicates 10 per cent level of significance, ** indicates 5 per cent level of significance and*** indicates 
1 per cent significance. 
Notes: Lx=Lc are the Jag lengths. CS is the difference between the left hand side and the right hand side in 
Equation 7.6. The !-ratios are asymptotically standard normal. The bandwidth values, e, were chosen 
where the most causality was found. 
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c. Net conflict from US to Chin causes d. Trade from US to China causes net 
trade rrom US to China conflict from China to US 
e ~ 1.46 
e~ 1.125 
Lx ~Le CS t-value Lx ~Le CS t-value 
I 0.83 0.798 I 0.53 0.481 
2 0.235 1.603 * 2 0.244 1.315 * 
3 0.152 1.67 ** 3 0.322 1.82 ** 
4 0.275 1.809 ** 4 0.325 0.836 
5 0.325 1.714 ** 5 0.849 2.132 ** 
6 0.435 2.85 *** 6 0.74 1.586 * 
7 0.38 1.829 ** 7 0.579 0.941 
8 0.606 2.428 *** 8 0.815 1.498 * 
9 0.799 2.952 *** 9 0.1177 2.527 *** 
10 0.1071 3.345 *** 10 0.1384 3.106 *** 
I! 0.1153 3.186 *** 11 0.1522 3.87 *** 
12 0.945 3.884 *** 12 0.1439 3.634 *** 
13 0.954 3.303 *** 13 0.1361 3.401 *** 
14 0.732 2.906 *** 14 0.1259 3.192 *** 
15 0.534 2.311 ** 15 0.1298 3.97 *** 
16 0.501 2.51 *** 16 0.1312 3.29 *** 
17 0.366 1.87 ** 17 0.1263 2.906 *** 
18 0.335 1.728 ** 18 0.1313 2.885 *** 
19 0.36 1.684 ** 19 0.1362 2.901 *** 
20 0.265 1.316 * 20 0.1424 2.867 *** 
e. Trade from US to China causes net 
conflict rrom US to China 
e ~ 1.5 
Lx ~Le CS t-value 
I 0.85 1.475 * 
2 0.144 1.779 ** 
3 0.195 1.794 ** 
4 0.285 2.91 *** 
5 0.306 1.879 ** 
6 0.264 1.429 * 
7 0.363 1.883 ** 
8 0.469 2.278 ** 
9 0.411 1.657 ** 
10 0.47 1.973 ** 
I! 0.445 1.796 ** 
12 0.398 1.935 ** 
13 0.462 2.744 *** 
14 0.48 3.31 *** 
15 0.471 2.879 *** 
16 0.444 2.762 *** 
17 0.433 2.688 *** 
18 0.379 2.457 *** 
19 0.36 2.333 *** 
20 0.393 2.441 *** 
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Table 7B.3 Nonlinear results for Japan-US 
a. Net conflict from US to Japan 
causes trade rrom Japan to US 
e ~ 1.5 
Lx ~Le CS !-value 
I 0.9 0.162 
2 0.109 -1.77 ** 
3 0.74 0.503 
4 0.97 0.571 
5 0.32 -1.266 
6 0.65 0.212 
7 0.309 0.797 
8 0.106 0.198 
9 0.139 0.24 
10 0.45 0.71 
!I 0.185 0.284 
12 0.486 0.724 
13 0.67 1.24 
14 0.!063 1.592* 
15 0.1016 1.231 
16 0.1317 1.697 ** 
17 0.1321 1.545 * 
!8 0.1378 1.45 * 
19 0.156 1.434 * 
20 0.1286 1.39 * 
c. Trade rrom Japan to US causes net 
conflict from US to Japan 
e ~ 1.5 
Lx ~Le CS t-value 
I 0.83 1.29 * 
2 0.198 1.675 ** 
3 0.105 0.702 
4 0.147 0.804 
5 0.206 0.889 
6 0.378 1.233 
7 0.352 0.955 
8 0.596 1.559 * 
9 0.463 0.953 
10 0.711 1.416 * 
11 0.1106 1.976 ** 
12 0.975 1.622 * 
13 0.1055 1.6 I 4 * 
14 0.714 0.854 
15 0.1128 I .402 * 
b. Trade fi·om Japan to US causes net 
conflict rrom Japan to us 
e ~ 1.46 
Lx ~Le CS !-value 
I 0.12 0.175 
2 0.58 0.545 
3 0.152 0.907 
4 0.386 1.818 ** 
5 0.238 0.852 
6 0.276 0.817 
7 0.1 I 0.294 
8 0.339 0.684 
9 0.475 0.85 
10 0.!03! 1.549 * 
ll 0.1428 2.55 *** 
12 0.1263 1.434 * 
13 0.1495 1.74 ** 
14 0.1544 1.42 * 
!5 0.1112 0.82 
16 0.2449 3.369 *** 
17 0.2 2.927 *** 
!8 0.2459 2.921 *** 
19 0.2128 2.88 *** 
d. Net conflict rrom US to Japan 
causes trade rrom US to Japan 
e ~ 1.25 
Lx~ Le CS t-value 
I 0.23 0.3 
2 0.38 0.308 
3 0.19 0.87 
4 0.21 0.67 
5 0.316 0.697 
6 0.901 -1.346 * 
7 0.507 0.561 
8 0.2 0.2 
9 0.1447 1.357 * 
10 0.2646 6.857 *** 
I I 0.255 5.872 *** 
12 0.2435 5.126 *** 
!3 0.2333 4.606 *** 
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e. Trade from US to Japan causes net 
conflict from US to Japan 
e ~ 1.38 
Lx ~Le CS !-value 
I 0.114 1.81 ** 
2 0.192 1.286 * 
3 0.367 2.68 *** 
4 0.337 1.529 * 
5 0.516 1.884 ** 
6 0.244 0.702 
*indicates 10 per cent level of significance,** indicates 5 per cent 1eve1 of significance and*** indicates 
1 per cent significance. 
Notes: Lx~Lc are the Jag lengths. CS is the difference between the left hand side and the right hand side in 
Equation 7.6. The !-ratios are asymptotically standard normal. The bandwidth values, e, were chosen 
where the most causality was found. 
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